Merge the two cherry-picked reap call sites into one unscoped sweep at
the top of _run_stdio (the unscoped sweep is a superset of the
per-server one), and run it via asyncio.to_thread so the 2s
SIGTERM->SIGKILL escalation cannot stall the shared MCP event loop.
When an MCP stdio subprocess fails to connect (token expiry, port
contention, timeout), the run() reconnect loop retries with backoff.
Each retry calls _run_stdio() which spawns a new process pair, but the
previous failed pair was only detected as orphaned (added to
_orphan_stdio_pids) — never actually killed. This caused rapid zombie
accumulation: 5 failed attempts × 2 procs each = 10 orphans competing
for the same port.
Add a _kill_orphaned_mcp_children() call at the top of _run_stdio(),
before the _snapshot_child_pids() baseline, so any orphans from prior
failed attempts are reaped before a new subprocess is spawned.
Fixes#57355
_run_approval_gate's gateway branch only queued via submit_pending, so
plugin-escalated approvals never sent the interactive embed+buttons on
Discord/Telegram/Slack (#59413) - the user was never notified and the
action stayed silently blocked. Mirror check_dangerous_command's path:
when a session notify callback is registered, run the blocking
_await_gateway_decision round-trip (redacted payload, once/session/
always persistence, deny/timeout produce definitive BLOCKED outcomes);
fall back to submit_pending only when no callback exists.
Fixes#59413.
* feat(trace): upload sessions to HF Agent Trace Viewer
Salvage trace upload as a smaller CLI-first feature: deterministic Claude Code JSONL export, fail-closed redaction, lazy Hugging Face dependency, and no gateway slash-command wiring.
* chore(trace): drop external porting references from docstrings
Describe the trace-upload design in Hermes' own terms.
* feat(sessions): fold trace upload into 'sessions export --format trace'
Integrates the HF Agent Trace Viewer exporter (PR #36145) onto the
unified export surface instead of a separate 'hermes trace' subcommand:
- --format trace: Claude Code JSONL to stdout/file, or one
<id>.trace.jsonl per session for filtered bulk export; defaults to
the most recent session when no --session-id/filters given.
- --upload pushes to the user's private HF traces dataset (--public to
opt out of private); reads HF_TOKEN with guided setup when missing.
- traces are secret-redacted by default (force mode); --no-redact opts
out after review; redaction failure blocks export (fail closed).
- hermes_cli/trace.py + subcommands/trace.py removed; agent/trace_upload.py
is the single engine. Docs EN + zh-Hans; 4 new CLI tests.
BaseEnvironment writes shell snapshots and cwd metadata through the process
umask. With a common 022 umask, snapshot files containing exported environment
state landed at mode 0644 even though they can include env-carried credentials
from the parent process.
Set umask 077 only around Hermes metadata writes: the initial snapshot
bootstrap and the post-command snapshot/cwd refresh. User commands still run
under the caller's original umask, while Hermes-owned snapshot and cwd files
are created owner-only.
This intentionally does not copy the source PR's global orphan sweep; deleting
all matching /tmp snapshot files could interfere with concurrent Hermes
processes. The security-critical local disclosure fix is the file mode clamp.
This is salvageable because the source report still identifies a concrete
credential-disclosure path, but the safe subset is smaller than the original
proposal: clamp only the Hermes-owned snapshot writes and leave process-wide
cleanup, user command umask, and concurrent sessions alone.
Salvages source PR: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/20056
Related issue: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/48441
Co-authored-by: Andrew Homeyer <andrew@hndl.app>
Same bug class as skills_tool: module-level SKILLS_DIR pinned at import
under the launch HERMES_HOME makes skill_manage() write/edit against the
wrong profile in long-lived multi-profile runtimes. Apply the same
_skills_dir() call-time resolution (honoring explicit test patches of
SKILLS_DIR) to _containing_skills_root, _resolve_skill_dir,
_find_skill_in_other_profiles, and create-result path reporting.
Refs #40677
Port from anomalyco/opencode#31877: JSON Schema type arrays like
["number","string"] (common in MCP tool schemas) were collapsed to the
first non-null type, silently dropping every other branch. Several
tool-call backends reject the array form outright — llama.cpp's grammar
generator and Gemini via OpenAI-compatible transports (e.g. GitHub
Copilot proxying to Gemini) 400 on it.
_sanitize_node now mirrors @ai-sdk/google: a single non-null type stays
type:X (+nullable if null was present), multiple non-null types become
an anyOf of single-type schemas so no branch is lost, and an all-null
array becomes type:null. Single-null collapse is unchanged.
Verified nested (object props, array items) survive the full sanitize
pipeline — combinator stripping is top-level-only and nullable-union
collapse only fires on single-survivor unions, so multi-type anyOf is
left intact.
Port from openclaw/openclaw#91950: normalize LLM-generated URLs like 'https:// docs.example' before web tool safety checks while preserving path and query encoding semantics.
Port from nearai/ironclaw#4547: treat a JSON null memory target as omitted so strict providers that fill optional fields with null use the documented default target instead of failing validation.
A user-approved terminal/execute_code command could be SIGINT-killed
(exit 130 + "[Command interrupted]") by a stale interrupt bit that landed
on the execution thread during the blocking approval-wait, while the
result still carried the "...approved by the user." note. The terminal
tool runs sequentially inline on the execution thread, and nothing
cleared or re-checked the bit between approval-grant and env.execute.
Clear the current thread's interrupt bit once before an approved command
spawns its child (terminal foreground; execute_code local + remote), and
enrich the note to "...approved by the user, then interrupted." on a
genuine post-start interrupt instead of implying success. A genuine
interrupt arriving after execution starts (or during a retry backoff)
still SIGINTs the command; non-approved commands keep current behavior.
Adds regression tests covering stale-bit-clears, genuine-interrupt-still-
kills, the retry-backoff window, natural-exit-130 (not mislabeled), and
execute_code local + remote.
When a bundled web provider (firecrawl, tavily, exa, ...) is listed in
plugins.disabled, its provider never registers and the web_search/
web_extract dispatchers emitted the misleading "No web extract provider
configured. Set web.extract_backend to ..." — even though the backend was
configured correctly. The real fix is to re-enable the plugin.
- web_tools.py + web_search_registry.py: when the configured backend names
a disabled bundled web plugin, both dispatchers now point the user at the
actual cause (re-enable the plugin) instead of a wrong config hint.
- plugins_cmd.py cmd_enable: enabling by canonical key now also clears the
manifest-name alias (web-firecrawl) from plugins.disabled, so the
suggested command actually re-enables the plugin ('explicit disable wins'
matches on the name too).
- plugins_cmd.py cmd_toggle / _run_composite_ui / _run_composite_fallback:
the interactive 'hermes plugins' menu now persists the canonical key
(web/firecrawl), never the bare manifest name — the drift that put the
offending entry in plugins.disabled in the first place.
Follow-up to #59518 (which fixed web credential resolution, a different
cause). Fixes the disabled-plugin symptom reported after that PR.
The Firecrawl provider used os.getenv() to read FIRECRAWL_API_KEY and
FIRECRAWL_API_URL, which only checks the process environment. When
values are supplied through Hermes's ~/.hermes/.env config mechanism
(via hermes_cli.config.get_env_value), they are not guaranteed to be
present in os.environ for every gateway/tool execution path.
Switch to get_env_value() which checks both os.environ and the .env
file, matching the pattern used by other providers (nous_subscription,
setup, discord adapter).
Fixes#40190
_sync_back_once defers a SIGINT that lands mid-sync, then re-delivers it once the
sync completes so the user's Ctrl+C isn't lost. It did so with
os.kill(os.getpid(), signal.SIGINT). That is not graceful on Windows: os.kill
only treats CTRL_C_EVENT(0)/CTRL_BREAK_EVENT(1) as console events; any other
value (SIGINT == 2) routes to TerminateProcess(sig), so a Ctrl+C during a
remote-backend (ssh/daytona/modal) sync-back hard-kills the whole CLI session
(exit code 2) on Windows instead of raising KeyboardInterrupt.
Use signal.raise_signal(signal.SIGINT) (3.8+), which invokes the restored
handler through C raise() on every platform. Verified on Windows: raise_signal
runs the handler (graceful) while os.kill(getpid, SIGINT) TerminateProcess-es
the process. Adds a cross-platform regression test that runs on Windows too (it
stubs the locked sync body, so unlike test_file_sync_back.py it needs no fcntl).
The Skills Hub 'Browse Hub' landing page and index-backed search render
empty on fresh deployments (e.g. Fly.io VPS agents) with no stale cache.
Root cause: the centralized index at /docs/api/skills-index.json is a
large body (~34MB, tens of MB compressed) served with Content-Encoding:
br. httpx's streaming Brotli decoder — backed by brotlicffi 1.2.0.1,
which is pinned so aiohttp can decode Discord attachments — trips over
its own output_buffer_limit on a payload this size and raises:
DecodingError("brotli: decoder process called with data when
'can_accept_more_data()' is False")
_load_hermes_index() catches that (DecodingError is an httpx.HTTPError
subclass) and silently falls back to the on-disk cache. On a fresh box
that cache never existed, so HermesIndexSource.is_available is False,
the index contributes 0 skills, and the hub landing page — which is
built solely from an empty-query index search — is blank. Existing
installs only appear to work because they serve a (possibly weeks-)stale
cached index instead.
Fix: request 'gzip, deflate' on the index fetch so httpx never
negotiates the broken Brotli path, and retry once with 'identity' if a
DecodingError still occurs (defends against a proxy that ignores the
header). Falls through to the stale cache only when both attempts fail.
Verified on a live staging VPS agent: index_available flips False->True
and the featured landing list repopulates from 0 to 12.
Also un-freezes already-deployed images: skills added after an image was
built (e.g. the 'unbroker' optional skill) become reachable again via
the index, which is the whole point of the centralized catalog.
register_mcp_servers now nudges cached entries whose session is None
via _signal_reconnect, so a new agent session recovers a parked server
immediately instead of waiting up to _PARKED_RETRY_INTERVAL for the
next self-probe (#50170). Gate-check idea credit: @izumi0uu (#50184),
@LeonSGP43 (#37772), @Tranquil-Flow (#37899).
_wait_for_server_session_ready used a time.monotonic deadline; the
circuit-breaker tests freeze monotonic, turning the loop into an
infinite spin (300s SIGKILL in CI-parity runs). Bound by iteration
count instead.
Four independent pre-request stalls sat on the critical path between
prompt submission and the first streamed token, measured with cProfile
against a live process:
1. Discord capability detection (~2.0s, worst 5s): get_tool_definitions
-> _get_dynamic_schema made a BLOCKING https call to discord.com
inside AIAgent.__init__ for any user with DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN set, on
every platform, every cold process. Now non-blocking: memory cache ->
24h disk cache -> permissive default + one background detection that
seeds the disk cache for the next process. The permissive default is
pinned per-process so tool schemas never flip mid-conversation
(prompt-cache safety); it mirrors the existing detection-failure
fallback (all actions exposed, 403s enriched at call time).
2. Ollama /api/show probe (~0.3s): get_model_context_length step 5e
POSTed to <base_url>/api/show for KNOWN providers (openrouter etc.),
got a 404, and never cached the miss - so every fresh process paid a
full HTTP round-trip. Known non-Ollama providers now skip the probe;
local/custom/unknown endpoints keep the exact previous behavior.
3. env_probe subprocess sweep (~0.5s): the Python-toolchain probe ran
4-8 subprocess calls inside the FIRST system prompt build. Now warmed
off-thread during agent init; the prompt build hits the cache (same
lock, so a mid-flight warm just joins instead of recomputing).
4. tools.mcp_tool import (~0.4s): the between-turns MCP refresh in
build_turn_context imported the whole mcp package even with zero MCP
servers configured. MCP tools can only exist if tools.mcp_tool was
already imported (discovery/reload paths), so gate the import on
sys.modules membership - no behavior change for MCP users.
CLI additionally pre-imports run_agent + openai off-thread during the
idle banner window (same pattern as the /model picker prewarm), hiding
the remaining ~1.5s of module imports while the user types. Fixes 1-4
apply to every interaction layer (CLI, gateway, TUI, desktop, cron).
Measured cold first turn (submit -> request dispatched, openrouter,
discord token set): 4.3s before -> 0.9s after CLI prewarm (~80%); the
agent-side non-import cost drops 2.9s -> 0.36s (init) + 0.27s (turn
prologue).
Some MCP servers (e.g. Spring Boot apps with a React SPA) serve their
frontend on any unmatched GET route. The MCP endpoint works perfectly
via POST (JSON-RPC), but a GET to /mcp falls through to the SPA
controller and returns text/html. Hermes's preflight content-type probe
sees HTML instead of application/json or text/event-stream and refuses
to connect.
This adds a per-server config option that
bypasses the content-type probe, letting the SDK connect directly via
POST where it works fine.
```yaml
mcp_servers:
stirling-pdf:
url: http://localhost:8090/mcp
headers:
X-API-KEY: <key>
skip_preflight: true
```
Related: #52460 (OAuth redirect preflight), #51600 (skip probe on mcp add),
#40366 (skip probe on reconnect — already merged).
Some MCP servers (e.g. DocuSeal) serve their web UI on HEAD/GET but
speak Streamable HTTP only via POST. The preflight probe now tries a
lightweight JSON-RPC `initialize` POST before rejecting endpoints
whose HEAD/GET returns a non-MCP content type (e.g. `text/html`).
If the POST returns `application/json` or `text/event-stream` with a
2xx status, the endpoint is accepted. Otherwise the original rejection
behaviour is preserved.
Adds 5 new test cases covering the POST probe path:
- POST rescues HTML HEAD with JSON response
- POST rescues HTML HEAD with event-stream response
- POST still rejects when it also returns HTML
- POST still rejects on non-2xx status
- POST not attempted when HEAD already returns valid MCP content type
Parking deregisters the server's tools, which removes the only paths
that could ever set _reconnect_event (circuit-breaker half-open probe
and _signal_reconnect both live inside registered tool handlers). A
parked server was therefore unrevivable short of a manual /mcp reload —
the park comment's promised breaker wake could never fire.
Make the parked wait a timed wait: every _PARKED_RETRY_INTERVAL (300s)
the run task wakes and attempts one revival probe, re-parking on
failure instead of burning the full 5-retry budget each cycle. Explicit
reconnect requests still wake it immediately. Idea credit: @Hellbayne
(PR #38881, earliest never-abandon proposal), reconciled with the
park design from #53599.
_discover_tools only filled self._tools; registry registration happened
only in _discover_and_register_server (initial start) and _refresh_tools.
After parking deregistered a server's tools, a revival rebuilt the
transport but published zero tools — a phantom recovery.
Register freshly discovered tools whenever _ready is set and the
registry entry list is empty. Extracted from PR #54139 by @nicha16
(the remainder of that PR reverses the park design and is not taken).
The local retries variable in MCPServerTask.run() accumulated across
transient disconnections — each transport exception incremented it, but
only clean transport returns (auth recovery / manual refresh) or
park-wake reset it. Five transient blips over a long-uptime gateway
would permanently park the MCP server.
Promote retries to instance attribute _reconnect_retries and reset it
at all 4 session-establishment sites in _run_stdio / _run_http, so only
consecutive failures without successful reconnection count toward the
parking budget.
Fixes#57604
Adds approvals.deny to config.yaml — a list of fnmatch globs matched
against terminal commands. A match blocks unconditionally, BEFORE the
--yolo / /yolo / approvals.mode=off bypass, making it the user-editable
counterpart to the code-shipped hardline blocklist.
- Checked in both command gates (check_dangerous_command and
check_all_command_guards), after the hardline floor and sudo-stdin
guard, before the yolo bypass and permanent allowlist.
- Matching runs over the same normalized/deobfuscated command variants
as the dangerous-pattern detector, case-insensitive.
- Opt-in: empty/absent list is a no-op; behavior unchanged.
Supersedes the trust-engine approach from #21500 with a minimal
config-native design: the only capability the existing stack lacked
was deny-that-beats-yolo. Allow already exists (command_allowlist),
ask already exists (session approvals).
PR #58889 fixed the CLI-fallback transport; review of that fix found the
same leak class at four sibling spawn sites of the third-party cua-driver
binary:
- _resolve_mcp_invocation (cua-driver manifest): no env= at all — full
parent environment inherited
- cua_driver_update_check (check-update --json): telemetry env but no
secret sanitization
- doctor._drive_health_report (<binary> mcp Popen): telemetry env only
- permissions._run (every macOS/Linux permission probe): telemetry env only
All now route through _sanitize_subprocess_env(cua_driver_child_env()),
matching the sanctioned MCP spawn and the #53503/#55709/#58889 strip-by-
default policy for non-terminal spawns. Sanitization degrades gracefully
(falls back to the telemetry env) so doctor/permission probes never break
on an import error.
4 regression tests covering each site.
When a single line exceeds the entire char budget, its tail is
unreachable via offset pagination (offsets are line-granular). Tell
the model so it doesn't assume it saw the full line.
read_file previously hard-rejected any read whose formatted output exceeded
the ~100K char safety limit, returning an error with zero content. A file
with few but very long lines (logs, wide CSV rows, minified data) sails past
the line-count limit and then trips the char guard, so the model gets nothing
and must guess a smaller limit — wasting a full round-trip.
Now the read is trimmed to the last complete line that fits the budget and
returns the partial content plus truncated_by="bytes" and a next_offset, so
the model paginates forward instead of starting over. A single line larger
than the whole budget is clamped on a code-point boundary (never empty) and
the cursor still advances. Applies at both read paths (normal + extracted
documents).
Adapted from IronClaw's Rust dual line/byte cap to hermes's Python tool-layer
char guard, which is the single uniform chokepoint over the gutter-rendered
content for every backend.
Follow-up to the salvaged toggle commit:
- file_tools.py / code_execution_tool.py: carry docker_network in their
container_config dicts so those environment-creation paths honor the
lockdown instead of silently defaulting back to bridge (the probe/exec
asymmetry class reported on #46358).
- docker.py: cross-process reuse now inspects HostConfig.NetworkMode when
docker_network=false and removes a mismatched (networked) container
before starting a fresh air-gapped one. Fails closed when inspect fails.
Default-network config never churns containers, so operators using
docker_extra_args --network=none are unaffected.
- tests: AST invariant that every container_config site carrying
docker_run_as_host_user also carries docker_network, plus three reuse
guard tests (reject bridge under lockdown / keep matching none /
no inspect when network enabled).
- docs: configuration.md gains terminal.docker_network + env var row.
Port from qwibitai/nanoclaw#2713: expose Hermes' existing Docker network isolation primitive through terminal config so operators can opt out of container egress.
_CuaDriverSession._call_tool_via_cli() (the EAGAIN/silent-empty MCP
fallback transport) invokes `cua-driver call <tool> <json>` via
subprocess.run() with no env= argument, so the third-party cua-driver
binary inherits the full, unsanitized parent environment. The primary
MCP spawn site (_lifecycle_coro) already applies
_sanitize_subprocess_env(cua_driver_child_env()) before opening the
stdio client, per the same policy #53503/#55709 established for other
subprocess spawn points — this fallback path, added alongside the
EAGAIN/silent-empty-capture hardening, missed it.
Fix: apply the same env=_sanitize_subprocess_env(cua_driver_child_env())
to the subprocess.run() call in _call_tool_via_cli(), mirroring the
sanctioned spawn site exactly (telemetry policy applied first, then
Hermes-managed secrets filtered).
Port from openai/codex#21069 ("Spill large hook outputs from context").
Both shell hooks and Python plugins can return {"context": "..."} from
pre_llm_call, which gets appended to the current turn's user message on
every subsequent API call. A plugin that emits a large blob inflates
every turn and blows out the prompt cache prefix.
- tools/hook_output_spill.py: shared helper that writes oversized
context to $HERMES_HOME/hook_outputs/<session_id>/<uuid>.txt and
returns a head/tail preview plus the saved path. Never raises.
- agent/turn_context.py: apply the cap at the pre_llm_call aggregation
site (moved here from run_agent.py since the original PR), covering
both Python plugins and shell hooks.
- agent/shell_hooks.py: reserve output_spill as a sub-key under hooks:
so the config block doesn't emit unknown-hook-event warnings.
- Docs: document the cap + config in build-a-hermes-plugin.md.
Config (behaviour-preserving when absent):
hooks.output_spill: enabled/max_chars/preview_head/preview_tail/directory
Tests: 14 unit tests; shell_hooks (56) and plugins (100) suites green.
E2E validated with isolated HERMES_HOME (spill, passthrough, traversal
sanitisation, reserved-key skip).
ruff check --fix --select F541 . on current main. Pure prefix removals;
adjacent-string concatenations keep the f only on interpolating fragments.
No string content or live placeholder altered.
Port from anomalyco/opencode#33533. Native MCP tools now register as
mcp__<server>__<tool> (double-underscore delimiter) instead of
mcp_<server>_<tool>, aligning with the convention used by Claude Code,
Codex, and OpenCode.
The double-underscore delimiter disambiguates the server/tool boundary
even when either component contains underscores (the single-underscore
form was ambiguous, which is why is_mcp_tool_parallel_safe already had to
track provenance in a side-map). It also unifies native registration with
the Anthropic-OAuth wire form (_MCP_TOOL_PREFIX = 'mcp__'), so the
single->double promotion that path performed is now a no-op for native
tools while still handling legacy replayed names.
- tools/mcp_tool.py: add MCP_TOOL_NAME_PREFIX + mcp_prefixed_tool_name()
helper; route _convert_mcp_schema, utility schemas, refresh stale-set,
and the parallel-safe prefix gate through it
- agent/transports/codex_event_projector.py: mirror convention in the
deterministic call_id input for MCP server-executed tool calls
- tests: update produced-name assertions to the new convention
The SOM/AX element list dropped labels for two extremely common cua-driver
render forms, leaving the model unable to target elements by name:
- [79] AXButton (Dark) -> parenthesised label
- [4] AXStaticText = "Wi-Fi" -> = "value" form
- [92] AXPopUpButton = "Automatic" -> = "value" form
The old regex only matched quoted "label" and id=Label, so System Settings
buttons/text/popups all surfaced with empty labels. That's why selecting the
macOS Appearance 'Dark' button by element index required guessing — the
labels weren't available to aim with.
Fix: extend _ELEMENT_LINE_RE to capture all four label forms (= "value",
"quoted", (parenthesised), id=Label), skipping a pure-digit (N) order number
in favour of the id= label. Verified live against System Settings: the
Appearance buttons now surface as Auto/Light/Dark.
Adds a regression test covering all label forms. Full suite: 84 passed.
The first fix handled the EAGAIN McpError path. But the persistent MCP
session (long-running gateway/desktop worker) has a second failure mode:
list_windows or get_window_state 'succeed' over MCP yet return a
degenerate/empty payload (no windows, or no screenshot + blank tree)
WITHOUT raising — typically when the bridge reconnected mid-call and
dropped the heavy response. That surfaced to the model as a silent 0x0
capture with no error and no fallback firing (0.00s empty return).
Fix: detect empty results in capture() and re-fetch over the CLI
transport before giving up:
- empty list_windows -> CLI re-fetch the window list
- empty get_window_state (som/ax) -> CLI re-fetch the AX tree + screenshot
- empty screenshot (vision) -> CLI re-fetch get_window_state for the PNG
Adds 2 regression tests. Full suite: 83 passed.
The cua-driver MCP stdio bridge intermittently (and on some machines
persistently) fails to forward heavier calls like get_window_state to
the daemon with POSIX EAGAIN — 'daemon transport error forwarding
get_window_state: Resource temporarily unavailable (os error 35)'.
The wrapper surfaced this as an empty 0x0 capture, so computer_use
returned blank screenshots even though the display, permissions, and
the daemon were all healthy (the direct 'cua-driver call' CLI path
worked fine throughout).
Fix: when the MCP path raises the transient/transport error, fall back
to the 'cua-driver call' subprocess transport, which talks to the
daemon over a different socket. The CLI fallback routes get_window_state
screenshots to a temp file via screenshot_out_file (tiny JSON response
instead of a multi-MB base64 blob that congests the socket), reads the
PNG back, retries with backoff, and remaps the JSON into the same
{data, images, structuredContent, isError} shape the MCP path produces
so capture()/_action() are transport-agnostic.
Adds _is_transient_daemon_error() classifier and 3 regression tests.
Verified live: captures that returned 0x0 now return full
1567x905 screenshots with the AX element tree.
The 'never reached ready' error (issue #57025) was undiagnosable — doctor
and MCP test pass while the wrapper times out, with no hint where startup
stalled. Track a phase marker through _lifecycle_coro (binary-check →
manifest-discovery → mcp-initialize → capability-discovery → ready) and
include it in the timeout RuntimeError plus a pointer to doctor and the
agent.log phase timings.
Complements the 15s→30s bump + success-path phase timing log from #58760.
On Windows, the cua-driver MCP session initialization can exceed the 15s
timeout due to manifest subprocess discovery + MCP transport setup.
This makes the computer_use tool permanently unavailable even though
hermes computer-use doctor and hermes mcp test both pass.
- Increase _ready_event.wait timeout from 15s to 30s
- Add startup timing instrumentation (manifest + mcp_init durations)
- Log timing at INFO level for diagnosability
Fixes#57025
Follow-up to #56236: the broadened root token /[/.]*\** treats any run of
dots after the root slash as a collapse spelling, so a literal root-level
directory named '...' (rm -rf /...) was unconditionally hardline-blocked
with no approval path. Tighten the token to /(?:(?:\.\.?)?/)*(?:\.\.?)?\**
so each inter-slash segment must be exactly '.' or '..' — all real collapse
spellings (//, /., /./, /.., //*, ///, /../..) stay on the hardline floor
while literal dot-run dirs fall through to the softer DANGEROUS_PATTERNS
rules like every other real path.
* feat(approvals): /deny <reason> relays denial reason to the agent
Port from qwibitai/nanoclaw#2832 (reject with reason).
Gateway /deny now accepts an optional trailing reason (/deny <reason>
or /deny all <reason>). The reason rides on the per-session approval
entry through resolve_gateway_approval -> _await_gateway_decision and is
appended to the BLOCKED tool result the agent receives, so a declined
agent can adapt instead of only hearing 'denied'.
Adapted to hermes-agent's synchronous single-command /deny model: no DB
state, no second-message capture step, no migration. Reason is capped at
280 chars and threaded through both the terminal-command guard and the
execute_code guard. Plain /deny and the approve paths are unchanged.
- tools/approval.py: _ApprovalEntry.reason; resolve_gateway_approval gains
optional reason; _await_gateway_decision returns it; both gateway BLOCKED
messages include it
- gateway/slash_commands.py: parse leading 'all' + trailing reason
- locales/en.yaml: deny.denied_reason_{singular,plural}
- hermes_cli/commands.py: /deny args_hint '[all] [reason]'
- tests: 3 new (with-reason, all+reason, plain-deny regression)
* fix(ci): localize deny-reason keys across all locales + update interrupt-path assertions
CI surfaced two enforced invariants broken by the deny-with-reason change:
- test_i18n catalog-parity requires every locale to carry the same keys as
en.yaml with matching placeholders. Added deny.denied_reason_singular/plural
(with {count}/{reason}) to all 15 non-English locales.
- test_approval_interrupt asserts the exact dict from _await_gateway_decision,
which now carries a 'reason' key (None on the interrupt/timeout paths).
Port from anomalyco/opencode#34529: MCP servers can emit
notifications/message logging notifications (RFC 5424 levels), but the
MCP SDK's default logging_callback silently discards them — server-side
warnings/errors during tool calls were invisible.
- tools/mcp_tool.py: pass a logging_callback to every ClientSession
(stdio, SSE, streamable HTTP old+new API paths via the shared
sampling_kwargs sites), mapping the 8 MCP log levels onto Python
logging levels and tagging entries with [server/logger] origin.
- JSON-serialize non-string payloads, cap at 2000 chars so a chatty
server can't flood agent.log, never raise from the handler.
- Gated on SDK support (_check_logging_callback_support) mirroring the
existing message_handler gate for old SDK versions.
- tests/tools/test_mcp_server_log_notifications.py: 10 tests covering
level mapping, origin tagging, JSON payloads, truncation, and the
never-raise contract.
video_analyze_tool's local-path branch read raw bytes via
_detect_video_mime_type (extension-only, no magic-byte check) with no
call to agent.file_safety.raise_if_read_blocked, unlike the image-gen
and video-gen provider plugins that already route local inputs through
that shared chokepoint (#57698). A model could point video_url at a
credential store (e.g. .env, auth.json) renamed or symlinked to a
video-like extension and have its raw bytes base64-encoded and sent to
the vision provider.
vision_analyze_tool and its native fast path (_vision_analyze_native)
had the same gap in their local-file branches; they were only
incidentally protected by the image magic-byte sniff rejecting
non-image content, not by the intended read guard.
Add raise_if_read_blocked() to all three local-file branches, mirroring
the existing plugins/image_gen and plugins/video_gen call sites.
Extend the pre_tool_call plugin hook return contract with a new directive:
{"action": "approve", "message": "why this needs human confirmation"}
Previously a pre_tool_call hook could only veto a tool call (action: block)
or allow it silently. It could not escalate to the existing human-approval
flow. This unlocks user-defined runtime approval rules on ANY tool (HTTP
writes, file writes to sensitive paths, email sends), enforced at runtime —
resolving #51221 as a pure plugin, with no core approval.py rule schema.
Mechanism:
- get_pre_tool_call_directive() returns (action, message) for block|approve;
get_pre_tool_call_block_message() kept as a block-only back-compat shim.
- resolve_pre_tool_block() is the single dispatch-site chokepoint: fetches
the directive and, for approve, invokes the human gate; fail-closed to a
block on denial, timeout, or gate exception. ALL FOUR tool-dispatch sites
now call it: tool_executor (concurrent + sequential), agent_runtime_helpers,
and model_tools.handle_function_call.
- request_tool_approval() escalates via the SAME machinery as Tier-2
dangerous commands: session/permanent allowlist, prompt_dangerous_approval
(CLI) / submit_pending (gateway), [o]nce/[s]ession/[a]lways/[d]eny,
timeout fail-closed, approvals.cron_mode for cron contexts.
Architecture: extracted the shared decision core into _run_approval_gate(),
called by BOTH check_dangerous_command() and request_tool_approval() so the
fail-closed / cron / gateway / yolo / persist policy lives in ONE place and
cannot drift. Fixed a latent divergence — the plugin path now honors --yolo.
Approval grain: [a]lways is keyed on tool_name + a hash of the reason (an
explicit plugin rule_key overrides), so distinct reasons on the same tool
persist independently instead of one 'always' blanketing the whole tool.
Non-interactive: cron honors approvals.cron_mode (parity with commands); any
other non-interactive non-gateway context fails CLOSED for the plugin path
(the command path keeps its historical fail-open default, unchanged).
No new config schema, no new env vars, no new hook events.
The container exec-read piped the whole file through base64 with no size
guard — the 50MB cap was only enforced host-side AFTER the full payload
had already streamed into host memory. A prompt-injected read of a huge
container file (or /dev/zero) could balloon the gateway process.
head -c (cap+1) bounds the read inside the sandbox; the +1 byte lets the
host distinguish at-cap from over-cap and reject with SourceTooLarge.
Input redirect replaces 'base64 --' (no argv exposure at all for
leading-dash paths). Docker integration tests re-verified live.
The salvaged #52688 rasterizer shell-out predates the TUI subprocess
stdin= guard; a rasterizer that prompts on stdin could hang the tool
under prompt_toolkit. DEVNULL it.
- _normalize_to_supported_image: ensure cache/vision exists before writing
the converted PNG (fresh HERMES_HOME had no dir -> FileNotFoundError).
- resolver: SVG passes through as image/svg+xml instead of erroring; the
call sites rasterize to PNG via the salvaged normalize step (cairosvg /
svglib / rsvg-convert / inkscape, best-effort with actionable error).
- normalization offloaded via asyncio.to_thread at both call sites.
- tests: resolver pass-through + rasterization + no-converter error paths.
- AUTHOR_MAP: jonathan@mintrx.com -> JAlmanzarMint (PR #52688 salvage).
vision_analyze embedded SVG (and BMP/TIFF) tool-results into conversation
history with media_type image/svg+xml. Anthropic only accepts jpeg/png/
gif/webp, so the request fails with a non-retryable 400. Because the image
is baked into immutable history and re-sent every turn, the session is
permanently wedged on resume — retries re-send the same bad bytes.
Add _normalize_to_supported_image(): SVG is rasterized to PNG (best-effort
via cairosvg/svglib/rsvg-convert/inkscape), other non-supported raster
formats are re-encoded to PNG via Pillow, and if conversion is impossible
the tool returns an actionable error instead of a session-wedging payload.
Wired into both the native-vision fast path and the auxiliary-API path so
the whole bug class is covered, not just the one call site.
All 99 existing vision tests pass.
- resolve_image_source: bare cwd-relative filenames ('pic.png') resolve
again (main accepted them; the path-shape gate regressed them — review
by egilewski). Unknown explicit schemes (ftp://, s3://) still rejected.
- Local backend: nonexistent path now raises a clean 'image file not
found' instead of a misleading sandbox-fallback message.
- W4: remove the now-dead path-based _detect_image_mime_type (suffix-trust
SVG acceptance) so future callers can't reintroduce it.
- W3: SVG sources rejected with a dedicated actionable message + test.
- Polish: host read_bytes / temp-file write_bytes offloaded via
asyncio.to_thread (matches the container exec-read); unused
ResolveContext.cfg/extra_roots fields dropped; duplicate policy check
documented as intentional pre-flight short-circuit.
Salvage of #35362, evolved to also close the vision sandbox-escape
(GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq). The two were the same root cause — vision read image
bytes host-side while every other tool reads through the terminal backend —
so one resolver fixes both the delivery gaps and the escape.
Delivery (from #35362, re-authored against current main since the branch was
4140 commits stale and vision_tools.py had been rewritten on both sides):
- tools/image_source.py: one resolver for data:/http(s)/file/local/container
image sources, returning raw bytes through a single magic-byte-sniff +
50MB-ingest chokepoint. Fixes 'no image attached' / 'Invalid image source'
for every source type (#7571, #25118, #29643, #22328, #32709, #9077).
- tools/credential_files.py: from_agent_visible_cache_path, the container->host
cache reverse-map (inverse of the existing forward twin).
- tools/vision_tools.py: both vision sites route through the resolver with
task_id threaded from the handler; resolved bytes are materialized to a temp
file so main's evolved encode/resize/embed-cap pipeline is reused verbatim
(kept over the PR's older bytes-core resize to avoid touching browser_tool /
conversation_compression callers).
Security (fills #35362's deliberately-stubbed _within_allowed_roots seam):
- Under a non-local terminal backend the file tools are confined to the sandbox
(SECURITY.md 2.2), but vision read host-side — a prompt-injected
vision_analyze('/etc/passwd') exfiltrated host secrets, and read_file even
redirects the model to vision_analyze for image paths. The resolver now
enforces the same boundary: local backend reads any host path (chosen
posture); non-local backend host-reads ONLY the media caches under
HERMES_HOME (where the gateway/download media lives) and routes every other
path to an in-sandbox base64 exec-read — which reads the CONTAINER's file,
the same one 'cat' would, never the host's. Paths are resolve()-d so a
symlink can't escape a cache; fail-closed when no sandbox env exists.
This closes the escape AND delivers container-only images (#32709) with the
same mechanism.
Tests: unified resolver + confinement model (tests/tools/test_image_source.py,
incl. proof a non-cache host path under Docker yields container bytes not the
host secret); existing vision tests updated to the resolver boundary; Docker
integration test verified green against a real daemon (exec-read of a tmpfs
/workspace file, a root-owned mode-600 file, and the host-secret invariant).
Fixes GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq.
Co-authored-by: banditburai <promptsiren@gmail.com>
The Contents-API fallback's directory listing used a raw httpx.get with
no retry, so a 429/403 rate limit aborted the whole skill download even
though file fetches already retry via _github_get. Route the directory
listing through the same helper (429/reset-aware backoff, 5xx retry,
rate-limit flagging).
Salvage of PR #3033's intent — rerouted through the _github_get helper
that landed after the PR was opened, instead of the PR's ad-hoc retry
loops.
Co-authored-by: 0xbyt4 <35742124+0xbyt4@users.noreply.github.com>
The cache used a '__default__' sentinel as its path key, so switching
HERMES_HOME (profiles, tests) within one process kept serving the stale
policy loaded from the previous home. Key the cache on the actual
resolved default config path instead, so a home/config-path change
naturally misses the cache.
Trimmed from bundled PR #3923 (the other sub-fixes are superseded on
main); authored by @aydnOktay.
Both wired against features the iron-proxy author (@mslipper) confirmed on
PR #30179 — and both verified present in the pinned v0.39.0 source.
Header-auth providers (match_headers):
- New _HEADER_AUTH_PROVIDERS: Anthropic native (x-api-key), Azure OpenAI
(api-key on *.openai.azure.com / *.cognitiveservices / *.services.ai),
Gemini (x-goog-api-key + ?key= query param via match_query).
- TokenMapping grows match_headers + alias_env_names; per-provider header
sets flow into the secrets rules; mappings.json roundtrips them
(legacy files load with the Authorization default).
- GEMINI_API_KEY / GOOGLE_API_KEY collapse into ONE mapping (two
require-rules on the same host would reject each other); the sandbox
gets the token under both names, and the proxy child env mirrors the
alias into the canonical name when only the alias is set.
- Docker backend injects alias env names alongside canonical ones.
- The fail-closed tier is now empty, so fail_on_uncovered_providers and
discover_blocked_providers are deleted (dead toggle otherwise);
_NON_BEARER_PROVIDERS shrinks to genuinely-unswappable signature auth
(AWS SigV4, GCP service-account OAuth) — warn-only, as before.
Management API (hot reload):
- Generated proxy.yaml enables the v0.39 management listener: loopback
only at tunnel_port+2, bearer key from HERMES_IRON_PROXY_MGMT_KEY.
- Key minted at setup (management.token, 0600); start_proxy injects it
(v0.39 refuses to start when api_key_env is empty).
- hermes egress reload -> POST /v1/reload: re-reads proxy.yaml and
atomically swaps the pipeline; 422 leaves the running ruleset
untouched; actionable errors for not-running / pre-management config /
key mismatch. Secrets changes still require restart (daemon env is
read at spawn) — the CLI says so.
Validation: 218/218 unit+CLI+docker tests; 3/3 gated live E2E against the
real v0.39.0 binary (Authorization swap, x-api-key swap, live reload with
token rotation on the same pid). Docs updated.
On X11 a window's PID comes from the optional _NET_WM_PID property, so
cua-driver's list_windows legitimately returns pid: null for windows that
don't set it (desktop root, panels, override-redirect popups). capture()
and focus_app() coerced every entry via int(w["pid"]) inside a list
comprehension, so a single null-pid window raised TypeError and aborted
the whole enumeration before any screenshot — capture was impossible on
any X11 desktop with even one such window.
Route both ingestion sites through a new _ingest_windows() helper that
skips entries lacking a usable pid/window_id (uncapturable anyway) and
coerces the rest.
Adds tests/tools/test_computer_use_null_pid_windows.py covering the
helper's filtering/coercion and an end-to-end capture() regression that
reproduced the crash.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the salvaged SSH-tilde-cwd fix. The predicate
"backend == ssh and (cwd == ~ or cwd.startswith(~/))" was inlined at
each expanduser guard site, which is how the test simulator drifted from
production (it grew an SSH guard on a top-level-alias branch that has no
production counterpart).
- Add tools/terminal_tool._is_ssh_remote_tilde_cwd(backend, cwd) as the
single source of truth (case/whitespace-tolerant).
- Use it in _get_env_config and the gateway config bridge.
- Test simulator imports the real helper instead of re-implementing the
predicate; revert the phantom SSH guard on the top-level-alias branch
(production maps top-level cwd: to a plain env var, not TERMINAL_CWD via
an SSH-guarded path — that branch tested nothing real).
Follow-up to the salvaged #58000 fix.
- Extract _raise_if_non_interactive(lead) so the shared 'hermes mcp login'
next-step wording lives in one place across both OAuth boundaries
(_redirect_handler, _wait_for_callback), rather than two copy-pasted
inline raises. Boundary-specific lead sentences preserved verbatim, so
existing message-match tests stay green.
- Add a positive-control test asserting the guard does NOT over-fire on the
interactive path (valid/refreshable tokens keep working), satisfying an
explicit regression-coverage line from #57836.
A cached-but-unusable OAuth token (expired/revoked, or a refresh the IdP
rejects) makes the MCP SDK fall through to the authorization-code flow even
though build_oauth_auth's guard only checks token-file existence. In a
non-interactive context (systemd gateway, cron, background MCP discovery)
_redirect_handler then printed an auth URL / launched a browser flow no
operator can complete, and _wait_for_callback bound a localhost listener and
blocked for the full 300s timeout — gating gateway adapter startup and, on
retry, colliding on the callback port (OSError: [Errno 98] Address already
in use).
Re-check interactivity at the redirect/callback boundary and raise an
actionable OAuthNonInteractiveError before printing a URL, opening a browser,
or binding a listener. The guard holds regardless of whether a token file
exists (the point the token-file guard cannot cover), and only triggers on
the authorization-code path, so valid/refreshable tokens keep working
non-interactively. Both build_oauth_auth and MCPOAuthManager reuse these
handlers, so the sibling construction path is covered too.
Post-merge follow-ups + several review rounds + a hub-search rework, folded together.
Merge-scuff restores (a stale-base refactor had reverted two live-on-main fixes):
- gateway: SessionStore compression-tip healing + its regression test.
- desktop: messaging session/transcript polling in desktop-controller
(MESSAGING_POLL / ACTIVE_MESSAGING_SESSION_POLL, refreshMessagingSessions,
refreshActiveMessagingTranscript, the richer sameCronSignature) so inbound
platform traffic updates live again instead of freezing until manual refresh.
Profile-switch isolation (epoch/close/guard on every profile-scoped async):
- Hub store clears + in-flight runHubAction bails (and swallows the post-switch
404 instead of a phantom toast); hub preview/scan/search/sources profile-scoped.
- MCP: probe/auth epoch guards, dirty-draft reset, sidebar mutations blocked
until config resettles AND every persist re-checks the epoch post-await;
profilePending clears on config settle incl. error; logs re-key on profile.
- Model settings reload on switch and epoch-guard setModelAssignment /
saveMoaModels / API-key activation.
- Config draft resets + cancels its autosave on switch; skill editor/archive and
star-map node dialogs close on switch; openSkillEditor / star-map openEdit
discard stale fetches; tool-usage analytics loads are profile-guarded/keyed.
Correctness + UX:
- Unique per-skill action names for hub install AND uninstall; hub/catalog rows
flip only on a clean exit_code; catalog install polls the background bootstrap
to completion, reconciles the mcp.json draft (no dropped server), and fails
loudly on non-zero exit; MCP catalog query keyed by profile.
- /test reports needs-auth for anonymous auth:oauth servers; /auth snapshots +
restores tokens on a failed re-auth and clears the full 300s callback window.
- config-settings shows a retry on load failure; CodeEditor/JsonDocumentEditor
go read-only while saving so edits typed mid-save aren't dropped.
- Deep-link highlighter deletes its param only after a successful scroll.
- Restored the PageSearchShell trailing slot → Artifacts refresh button/spinner.
- /settings?tab=mcp redirect keeps server=.
Progressive hub search: fan out one query per backend-searchable source
(index-covered API sources stay unsearchable → no ~70-call GitHub re-hammer),
merge/dedupe by trust as each lands, per-source spinner overlaid on the dimmed
chip — results stream in without blocking on the slowest, no layout shift.
test(web): /api/skills list carries usage + provenance (CI contract).
Self-review follow-up. check_web_api_key() had a hand-rolled 'walk all
registered providers and probe each' fallback that duplicated the registry's
own availability-filtered resolvers (get_active_search_provider /
get_active_extract_provider, backed by _resolve()) — a second resolution path
that could diverge (the hand-rolled walk ignored capability, so a search-only
custom provider was handled inconsistently). Delegate to the registry's
resolvers so there is one authority for 'is a custom provider usable'.
Also: _get_backend()'s tail walk now probes provider.is_available() directly
instead of round-tripping through _is_backend_available(provider.name), which
redundantly re-did the registry get_provider() lookup on a provider object
already in hand. Both fallback loops guard is_available() against exceptions.
Documented that _LEGACY_WEB_BACKENDS intentionally includes 'xai' (probed via
has_xai_credentials, not a registered provider) while the registry's
_LEGACY_PREFERENCE excludes it, so the two built-in sets don't silently drift.
Plugin-registered web providers (registered via agent.web_search_registry)
were invisible to the tool-availability gate: _is_backend_available() was a
hardcoded env-var if-chain that returned False for any name outside the eight
built-in backends. Because check_web_api_key() is the check_fn for both
web_search and web_extract, a working custom provider with no built-in creds
left both tools filtered out of the toolset entirely.
Fix at the single chokepoint: _is_backend_available() now delegates non-legacy
backend names to the registered provider's is_available(), falling back to the
legacy built-in probes for known names and unregistered providers. Because
_get_backend(), _get_capability_backend(), and check_web_api_key() all resolve
availability through this one function, the fix cascades to every caller —
including the per-capability extract selection that produced a dead-end
'search-only' error (#32698). The two remaining hardcoded whitelist
early-returns (_get_backend, check_web_api_key) now also accept registered
names, and both walk registered providers as a final fallback so a custom
backend still resolves when no built-in has credentials.
Built-in backend priority is preserved unchanged: the registry is consulted
only for names outside _LEGACY_WEB_BACKENDS.
Fixes#28651Fixes#31873Fixes#32698
_handlers for vision_analyze and video_analyze read model name from
config.yaml (auxiliary.vision.model / auxiliary.video.model) before
falling back to AUXILIARY_VISION_MODEL / AUXILIARY_VIDEO_MODEL env
vars. Matches the existing config-first pattern for timeout and
temperature in the same file.
Fixes#53749
A user with tts.openai.model set to a direct-OpenAI model (e.g. tts-1-hd)
but no VOICE_TOOLS_OPENAI_KEY/OPENAI_API_KEY (or with tts.use_gateway)
routes TTS through the managed Nous audio gateway, which only proxies
gpt-4o-mini-tts. The request 400s with:
VALIDATION_ERROR: Unsupported managed OpenAI speech model
{'model': 'tts-1-hd', 'supportedModels': ['gpt-4o-mini-tts']}
_resolve_openai_audio_client_config now reports whether it resolved the
managed gateway; _generate_openai_tts coerces the model to a
managed-supported one (logging a warning that points at the direct-key
escape hatch) unless the user redirected base_url to their own endpoint.
Direct-key users keep their tts-1/tts-1-hd preference unchanged.
Source: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/52346
Related prior work: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/39462
Related prior work: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/27426
Maintainer direction: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/52346#issuecomment-4854881612
Remove acp_command and acp_args from the model-facing delegate_task schema and
dispatch paths. Child agents can still use ACP subprocess transport when it
comes from trusted delegation config or parent inheritance, but a model tool
call can no longer choose the command or arguments that reach child
construction.
This is salvageable because the risky boundary is model control over child ACP
transport, not ACP itself. The patch follows the maintainer direction from the
source discussion by preserving trusted ACP configuration and prior integration
work while removing the untrusted tool-call fields from both top-level and
per-task delegate inputs.
Reproduced on main by passing acp_command through delegate_task and observing it
reach _build_child_agent. Verified after the fix that model dispatch strips the
hidden top-level fields and per-task hidden fields are ignored before child
construction.
Co-authored-by: Carlosian <claudlos@agentmail.to>
Co-authored-by: ssiweifnag <120658181+ssiweifnag@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: nikshepsvn <23241247+nikshepsvn@users.noreply.github.com>
browser_cdp's frame_id (OOPIF) path returned early via
_browser_cdp_via_supervisor before _browser_cdp_private_guard ever ran,
unlike the stateless path a few lines below. A model that navigated a
cloud browser to a private/internal URL could still read page content
by passing frame_id, bypassing the same SSRF/private-page boundary
already enforced on Runtime.evaluate, Page.navigate, and other raw CDP
calls.
Apply the same guard call used by the stateless path before dispatching
to the supervisor, so both routing modes share one boundary.
A Cursor-style MCP manager inside Capabilities, plus the backend it needs.
- Server list with brand/favicon avatars + live status dot and a capability
summary (N tools, M prompts, K resources); Servers | Catalog views.
- Catalog: one-click install of Nous-approved servers with required-env prompts.
- GUI OAuth: Authenticate opens the system browser from the TTY-less backend and
verifies a token actually lands; header/API-key servers are never pushed down
OAuth; a dirty mcp.json can't drop a freshly-persisted auth field.
- Full-width mcp.json editor (ecosystem document format) + pinned stdio/agent
LogTail; probes cached 5m and keyed by (profile, config) so revisiting never
respawns the fleet or shows a stale probe.
- Whole-map persistence (PUT /api/mcp/servers) so deletes/toggles actually stick
(the generic /api/config deep-merge could not remove keys).
- perf: MCP probe/auth no longer hold the global skills lock, so a slow stdio
spawn can't stall every other request into a 15s timeout.
- per-tool include/exclude gating (lib/mcp-tool-filter) mirroring the CLI loader.
A Z.ai desktop user reported thinking reverting to medium after one turn,
burning ~200% of a week's credits in 4 days despite reasoning_effort: false
in config.yaml. Four compounding bugs:
- _session_info reported reasoning_effort "" for disabled reasoning,
indistinguishable from unset — the desktop adopted it after the first
turn, wiping its sticky "thinking off" pick so every later chat
reverted to the default effort.
- config.set key=reasoning always wrote agent.reasoning_effort to global
config.yaml, so every desktop model-menu selection (preset.effort ??
'medium') clobbered the user's configured value. Now session-scoped
like the messaging gateway's /reasoning, landing on
create_reasoning_override so lazily-built sessions keep it too.
- YAML `reasoning_effort: false`/`off`/`no` (boolean False) was coerced
to "" by every loader's `str(x or "")`, silently re-enabling thinking.
parse_reasoning_effort now treats False/"false"/"disabled" as
{"enabled": False}; loaders (tui gateway, gateway, cli, cron,
delegate) pass the raw value through. The desktop config reader also
crashed on the boolean (false.trim()), aborting voice/STT settings.
- The zai provider profile never sent thinking on the wire, and GLM-4.5+
defaults to thinking ON server-side — so disabling reasoning was a
silent no-op on direct Z.ai, the actual token burner. The profile now
emits extra_body.thinking {"type": "enabled"|"disabled"} for
thinking-capable GLM models, mirroring the DeepSeek profile.
Also: /new (session reset) now carries reasoning_config across the
rebuild like model_override; config.get reasoning prefers the session's
live value and maps a config False to "none"; Settings shows "Off"
instead of a blank select for hand-written false.
MSYS_NO_PATHCONV is honored by Git for Windows bash only. _find_bash's
final shutil.which fallback can return MSYS2-proper or Cygwin bash,
which ignore it and honor MSYS2_ARG_CONV_EXCL instead. Set both so argv
path conversion stays disabled regardless of which bash flavor spawns.
Also subsumes the cmd /c mangling in #56147.
Git Bash mangles native Windows command flags (/FO, /TN, /Create) into
bogus paths. Hermes terminal and background spawns now opt out by default
so tasklist, schtasks, and wmic work without manual prefixes.
Fixes#56700.
Follow-up to #56874, which added the Camofox private-page SSRF guard
(_camofox_current_page_private_url) but wired it only into the Camofox
eval path (_camofox_eval). The other Camofox content-read tools —
camofox_snapshot, camofox_get_images, and camofox_vision — still read the
current page's accessibility tree / images / screenshot without the
guard, so on a non-local Camofox backend they can return the content of
an intranet or cloud-metadata page (e.g. 169.254.169.254) that the
terminal itself can't reach.
Apply the same guard, gated on _eval_ssrf_guard_active (non-local
backend, not a local sidecar, allow_private_urls unset) and fail-open on
probe failure, matching the eval-path guard and the main-browser
snapshot/vision guards. camofox_back is intentionally not changed: its
target is unknown until navigation completes, and the subsequent content
read is already guarded.
Adds regression tests covering the three read tools blocking on a private
page, the public-page pass-through, and the guard-inactive no-probe path.
Three CLI reliability fixes:
1. Interrupt reliability: chat() only re-queued the user's interrupt
message when the turn result carried interrupted=True. When the agent
thread raced past its last interrupt check (or finished) before the
interrupt landed, the message was silently dropped — and the stale
_interrupt_requested flag left on the agent instantly aborted the
NEXT turn. Un-acknowledged interrupt messages are now re-queued as
the next turn and the stale flag is cleared (only when the agent
thread actually exited). The clarify-race path also parks the message
in _pending_input instead of dropping it.
2. Slow exit (5+ min): stdlib ThreadPoolExecutor workers are non-daemon
and joined unconditionally by concurrent.futures' atexit hook — even
after shutdown(wait=False). One wedged tool worker (abandoned after
interrupt/timeout) held the process open forever. Promoted
async_delegation's daemon executor to a shared tools/daemon_pool
module and adopted it in tool_executor (concurrent tool batches),
memory_manager (background sync), delegate_tool (child timeout wrapper
+ batch fan-out), and skills_hub (source fan-out). Added a 30s exit
watchdog (HERMES_EXIT_WATCHDOG_S) armed at _run_cleanup start as a
backstop for wedged cleanup steps.
3. Exit jank: after prompt_toolkit tears down the input/status bars the
terminal sat silent for the whole cleanup window, looking hung. Print
'Shutting down… (finalizing session)' immediately at exit start.
E2E: live PTY interrupt of a foreground 'sleep 120' terminal tool now
aborts in ~1s and the typed message runs as the next turn; wedged-worker
+ wedged-cleanup subprocess exits in 5.8s (watchdog) instead of hanging.
Salvage of #2863 by @aydnOktay, reimplemented against current main using the
existing utils.env_var_enabled / TRUTHY_STRINGS helper instead of per-site
tuple edits. Covers the 7 gateway/config.py env-flag sites that still rejected
'on' (WHATSAPP_ENABLED, SIGNAL_IGNORE_STORIES, MATRIX_ENCRYPTION,
API_SERVER_ENABLED, WEBHOOK_ENABLED, MSGRAPH_WEBHOOK_ENABLED,
BLUEBUBBLES_SEND_READ_RECEIPTS) plus HERMES_DESKTOP gating in
read_terminal/close_terminal. The PR's approval.py HERMES_YOLO_MODE portion is
already on main via is_truthy_value.
delegation.max_concurrent_children is now the single cap for both a
batch's parallelism and concurrent background delegation units.
- _get_max_async_children() delegates to _get_max_concurrent_children();
a leftover max_async_children key logs a one-time deprecation warning
- config v32→33 migration removes the stale key, folding a raised
max_async_children into max_concurrent_children (max wins, no lost
headroom)
- capacity error messages now point at max_concurrent_children
- pool-at-capacity sync fallback now attaches an explanatory note so
the model/user know why the call blocked instead of dispatching async
Previously users who raised max_concurrent_children (e.g. to 15) still
hit the invisible default-3 async cap: the 4th background delegate_task
silently ran inline, blocking the turn with no signal.
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN is set and owned by the user's Claude Code
install (subscription OAuth), not a Hermes-managed inference
credential — Claude subscription auth is not a working Hermes provider
path. Blocklisting it broke agent-spawned claude CLIs: with no token in
the child env, claude fell through to the shared macOS Keychain /
~/.claude/.credentials.json store and, on auth failure, cleared it —
logging the user out of their interactive Claude sessions and the
desktop app.
Exempt it from _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST (it arrives via the
anthropic registry entry, so discard explicitly with rationale).
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY / ANTHROPIC_TOKEN and every other provider credential
remain stripped, and the GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf fail-closed passthrough
guard is unchanged for everything still on the blocklist.
Fixes#55878
Extends the browser private-network eval guard to the Camofox backend.
On main, _browser_eval() returned early in Camofox mode before running the
shared private-URL literal pre-scan and before re-checking the page URL
after eval, leaving Camofox as a sibling backend that could execute
browser_console(expression=...) against private/internal targets.
- move the eval private-URL literal pre-scan before the Camofox early return
- add a Camofox current-page private-URL probe via the evaluate endpoint
- withhold Camofox eval results when the page is now private/internal
Follow-up to browser private-network hardening in #56173, #56526, #56664.
Salvage of #56764 by @rayjun (rayoo), cherry-picked to preserve authorship.
Vertex AI authenticates via OAuth2 (service-account JSON path / ADC), not
PROVIDER_REGISTRY, and VERTEX_CREDENTIALS_PATH is declared with
password=False (it's a path, not a bare key) under category="provider" —
a category the registry-derived blocklist loop never checks. Both it and
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS (the ADC fallback the adapter also reads)
fell through every existing blocklist source and leaked the on-disk
location of a GCP service-account key into every spawned subprocess
(terminal, codex/copilot app-server, browser workers) — the same leak
class already closed for every other provider's credentials in #53503.
Three connected changes that fix kanban notifications in multiplex_profile
gateways and enable event-driven agent collaboration:
1. Session profile propagation
- Add HERMES_SESSION_PROFILE ContextVar (session_context.py)
- Gateway stamps source.profile at dispatch time (run.py)
- _maybe_auto_subscribe reads profile from ContextVar instead of
os.environ which is unset in the gateway main process (kanban_tools.py)
2. Notifier profile-aware routing (kanban_watchers.py)
- Adapter selection: prefer _profile_adapters[sub.notifier_profile]
so each profile's bot delivers its own task notifications
- Relax profile skip-filter: process cross-profile subscriptions when
the gateway has an adapter for the owning profile
- Extend TERMINAL_KINDS with status/archived/unblocked
3. Creator agent wakeup on terminal events (kanban_watchers.py)
- After delivering completed/blocked/gave_up/crashed/timed_out
notifications, inject a synthetic MessageEvent into the creator's
session via adapter.handle_message to trigger their agent loop
- SessionSource built from subscription metadata — no session_store
lookup needed
Self-review follow-up on the salvaged approval-routing fix.
The initial adaptation re-read os.getenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE") at session-build
time. That diverges from the repo's security invariant: HERMES_YOLO_MODE is
frozen into tools.approval._YOLO_MODE_FROZEN at import time precisely so a skill
running mid-process cannot set the env var and instantly flip the approval
bypass (a prompt-injection escalation path). A live re-read re-opened that hole
for the codex routing path.
- Add tools.approval.is_approval_bypass_active() — the canonical three-source
bypass check (frozen --yolo/HERMES_YOLO_MODE + session /yolo + approvals.mode
off) in one place. This is the 4th inline copy of that OR-chain (the three
sites in approval.py and tui_gateway/server.py:3121 all use the same idiom);
the helper is the shared chokepoint they can collapse onto.
- codex_runtime.py now calls is_approval_bypass_active() instead of the
hand-rolled mode-or-session check plus a runtime env re-read.
- Update the env-yolo test to patch _YOLO_MODE_FROZEN (the canonical test
pattern, e.g. tests/tools/test_yolo_mode.py) rather than setenv, which is
dead-on-arrival against the frozen constant.
Fail-closed default preserved on every branch; 28 integration + 77 session/yolo
tests pass; E2E confirms the real exec decision flips decline->accept only when
bypass is active.
Every other content-returning browser tool entry point
(browser_snapshot/vision/console/eval, and click/type/press via
_blocked_private_page_action) re-checks window.location.href against the
private/internal/cloud-metadata floor after the page could have changed --
because a redirect chain or client-side navigation can land on an address
the initial browser_navigate preflight never saw. browser_back was the one
navigation-triggering entry point missing this: it called
_run_browser_command(..., "back", []) and returned the resulting URL
straight to the model with no re-check.
On a cloud/CDP (non-local) backend, if browser history contains a
private/internal address (e.g. a prior redirect touched an internal host),
browser_back would navigate the live browser there and hand the URL back
to the model with no guard -- the exact class of gap the private-page
guard exists to close, just on the one entry point it hadn't reached yet.
Re-check happens after the navigation succeeds (not before, unlike
click/type/press) since it's the resulting page -- not the one being left
-- whose safety matters. A failed back navigation (no history) skips the
check entirely since nothing changed. Verified live: the new regression
test fails (returns the private URL instead of a blocked payload) on the
pre-fix code and passes after.
The Windows _quote_cwd_for_cd override only reached _wrap_command; the
snapshot bootstrap cd in init_session still used a bare shlex.quote(),
so on Windows the bootstrap cd failed and pwd -P captured the login
shell's dir instead of terminal.cwd. Route it through _quote_cwd_for_cd
too, and add -- for hyphen-safety to match _wrap_command.
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