Sessions on sub-512K-context models were spending most of their wall-clock
re-summarizing: the 50% trigger left too little post-compaction headroom
(the incompressible floor — system prompt, tool schemas, protected tail,
rolling summary — ate most of the reclaimed space), so compaction re-fired
every 1-2 turns. Three compounding defects fixed:
- Threshold floor: models with context windows below 512K now trigger at
>=75% of the window (raise-only — a higher configured value or per-model
autoraise like Codex gpt-5.5's 85% always wins). Re-derived on
update_model() in both directions.
- No max_tokens on the summary call: the summary budget is prompt guidance
only ("Target ~N tokens"). The wire cap truncated summaries mid-section
on the Anthropic Messages / NVIDIA NIM paths (thinking models burn the
cap on reasoning first), yielding truncated or thinking-only summaries
and compaction loops. Summary token ceiling lowered 12K -> 10K to keep
the guidance within the intended 1K-10K envelope.
- Reasoning traces excluded end-to-end: inline <think>/<reasoning> blocks
are now stripped from assistant content before serialization to the
summarizer, and from the summarizer's own output before the summary is
stored (previously a thinking summarizer model's trace was persisted in
_previous_summary and re-fed into every iterative update, compounding
bloat). Native reasoning fields were already excluded.
Verified E2E with real imports against a temp HERMES_HOME: threshold table
across 64K-1M windows, override interactions (user 0.85 wins, spark 0.70
raised, gpt-5.5 0.85 kept), full compress() round-trip with a thinking
summarizer, and wire-kwargs capture proving no max_tokens is sent.
Completes the session-binding class on the gateway surface (#55578),
matching the TUI rules:
1. Fail-closed pinning: switch_session() re-opens ended sessions, so
pinning a completion to a spawning session that has since ENDED
(user /new, closed rotation) would resurrect a conversation the user
explicitly ended and inject into it. The injection path now checks
the pinned row's ended_at first and drops the injection with a
WARNING when the spawning session is dead or unknown - the result
stays in the delegation records.
2. /new ends the old conversation's delegations: _handle_reset_command
calls interrupt_for_session() with the expiring durable session id
(matching the parent_session_id pin stamped at dispatch) plus the
routing key as fallback, so a reset can't leave dangling subagents
whose completions have no live owner.
interrupt_for_session() gains the parent_session_id selector because a
gateway chat's session_key (the platform conversation key) survives a
reset while the session id rotates - key-based matching alone could
never sever a gateway conversation's delegations.
Background delegate_task completions only carried session_key. When multiple
active sessions shared a routing peer, get_or_create_session could recover the
latest ended_at IS NULL row and inject the subagent result into the wrong
session.
Capture parent_agent.session_id at dispatch time, include it on async-delegation
completion events, and pin gateway routing via switch_session when the
synthetic completion message is handled.
Fixes#57498
In single-query (-q) mode, the assistant's final answer was printed and
then immediately erased by _print_exit_summary() — which unconditionally
called _clear_terminal_on_exit() (ESC[3J ESC[2J ESC[H]). The answer was
present in the session store but invisible in the terminal.
The clear is only needed for interactive TUI teardown (#38928) where
prompt_toolkit chrome must be cleaned up. Add a clear_screen parameter
to _print_exit_summary() (default True, preserving interactive behavior)
and pass False from the single-query call site so the answer stays
visible above the exit summary.
Regression tests cover:
- clear_screen=True (default) calls _clear_terminal_on_exit()
- clear_screen=False skips the clear
- Single-query -q path passes False end-to-end
- Interactive path still clears (preserving #38928)
Extends the salvaged session_key filter with the same fail-closed,
compression-chain-aware ownership gate the poller uses (#55578):
- drain_notifications() accepts an owns_event callback; when provided,
an async-delegation event is consumed ONLY on positive proof of
ownership, and a broken callback re-queues (never leaks). Bare key
equality remains for single-session callers (CLI); no filter remains
legacy behavior.
- The TUI post-turn drain passes _session_owns_notification_event, so
it can't adopt another session's (or an orphan's) delegation payload,
while a post-compression session still claims its own pre-compression
dispatches - the gap bare key equality left open.
The completion event already carries the dispatching session's session_key
(captured at dispatch time in delegate_tool.py:2798), but the delivery
router ignored it — results landed in whatever session was active at
completion time instead of the session that dispatched the subagent.
Changes:
- drain_notifications() in process_registry.py: optional session_key
filter. Non-matching async_delegation events are re-queued instead of
consumed, so they remain available for the correct session's drain.
- cli.py process_loop: passes active session_key to drain_notifications()
- tui_gateway/server.py post-turn drain: passes session_key from the
TUI session dict
- gateway/run.py _build_process_event_source: logs warning when routing
metadata is unresolvable (previously silent drop)
- Regression tests verifying session-scoped drain filtering
Fixes#58684
- OPENROUTER_MODELS: remove openrouter/owl-alpha (free) and
tencent/hy3-preview{,:free}; add tencent/hy3 and tencent/hy3:free
- _PROVIDER_MODELS[nous]: tencent/hy3-preview -> tencent/hy3
- run_agent.py reasoning-prefix list: tencent/hy3-preview -> tencent/hy3
(prefix match still covers -preview if pinned)
- model_metadata: register hy3 context length (262144) alongside hy3-preview
- regenerate website/static/api/model-catalog.json
- update tokenhub curated-list tests to the new IDs
The tencent-tokenhub direct provider still serves hy3-preview and is
intentionally unchanged.
Two invariants layered on the origin-routing commit (#55578):
1. Fail closed on orphaned async-delegation payloads. The poller's
belongs-elsewhere check handles events owned by another LIVE session,
but an event whose owner is gone previously fell through and was
adopted by whichever poller saw it - injecting one chat's delegation
output into another chat. Delegation completions are now injected
only into a session that PROVABLY owns them (origin UI id, or
session-key/lineage match via the compression chain); unowned
payloads are dropped from injection with a WARNING (the subagent's
output is already persisted in the delegation records, so nothing is
lost). The shutdown drain applies the same rule. Non-delegation
events keep the historical adopt-orphans behavior.
2. A session's in-flight async delegations end with the session.
_finalize_session now calls interrupt_for_session(): delegations
commissioned by the closing UI session are interrupted always;
key-matched delegations only when the TUI owns the session lifecycle,
so closing a viewer tab on a live gateway session never kills the
gateway's own background work.
Carry the live TUI session id with async delegation completion events and prefer the commissioning UI session when desktop pollers share the completion queue. Resolve compressed session keys to their continuation before treating events as orphaned, and capture the live parent agent session id for TUI/ACP dispatch.
The desktop app's chat panel reuses tui_gateway as its backend, so every chat session was stamped platform="tui". That made the agent read terminal-specific platform guidance while running in the graphical desktop chat surface.
Resolve the misclassification at its source: tui_gateway now picks platform="desktop" when HERMES_DESKTOP=1 and HERMES_DESKTOP_TERMINAL is unset, and keeps platform="tui" for the embedded terminal pane and standalone TUI. Add a PLATFORM_HINTS["desktop"] entry describing the actual chat surface (full GFM markdown, MEDIA: intercept, inline images). Move the embedded-pane clarifier to the platform-hint resolution site so it appends only to the tui hint under HERMES_DESKTOP_TERMINAL=1. Delete the now-dead desktop-hint block from build_environment_hints() that competed with the platform hint.
Standalone TUI sessions produce byte-identical prompts as before; the new desktop hint and clarifier are assembled once per session in the stable tier, so prompt caching is preserved.
Three fixes for the silent post-restart ticker stall:
1. _jobs_lock() bounds its cross-process flock: LOCK_NB polled against a
30s deadline instead of an unbounded LOCK_EX taken while holding the
process-wide RLock. On timeout it logs at ERROR and degrades to
in-process-only locking (the existing fallback path), so a sibling
process wedged while holding .jobs.lock can no longer freeze every
cron function - including the ticker's get_due_jobs() and thus the
heartbeat - forever with zero logging.
2. fire_claim/run_claim freshness checks are bounded on both sides
(0 <= age < ttl): a claim stamped in the future (clock/TZ skew across
a restart) was previously fresh forever, making the job permanently
unfireable and every manual run report 'already being fired'.
3. _execute_job_now distinguishes paused/disabled/missing jobs from a
genuinely held claim instead of mislabeling them all as 'already
being fired'.
For air-gapped / self-hosted-IdP deploys with NO Nous Portal, let the gateway
obtain its caller-identity bearer from a generic OAuth2 client_credentials grant
against the operator's own IdP (e.g. Microsoft Entra ID) instead of only
resolve_nous_access_token(). The connector's OIDC tenant resolver reads a claim
(default tid) off that token as the tenant.
- gateway/relay: new canonical _resolve_relay_identity_token() — client_credentials
when gateway.idp.token_url (or GATEWAY_RELAY_IDP_* env) is set, else Nous Portal
(unchanged default). Wired into self_provision_relay().
- hermes_cli/gateway_enroll: _resolve_identity_token() delegates to the canonical
resolver so the enroll CLI and the runtime self-provision path share ONE impl.
Config via gateway.idp.{token_url,client_id,client_secret,scope} in config.yaml
(env override GATEWAY_RELAY_IDP_*). No behaviour change when unset.
Tests: tests/gateway/relay/test_identity_token_resolver.py (6 — mode selection,
request shape, config/env precedence, fail-closed). Relay suite 162 pass.
Validated via the cross-repo gateway<->connector live E2E (provision, managed
self-provision, inbound round-trip, /link) against a connector running the OIDC
tenant resolver with zero NAS config.
The salvaged guard used a hand-maintained frozenset of 14 platform names —
several of which (line, wechat, facebook, imessage, googlechat) aren't
actual Hermes Platform values, while real ones (whatsapp_cloud, feishu,
wecom, dingtalk, qqbot, yuanbao, plugin platforms like irc) were missing.
Resolve the source through gateway.config.Platform instead (built-ins +
registered plugin platforms via _missing_), with an explicit exclusion set
for self-owned/local sources. Adds tests for the guard and both reap paths.
Keep #60631's get_running_job_ids() snapshot + _active_cron_job_count()
(import-guarded for minimal test doubles) as the single read path, and
retarget #60612's drain tests at it. Drops the redundant
cron_jobs_in_flight() helper so there is one surface, not two.
Follow-up to the previous commit on #60432. The status-write guard
(_consume_interrupted_flag, checked right before mark_job_run) closes
the false-success bookkeeping gap, but run_one_job delivers its result
BEFORE that check: delivery happens right after run_job() returns,
mark_job_run happens at the very end. A job whose tool subprocess was
killed mid-flight can still produce a plausible-looking final_response
from the truncated output, and that response would reach the user via
_deliver_result before the interrupted flag was ever consulted --
correct status in jobs.json, wrong message already sent.
Adds _is_interrupted(), a non-destructive peek at the same
_interrupted_job_ids set (_consume_interrupted_flag stays as the
consuming, authoritative check right before the status write -- this
needed a peek instead since the flag has to still be visible there).
Checked right after save_job_output, before the deliver_content
decision: if the run looked successful but was flagged interrupted,
force success=False with an explicit interruption message. This
routes delivery through the existing _summarize_cron_failure_for_delivery
path (the same one a real failure already uses) instead of the raw
final_response, so the user gets an honest "this run was interrupted"
instead of a truncated/misleading result.
Testing: 4 new tests in tests/cron/test_shutdown_interrupt.py --
_is_interrupted peek semantics (false/true/does-not-clear, as opposed
to the consuming _consume_interrupted_flag), and the delivery-gate
test itself, which mocks run_job to return a normal-looking success
with a "plausible final response" while the job is pre-marked
interrupted, and asserts _deliver_result receives the failure summary
("This run was interrupted.") instead, with the summarizer's error
argument confirmed to mention the interruption.
Fail-then-pass: reverted cron/scheduler.py only, the 4 new tests fail
(3 on the missing _is_interrupted attribute, 1 -- the delivery-gate
test -- on _summarize_cron_failure_for_delivery never being called,
i.e. the raw response would have gone out); restored, all 16 tests in
the file pass.
Regression: tests/cron/ (683 tests) + test_cron_active_work_drain.py +
test_gateway_shutdown.py + test_shutdown_cache_cleanup.py -- 11
pre-existing failures (Unix file-permission-bit and path-tilde
assertions that don't apply on this Windows dev box), matching the
same set already established as pre-existing in the prior commit's
regression check. Zero new failures.
Continues #60432
Cron jobs run through cron/scheduler.py's own ThreadPoolExecutor via a
standalone AIAgent (run_job/run_one_job), entirely outside
GatewayRunner._running_agents -- the dict _drain_active_agents() and
every other active-work check on that class reads. A gateway shutdown
(/update, /restart, and SIGUSR1 all funnel through the same stop())
could log active_at_start=0 and immediately kill tool subprocesses
while a cron job's terminal command was still running, with no wait
and no indication anything was interrupted.
Real-world impact (from the issue): a scheduled daily briefing cron
job was in flight during /update, its tool subprocess got killed
by the unconditional shutdown cleanup, and the job was never marked
failed -- it simply never completed or delivered, with no error
surfaced anywhere. A repro with a 30-minute `sleep` cron job in flight
during /update reproduced the same pattern: subprocess killed at
+0.22s of drain (active_at_start=0), the job's agent thread continued
in-process and produced a plausible-looking final response from the
truncated tool output, and the scheduler marked the run successful.
Root cause is layered, not a single line:
1. GatewayRunner._drain_active_agents() only waits on _running_agents.
Cron work was invisible to it, so drain returned instantly whenever
the only active work was a cron job.
2. Even with visibility, the shutdown's final tool-subprocess kill
(process_registry.kill_all()) is a global, unconditional sweep with
no per-job targeting -- a long-running cron job that outlives the
drain timeout still gets its subprocess killed.
3. cron/scheduler.py had no way to detect that a job's tool subprocess
was killed out from under it mid-run; the agent thread kept going
and its eventual (often degraded but plausible-looking) response
got reported as a normal successful completion.
Fix, three parts:
- cron/scheduler.py: expose get_running_job_ids() (thread-safe
snapshot of the existing _running_job_ids set, already used to
prevent double-dispatch) so the gateway can read cron's in-flight
state without reaching into private module internals.
- gateway/run.py: GatewayRunner._active_cron_job_count() reads that
snapshot. _drain_active_agents() now waits on
(_running_agents OR active cron jobs), so a cron-only workload gets
the same bounded wait chat sessions already get instead of an
instant active_at_start=0. Shutdown drain logging gains
cron_active_at_start/cron_active_now fields alongside the existing
ones (unchanged, for compat).
- cron/scheduler.py: mark_running_jobs_interrupted(reason), called by
gateway/run.py's _kill_tool_subprocesses() right after
process_registry.kill_all(), marks every job still in
_running_job_ids at that instant as failed/interrupted via the
existing mark_job_run() -- and records the job IDs in
_interrupted_job_ids BEFORE writing, so run_one_job()'s own
eventual completion for the same run (racing in its own thread)
checks that flag and skips its normal write instead of clobbering
the interrupted status with a false "ok" produced from the
now-truncated tool output. This does not attempt to correlate a
killed PID to a specific job ID (process_registry tracks PIDs, not
job IDs) -- any job still dispatched at the moment of a forced kill
is treated as interrupted, matching the existing coarser precedent
set by _interrupt_running_agents(), which interrupts every entry in
_running_agents on a drain timeout without per-agent correlation
either.
Deliberately out of scope (flagged in the issue as a separate,
lower-priority concern): startup-time reconciliation of cron runs that
started but never reached a terminal status.
Testing:
- tests/cron/test_shutdown_interrupt.py (12 tests): get_running_job_ids
snapshot semantics, mark_running_jobs_interrupted marking/no-op/
partial-failure behavior, and -- the core race guard -- run_one_job
skipping its own last_status write (both the success path and the
exception path) when the shutdown path already marked the run
interrupted, with a control test proving ordinary un-interrupted
completions are unaffected.
- tests/gateway/test_cron_active_work_drain.py (9 tests):
_active_cron_job_count reading cron state and failing closed (0) if
the cron module is unavailable; _drain_active_agents waiting for an
in-flight cron job the same way it waits for chat sessions, timing
out if the job outruns the window, and leaving existing chat-session
drain behavior unchanged; a full runner.stop() integration test
(drain-timeout path) proving mark_running_jobs_interrupted actually
fires with the right job ID when a tool subprocess is force-killed,
plus a no-op control when nothing cron-related is in flight.
- tests/gateway/test_shutdown_cache_cleanup.py: added
_active_cron_job_count() to that file's hand-rolled _FakeGateway test
double, which stop() now calls -- without it those 8 pre-existing
tests AttributeError (caught by fail-then-pass below, not a
production bug).
Fail-then-pass: reverted gateway/run.py + cron/scheduler.py, all 21
new tests fail (fixture/attribute errors -- the feature doesn't exist
yet); restored, all 21 pass.
Regression check: ran the full plausibly-affected surface --
tests/gateway/{test_gateway_shutdown,test_restart_drain,
test_restart_notification,test_restart_redelivery_dedup,
test_restart_resume_pending,test_restart_service_detection,
test_shutdown_cache_cleanup,test_stuck_loop,test_clean_shutdown_marker,
test_external_drain_control,test_session_state_cleanup,
test_update_command,test_update_streaming}.py plus tests/cron/ (944
tests) -- against a clean upstream/main checkout and against this
branch. Diffed the two FAILED lists: identical, 20 pre-existing
failures on both sides (Windows-locale/cp1252 file-encoding issues and
Unix-permission-bit assertions that don't apply on this Windows dev
box), zero new failures, zero fixed-by-accident. The 8
test_shutdown_cache_cleanup.py failures found mid-development were
from the _FakeGateway gap above, fixed in the same commit and
confirmed clean on the final rerun (diff against baseline: exit 0).
Fixes#60432
safe_load() raises ComposerError on multi-document streams (k8s manifests)
and ConstructorError on application-defined tags (CloudFormation !Sub,
Ansible !vault) — both valid YAML syntax. Now that the linter's verdict is
a fail-closed write gate, those false positives would refuse legitimate
writes outright. Switch to yaml.parse() (scanner+parser only), which still
catches real syntax failures.
write_file() previously called _atomic_write() first and only ran the
JSON/YAML/TOML/Python syntax check afterward as an informational lint
delta -- a parse failure never set the top-level `error` key, so a
corrupt structured-data write still landed on disk (and file_tools.py's
files_modified gating, which keys off `error`, silently reported it as
a successful modification).
Move the in-process syntax check for JSON/YAML/TOML ahead of
_atomic_write() and refuse the write outright on a parse failure: no
temp file, no rename, nothing touches disk, and the result carries a
top-level `error` so callers correctly see it as unmodified.
Deliberately scoped to _FAIL_CLOSED_INPROC_EXTS (JSON/YAML/TOML), not
all of LINTERS_INPROC -- .py is excluded because this codebase's own
test fixtures (TestPatchReplacePostWriteVerification et al.) write
arbitrary non-Python text through *.py paths purely to exercise
write-mechanics; a hard block there broke 3 previously-passing tests
during development. Python keeps its pre-existing non-blocking
lint-delta report.
Adds tests/tools/test_write_file_syntax_gate.py: invalid JSON/YAML/YML/
TOML refused with nothing written (new file) and nothing modified
(existing file); valid JSON/YAML still written byte-for-byte; a
non-linted extension with garbage content is unaffected; invalid Python
is confirmed NOT hard-refused (still just reported).
* feat(install): warn pip/Homebrew installs are unsupported (CLI, TUI, desktop)
pip and Homebrew are now Unsupported install methods per
website/docs/getting-started/platform-support.md. Surface a
warn-don't-block deprecation notice everywhere the install method is
already shown, pointing at the platform-support docs and noting these
installs will not receive further updates. NixOS (Tier 2) is untouched.
- hermes_cli/config.py: shared is_unsupported_install_method() /
format_unsupported_install_warning() helpers so the wording and docs
link stay consistent across every surface.
- hermes_cli/banner.py: generalize the existing pip-only banner
warning to also cover Homebrew.
- hermes_cli/main.py: hermes update and hermes update --check print
the warning before proceeding (still update; warn, don't block).
- tui_gateway/server.py: session.info gains install_warning.
- ui-tui: SessionPanel renders install_warning alongside the existing
'N commits behind' notice.
- apps/desktop: SessionRuntimeInfo/GatewayEventPayload gain
install_warning; applyRuntimeInfo + the live session.info event fire
a snoozable warning toast via a new reportInstallMethodWarning(),
mirroring the existing backend-contract-skew toast pattern. i18n
strings added for en/zh/zh-hant/ja.
- Tests: updated pip banner assertions for the new wording, added a
Homebrew banner test, and two tui_gateway session_info tests
(install_warning present for pip, absent for git).
* fix(nix): make `hermes` in developement environment actually work
install modules as editable overlay with uv
* feat: print install method when running --version
* fix: correct detect install method when running from a subtree
The connector now depends on the single multiplexed gateway for per-profile
relay routing, so hosted deployments need to FORCE multiplexing on regardless
of the image's config.yaml. gateway.multiplex_profiles was config.yaml-only,
which a user could leave unset or flip off.
Add GATEWAY_MULTIPLEX_PROFILES as a standard operator override on top of the
existing config key — the same 'config.yaml is canonical, env is the operator
override' pattern the Telegram/Signal require_mention bridges use:
env (recognized token) > config.yaml (top-level or nested gateway.*) > False
- gateway/config.py: _env_multiplex_profiles_override() resolves the env var
tri-state — recognized truthy/falsy token → bool; unset/blank/unrecognized
→ None (fall through to config). Blank is deliberately None, not False, so a
provisioned-but-unpopulated Fly secret ('') can't shadow a config.yaml opt-in
(the empty-secret trap). Wired into GatewayConfig.from_dict so every consumer
(run.py, session.py via self.config) sees the resolved value.
- hermes_cli/gateway.py: the named-profile-start guard
(_guard_named_profile_under_multiplexer) reads config.yaml directly, so it
gets the SAME env precedence — otherwise env-forced multiplex would leave the
guard blind and someone could start a conflicting per-profile gateway that
double-binds a bot token. Env-forced-on trips the guard even with no
config.yaml key; env-forced-off disables it over a config opt-in.
Tests: full 3-tier precedence in test_config.py (incl. the discriminating
env-overrides-config cases + the empty/whitespace/unrecognized fall-through
trap + resolver tri-state), mutation-verified (flipping precedence fails
exactly the two env-wins tests); guard env cases in test_multiplex_lifecycle.py.
Force-on is safe on a single-profile instance: session keys stay byte-identical
(agent:main) and the _run_agent wrapper installs the per-turn secret scope, so
the fail-closed get_secret() path is satisfied.
Strict charset allowlist (alnum + - _, max 64) on the {name} path param of
the memory-provider config/setup endpoints. Prevents traversal-shaped names
from reaching find_provider_dir(), and setup now 404s when neither a
loadable provider nor a plugin manifest exists, so the command-running path
is only reachable for discoverable plugins. Adds regression tests.
The multiplex machinery already routes an inbound message to a profile via
SessionSource.profile (build_session_key namespacing + the per-turn
config/credential scope in SessionStore._resolve_profile_for_key). But the
relay path never populated it: _event_from_wire rebuilt the SessionSource
field-by-field and dropped any 'profile' the connector sent, so a
Team-Gateway (connector + relay) message could not be routed to a specific
profile the way the /p/<profile>/ HTTP prefix and per-credential polling
adapters already can.
Stamp source.profile from the wire payload in _event_from_wire. This is the
last missing link for NAS-driven per-profile routing over the relay in
multiplex mode; the connector populating the field ships separately
(gateway-gateway contract adds the optional wire field).
Back-compat: absent 'profile' → None → legacy agent:main namespace,
byte-identical to today for every single-profile gateway.
The profile+gateway topology added in #60537 sits entirely behind the
loopback/--insecure auth gate. But a hosted agent (Hermes Cloud) binds
non-loopback with OAuth, so should_require_auth is True, and NAS reads
/api/status over the network (fly-provider.ts getInstanceRuntimeStatus)
with no session token. On that gated path the whole topology block was
omitted, so the Portal could never render the profile list.
Split the topology readout by sensitivity:
- profile NAMES (profiles) + gateway_mode are low-sensitivity product
surface and now ride the always-public status body, surviving the auth
gate so NAS/the Portal can enumerate profiles.
- the per-gateway detail (gateways[], carrying host ports) is deployment
recon and stays gated alongside hermes_home / config_path / env_path /
gateway_pid / gateway_health_url.
The collector now runs unconditionally (still in the executor, off the
event loop). No new fields; only the gate placement changes.
Headless/hosted deploys run the dashboard server without COLORTERM in
the process environment, so chalk inside the PTY-spawned TUI child
downgraded every skin hex color to the xterm 256 palette — the default
skin's bronze banner border (#CD7F32) snapped to palette 173 (#D7875F,
salmon red) and the gold caduceus rendered red/yellow on fresh cloud
instances. Local launches never reproduced it because the operator's
interactive terminal leaks COLORTERM=truecolor into the server env.
xterm.js always renders 24-bit RGB, so the dashboard PTY child should
always advertise truecolor: backfill COLORTERM=truecolor in
_resolve_chat_argv via setdefault (an explicit operator value wins).
Verified with a clean-env PTY probe of the real TUI binary:
no COLORTERM -> 0 truecolor SGRs / 165 palette-256 (salmon 38;5;173);
with the backfill -> 166 truecolor SGRs, exact bronze 38;2;205;127;50.
Session-based channel discovery resurrected historical origins for
platforms with no connected adapter, exposing stale send_message
targets that can no longer deliver. Gate both the enum loop and the
plugin-registry loop on the live adapter set.
Surgical reapply of the channel-directory portion of PR #25959 (branch
was 6.5k commits stale; the text-batching delay changes bundled there
were dropped - separate concern, defaults have since been retuned on
main).
Co-authored-by: Marco-Olivier Lavoie <marcolivier@gmail.com>
Log a one-shot structured warning when Discord denies traffic because
no allowlist/policy is configured, and correct the setup wizard's
inverted warning text. The fail-closed default itself is unchanged.
Fixes#58682.
When a user explicitly configures a platform with its native composite
(e.g. platform_toolsets.discord: [hermes-discord]), the discord and
discord_admin toolsets were silently stripped by _DEFAULT_OFF_TOOLSETS
even though the composite contains those tools. The strip could not tell
an explicit composite opt-in apart from the unconfigured default.
Track whether the platform was explicitly configured and, when it was,
exempt toolsets that are both default-off and platform-restricted to the
current platform from the strip. Only discord/discord_admin are affected
(the sole entries in both _DEFAULT_OFF_TOOLSETS and
_TOOLSET_PLATFORM_RESTRICTIONS). Unconfigured and empty-list platforms
keep the security default-off behaviour.
/api/status (loopback/insecure binds only) now includes:
- profiles: every profile on the host (default + named)
- gateway_mode: none | single | multiple | multiplex
- gateways: one entry per live gateway with the host ports its
port-binding platforms listen on, plus served_profiles when the
default gateway is multiplexing
Ports resolve from each profile's config.yaml (top-level platforms:
wins over gateway.platforms:, matching load_gateway_config precedence)
with adapter defaults as fallback. Topology enumeration runs in an
executor so the profile scan + process-table probes stay off the event
loop, and the whole block is gated behind the same loopback-only split
as hermes_home/gateway_pid so gated binds leak nothing new.
The salvaged test predates the parked-server self-probe
(_PARKED_RETRY_INTERVAL, landed on main after the PR branched): after the
final failed retry, run() parks in a real asyncio.wait that the patched
asyncio.sleep doesn't cover, stalling the test 300s. Signal shutdown once
the retry budget is exhausted so the park exits immediately.
A stdio MCP server (e.g. `npx -y mcp-remote <url>`) is spawned as a direct
child of the Hermes process. Existing teardown (MCPServerTask.shutdown() /
_kill_orphaned_mcp_children()) reaps it correctly on a clean exit, but a
kill -9 / crash / force-quit of the Hermes process skips that path entirely
-- the child (and its own descendants, e.g. mcp-remote's spawned node
process) is orphaned and keeps running. Repeated ungraceful restarts pile up
N orphaned processes racing to hold the same upstream SSE session, producing
errors like 'Invalid request parameters' on legitimate reconnects.
macOS/Linux have no portable equivalent of prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG) at the
Python subprocess level, so this adds a thin supervisor
(tools/mcp_stdio_watchdog.py) that:
- execs the real command as its own child in its own process group
- passes stdin/stdout/stderr through untouched (MCP stdio protocol
talks directly over those streams)
- polls the original spawning PID with the same orphan-detection
algorithm already proven in tui_gateway/slash_worker.py (ppid
comparison + psutil creation-time guard against PID reuse)
- SIGTERM-then-SIGKILL's the child's process group the moment the
original parent is gone
Wired into _run_stdio via a new _wrap_command_with_watchdog() helper,
POSIX-only (matches the existing killpg-based cleanup's platform scope),
fails open (any error resolving pid/create-time falls back to the
unwrapped command) so this can never be the reason a working MCP server
stops starting.
Verified: reproduced the exact orphan scenario standalone (fake parent
process spawns watchdog + fake long-running MCP child, kill -9 the fake
parent, confirm the watchdog reaps the child within its poll window with
zero leaked processes). Updated test_mcp_tool_issue_948.py's resolved-path
assertion to check the watchdog-wrapped command instead of the raw
resolved binary. Full test_mcp_tool.py + test_mcp_stability.py +
test_mcp_tool_issue_948.py suite: 232 passed. Full -k mcp sweep across the
whole test tree: 1003 passed, 2 skipped, 0 failed.
A stdio MCP server that never completes `initialize` (e.g. emits a
non-JSON-RPC frame and then blocks on stdin) leaks a child process plus its
stdio pipes/pidfd on every discovery-retry cycle — unbounded, until the
gateway hits EMFILE and every new open()/spawn fails (#59349).
Root cause (confirmed by instrumenting the live repro, and different from the
issue's own hypothesis): the spawned child IS captured in `new_pids`, so the
report's "new_pids empty at finally" guess is not it. The real cause is that
`session.initialize()` hangs forever on the garbage stream. `connect_timeout`
only bounds the caller's `.result()` wait on the foreground thread — it does
NOT cancel the `_run_stdio` coroutine on the background MCP loop. So the
coroutine is stuck at `await session.initialize()` permanently, its cleanup
`finally` never runs, the child is never reaped, and it stays invisible to the
orphan-reaper (whose `_orphan_stdio_pids` set never gets populated).
Fix: wrap `session.initialize()` in `asyncio.wait_for(..., connect_timeout)`
so a stalled handshake fails instead of hanging. The TimeoutError unwinds
through the SDK context managers (closing the child's stdin -> EOF -> exit)
and lets the existing `finally` reap any straggler. Cross-platform — no
signals/pgid/proc.
Scope: stdio only. The HTTP path has the same `await session.initialize()`
shape but spawns no subprocess (so it can't cause this leak) and already has
httpx transport timeouts.
Verified: the reporter's repro goes from unbounded growth to draining to zero;
added a hermetic regression test (fake transport whose `initialize()` hangs,
asserts the connect is bounded by connect_timeout) that fails on the pre-fix
code and passes on the fix; 566 existing MCP tests pass; ruff clean.
Repro confirmed on macOS (pipe FDs); the Linux-specific pidfd growth in the
report should be equivalent — the reporter offered to validate on Linux.
Closes#59349
When an MCP stdio subprocess fails to connect (token expiry, port
contention, timeout), the run() reconnect loop retries with backoff.
Each retry calls _run_stdio() which spawns a new process pair, but the
previous failed pair was only detected as orphaned (added to
_orphan_stdio_pids) — never actually killed. This caused rapid zombie
accumulation: 5 failed attempts × 2 procs each = 10 orphans competing
for the same port.
Add a _kill_orphaned_mcp_children() call at the top of _run_stdio(),
before the _snapshot_child_pids() baseline, so any orphans from prior
failed attempts are reaped before a new subprocess is spawned.
Fixes#57355
Keep-alive path when ?attach=<token> is present: PTY outlives the socket
via PTY_REGISTRY, reattaches on reconnect. No token = unchanged legacy
pump (_legacy_pump). detach (not close) on disconnect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up on the #56966 salvage:
- is_provider_explicitly_configured(): an env-seeded credential-pool entry
only counts as explicit while its env var still resolves to a usable
secret. A stale auth.json entry left behind after the user deletes the
var no longer keeps the provider in the picker forever (#55790).
- TUI modelPicker + dashboard ModelPickerDialog/api.getModelOptions pass
include_unconfigured=true explicitly, preserving their full-universe
setup-affordance behavior now that the backend defaults to the
configured subset.
- desktop lib/model-options.ts routes explicit_only through the shared
requestModelOptions() helper (added on main after the PR branched).
- regression tests for ambient (gh_cli) pool sources, explicit manual/
device-code sources, and stale vs live env-seeded entries.
* feat(trace): upload sessions to HF Agent Trace Viewer
Salvage trace upload as a smaller CLI-first feature: deterministic Claude Code JSONL export, fail-closed redaction, lazy Hugging Face dependency, and no gateway slash-command wiring.
* chore(trace): drop external porting references from docstrings
Describe the trace-upload design in Hermes' own terms.
* feat(sessions): fold trace upload into 'sessions export --format trace'
Integrates the HF Agent Trace Viewer exporter (PR #36145) onto the
unified export surface instead of a separate 'hermes trace' subcommand:
- --format trace: Claude Code JSONL to stdout/file, or one
<id>.trace.jsonl per session for filtered bulk export; defaults to
the most recent session when no --session-id/filters given.
- --upload pushes to the user's private HF traces dataset (--public to
opt out of private); reads HF_TOKEN with guided setup when missing.
- traces are secret-redacted by default (force mode); --no-redact opts
out after review; redaction failure blocks export (fail closed).
- hermes_cli/trace.py + subcommands/trace.py removed; agent/trace_upload.py
is the single engine. Docs EN + zh-Hans; 4 new CLI tests.
The salvaged SelfHostedBackend made self-hosted servers reachable via
mem0.json / MEM0_HOST, but the setup wizard still offered only Platform
and OSS — exactly the gap users hit (Discord report: 'At memory setup
there's only 2 options'). Adds a third wizard mode:
- interactive picker: Platform / Self-hosted server / Open Source
- non-interactive: hermes memory setup mem0 --mode selfhosted
--host http://... [--api-key ...] [--dry-run]
- host -> mem0.json (behavioral), API key -> .env as MEM0_API_KEY
(secret), optional key for AUTH_DISABLED servers
- best-effort reachability check against the server, non-fatal
- README + memory-providers docs updated with the wizard path
`_save_anthropic_oauth_creds` wrote the Anthropic OAuth token file with
`os.replace(tmp, path)` followed by a post-hoc `chmod(0o600)`. Between the
rename and the chmod the token file existed at the default umask (0o644 on most
hosts) — a window in which another local user could read the access/refresh
tokens.
Write via `utils.atomic_json_write(..., mode=0o600)`, which creates the temp
with mode 0o600 *before* any content is written, fsyncs, atomically replaces,
preserves the existing file's owner, and cleans up its temp on failure. This
matches the `atomic_json_write(mode=0o600)` call already used elsewhere in this
module for the credential-pool write, and #56644's owner preservation.
Tests updated for the new mechanism, plus a check that the write goes through
`atomic_json_write(mode=0o600)` (mutation-verified).
Opt-in discord.approval_mentions (config.yaml, bridged to
DISCORD_APPROVAL_MENTIONS) prepends <@id> mentions for numeric
allowlist entries to exec-approval prompts, with a scoped
AllowedMentions override (users only). Default off - no surprise
pings. Reapplied onto the content-mirror layout from #60245: mentions
prepend to the visible content block and its truncation budget.
Original implementation from PR #39719; commits arrived bot-authored,
re-attributed to the contributor.
Salvage follow-up integrating PR #30481 (@simplast) and PR #57683
(@catbearlove1-lang) into the unified export surface:
- --format html: standalone self-contained HTML transcript (single
session or multi-session with sidebar), works with all shared filters
and --redact; requires a file output path.
- --only user-prompts: prompt-only export (jsonl records or md sections)
via the shared session_export renderer; the separate export-prompts
subcommand from the original PR is subsumed by this flag.
- AUTHOR_MAP entries for both contributors; docs EN + zh-Hans.
Review follow-ups on the salvage:
- get_all() pruned from the ABC and all three backends: mem0_list (its
only caller) was removed by the recall-tuning commit, leaving new,
tested, unreachable code — including SelfHostedBackend's _MAX_TOP_K
over-fetch workaround. Tests for it dropped; fake-class stubs remain
harmlessly. (The #52921 true-total fix lives on in the PR history if
a lister ever returns.)
- The persisted rerank config key was write-only (setup prompted for it,
nothing read it). initialize() now parses it into _rerank_default and
mem0_search uses it when the model doesn't pass rerank explicitly;
per-call args still win. Guard test added.
- Platform-mode setup now warns when MEM0_HOST is set in the environment:
the json host-clear can't help there (_load_config seeds host from the
env var, docs tell users to put it in .env) — the user would silently
keep routing to the self-hosted server.
- SelfHostedBackend: connect-level retries (httpx.HTTPTransport(retries=2))
so a single transient blip doesn't count toward the provider breaker;
transport now injectable and the test helper uses the real __init__
instead of mirroring it via __new__.
- plugin.yaml description no longer leads with reranking (off by default,
platform-only); docs em-dash typo fixed.
Follow-up on the salvaged #55614. The PR added host-based routing to
_create_backend (precedence: oss > host > platform) but two sibling surfaces
didn't mirror it:
- system_prompt_block() checked host before oss, so an oss+host config ran
OSS but told the model it was self-hosted HTTP. Reordered to match routing.
- Platform setup (hermes memory setup mem0 --mode platform) left a stale host
in mem0.json; since host beats platform, the user kept routing to the
self-hosted server. save_config merges (no delete), so clear host to ""
rather than pop() so the merge actually overwrites it.
Adds regression tests for both (mutation-checked).
Salvage of #55614 by @kartik-mem0 (mem0 maintainer). Adds a SelfHostedBackend
that talks to a self-hosted Mem0 Docker server over httpx (X-API-Key auth,
/search + /memories routes), gated behind `host`. Also folds in the mem0
research-team recall tuning that rides with it: rerank defaults to false across
all modes, the mem0_list tool is removed (5->4 tools), search guidance is
de-shouted, and self-hosted get_all reports the true stored total (#52921).
Supersedes the self-hosted portion of #52487 (@liuhao1024, first-submitted).
Closes#52478Fixes#52921
Review findings on the salvaged shim: (a) OpenAI callers may pass stop as
a bare string but Converse's stopSequences requires a list — normalize;
(b) call_llm(stream=True) (MoA aggregator) can reach this client and the
shim silently returned a complete response — keep that behavior (the
streaming consumer's got-final-object path downgrades gracefully) but log
it, and log dropped tool_choice, instead of silently ignoring both.
+2 regression tests.
Follow-up to the salvage of #60217 by @xxxigm.
Review findings on the salvaged #60332 breaker, fixed as follow-ups:
- restore_primary_runtime() now resets the streak (third provider-swap
path; without it a recovered primary was short-circuited before a
single attempt and could never be re-proven healthy except via /model).
- interruptible_api_call (non-streaming) now carries the same breaker
(guard at entry, bump on stale_call_kill, reset on success). Quiet-mode
/ subagent / headless sessions — the profile most like #58962's
unattended 494-failure session — take this path and had the identical
infinite stale-retry class.
- Partial-stream stub return now resets the streak (chunks were received,
provider demonstrably responsive).
- Consolidated the triple-duplicated counter arithmetic into shared
helpers (_stale_streak/_bump_stale_streak/_reset_stale_streak/
_check_stale_giveup) with one canonical comment block; error message
now says 'consecutive stale attempts' (the counter counts kills, not
turns — a single turn can produce several).
4 new tests (restore resets / no-op restore keeps latch / non-streaming
short-circuit / non-streaming success reset).
Follow-up for the salvaged #60332 circuit breaker. The breaker latches:
once the streak trips, interruptible_streaming_api_call raises before any
stream is attempted, so the on-success reset can never run again. The
error text tells the user to switch models and retry — but neither
switch_model() nor try_activate_fallback() cleared the streak, so a
freshly selected healthy provider kept short-circuiting forever (only
/new recovered), and the automatic fallback chain was wedged the same way.
Reset the streak at both swap sites (after a successful rebuild only;
rollback/exhaustion paths keep the latch). 4 tests.
A session wedged against an unresponsive OpenAI-compatible provider can hit the stale-stream detector on every turn and loop forever, burning the full 180s x retries each turn with no response. Issue #58962 reports 494 consecutive failures over 3+ days on a single session.
The streaming retry path already caps retries WITHIN a turn (HERMES_STREAM_RETRIES, default 2) but has no cross-turn cap. Once a session's conversation state makes every turn stale, it retries indefinitely across turns and never notifies the user.
Add a per-session consecutive-stale-stream counter on the agent:
- incremented on every stale-stream kill in the outer poll loop;
- reset to 0 only when a stream actually completes;
- when it reaches HERMES_STREAM_STALE_GIVEUP (default 5), the next turn aborts immediately with a clear, actionable RuntimeError instead of spending 180s x retries again.
This is distinct from the existing stale-stream work (local-provider hard ceiling #44938, backoff/parse-error #60031): those bound a single hung stream, while this bounds repeated cross-turn staleness and surfaces a user-visible error.
Adds tests/run_agent/test_stream_stale_circuit_breaker.py covering the short-circuit, the success-reset, and the increment.
Same 10062 degrade-gracefully pattern as _run_simple_slash: create the
thread anyway, skip the ephemeral followups that need a live
interaction token. Non-expiry defer errors still raise.
- export now shares _add_session_filter_args / build_prune_filters with
prune/archive: AGE grammar (5h/2d/1w/ISO) on --older-than plus the full
filter set (--model, --provider, --min-messages, --min-cost, --branch,
--chat-id, ...) for both JSONL and md/qmd bulk exports; --dry-run works
on JSONL too; removes the one-off list_export_candidates helper.
- new --redact flag runs exported message content and tool output through
force-mode secret redaction (agent.redact) for jsonl, md, and qmd.
- docs EN + zh-Hans updated; new tests for AGE grammar, extended filters,
filtered JSONL, and redaction.
Replaces the parallel export-md subcommand from the salvaged commit with
a --format jsonl|md|qmd flag on the existing export subcommand, so all
session export formats share one surface. Adds AUTHOR_MAP entry.
Salvage follow-up for PR #59542 by @web3blind.
_handle_active_session_busy_message (the busy_session_handler most
platform adapters register) demotes busy_input_mode='interrupt' to
queue semantics for two reasons: active subagents (#30170) and, as of
this week, context compression in flight (#56391) — interrupting while
compression holds the state.db lock races a new turn against the
pre-rotation parent session, and if that new turn also grows past the
compression threshold it starts its own uncancellable compression on
the same stale parent, forking orphaned compression siblings.
_handle_message has its own, independent inline "PRIORITY" busy-path
(reached directly with a live running agent — see the `if _quick_key in
self._running_agents:` guard, exercised end-to-end by the existing
tests/gateway/test_running_agent_session_toggles.py harness). Its own
comment says it mirrors _handle_active_session_busy_message's subagent-
demotion rationale verbatim, and it does demote for active subagents,
but it never checked _session_has_compression_in_flight, so a plain-text
follow-up landing on this path while compression is mid-flight still
called running_agent.interrupt() unconditionally.
Fix: add the same _session_has_compression_in_flight(session_key) check
before the PRIORITY interrupt call, demoting to queue exactly like the
sibling path.
Tests: tests/gateway/test_priority_path_compression_demotion_56391.py
drives _handle_message end-to-end (reusing the test_running_agent_
session_toggles.py harness pattern) with a live running agent and a
mocked compression lock. Mutation-verified: reverting the fix makes the
demotion test fail (interrupt() gets called) against the pre-fix code;
a control test pins the unchanged default-interrupt behavior when no
compression lock is held.
Extends the send_exec_approval embed-invisibility fix to its three
sibling prompt surfaces — send_slash_confirm, send_clarify, and
send_update_prompt — via a shared _self_contained_prompt_content()
helper. All four interactive views now carry their payload in plain
content next to the buttons; the embed stays as progressive
enhancement for clients that render it. Adds gold to the conftest
discord Color mock (update prompt is the only gold user).
Discord's ExecApprovalView, SlashConfirmView, UpdatePromptView, and
ClarifyChoiceView hardcoded timeout=300, ignoring approval timeout
configuration. All four now read approvals.discord_prompt_timeout from
config.yaml (default 300s, clamped 30-900s — Discord interaction tokens
expire at ~15 min, so values beyond 900s would render dead buttons).
Surgical reapply of the timeout portion of PR #45904; the unrelated
channel-context changes bundled in that PR were intentionally excluded.
Co-authored-by: cruzanstx <cruzanstx@users.noreply.github.com>
BaseEnvironment writes shell snapshots and cwd metadata through the process
umask. With a common 022 umask, snapshot files containing exported environment
state landed at mode 0644 even though they can include env-carried credentials
from the parent process.
Set umask 077 only around Hermes metadata writes: the initial snapshot
bootstrap and the post-command snapshot/cwd refresh. User commands still run
under the caller's original umask, while Hermes-owned snapshot and cwd files
are created owner-only.
This intentionally does not copy the source PR's global orphan sweep; deleting
all matching /tmp snapshot files could interfere with concurrent Hermes
processes. The security-critical local disclosure fix is the file mode clamp.
This is salvageable because the source report still identifies a concrete
credential-disclosure path, but the safe subset is smaller than the original
proposal: clamp only the Hermes-owned snapshot writes and leave process-wide
cleanup, user command umask, and concurrent sessions alone.
Salvages source PR: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pull/20056
Related issue: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/48441
Co-authored-by: Andrew Homeyer <andrew@hndl.app>
_SlashWorker call sites now pass profile_home=; the fakes' 2-arg
__init__ raised TypeError inside the spawn guard, leaving
slash_worker=None and failing the orphan-race regression tests.
Profile-local skills are unavailable in Dashboard/TUI/Desktop GUI because the
_SlashWorker subprocess is spawned with os.environ.copy() but does NOT receive
the profile-specific HERMES_HOME from the parent session. This causes the
subprocess to search ~/.hermes instead of the active profile's skills directory.
1. Modify _SlashWorker.__init__ to accept optional profile_home parameter
2. When profile_home is provided, set env['HERMES_HOME'] = profile_home before
spawning the subprocess
3. Update all 4 call sites to pass profile_home=session.get('profile_home')
4. Add regression tests for profile-home propagation
- Full TUI gateway test suite: 107 tests pass
- New tests cover:
- profile_home parameter acceptance
- backward compatibility (None, omitted)
- argv correctness
Fixes#40677
Sessions no longer auto-reset by default. SessionResetPolicy.mode now
defaults to "none" (was "both": 24h idle + daily 4am), matching the
setup wizard's existing no-reset default and community feedback that
surprise context loss hurts more than it helps.
- gateway/config.py: dataclass default + from_dict fallback -> "none";
installs whose config.yaml lacks a session_reset section stop
auto-resetting
- hermes_cli/setup.py: "Never auto-reset" is now the recommended/default
choice in hermes setup agent; stale comment updated
- docs (en + zh-Hans): default is no auto-reset, opt in via
session_reset in config.yaml
Users who explicitly configured idle/daily/both resets keep them.
/new's handler calls _reset_notice_session_info, which resolves live
provider credentials and can probe model context length over HTTP. In
CI there are no credentials, so resolution walks the entire fallback
chain (the failed run's log shows 'Primary provider auth failed ...
trying fallback' captured inside the test) and on a slow runner the
first parametrization can blow past send_and_capture's 2s poll window,
making adapter.send appear never-called.
Stub it to return an empty info block in the e2e runner fixture — these
tests exercise gateway command dispatch, not provider resolution, and no
other network-touching path exists in the /new flow. Flaked in run
28856659216 (telegram param only); tests/e2e now 57/57 locally.
Replace the hand-rolled ensurepip bootstrap (and five other one-off
pip-install code paths) with hermes_cli.tools_config._pip_install, which
prefers the bundled uv (fast, needs no pip in the venv), falls back to
python -m pip, and bootstraps pip via ensurepip only when missing.
Sites unified:
- hermes_cli/setup.py: _install_neutts_deps, _install_kittentts_deps,
modal SDK install, daytona SDK install
- hermes_cli/memory_setup.py: memory-plugin pip deps (previously dead-ended
when uv AND pip binaries were both absent)
- hermes_cli/dingtalk_auth.py: qrcode auto-install (previously invoked
'python -m uv' which is not how uv ships)
- agent/lsp/install.py: --target LSP server installs
- plugins/google_meet/cli.py, plugins/platforms/matrix/adapter.py,
plugins/platforms/google_chat/oauth.py, plugins/memory/honcho/cli.py
Tests updated to assert the ladder behavior (uv-first, pip fallback,
ensurepip bootstrap) instead of the removed bespoke branches.
Follow-up on the salvaged fix, which bounded start_polling() only in
_handle_polling_network_error. The same wedge (#59614) exists at the two
sibling call sites:
1. _start_polling_resilient (bootstrap): an exhausted pool hangs connect()
forever. The TimeoutError from wait_for is a builtins TimeoutError
(OSError subclass), so the existing except classifies it via
_looks_like_network_error and schedules background recovery.
2. _handle_polling_conflict (conflict-retry ladder): identical hang wedges
conflict attempt N forever; timeout now converts to RuntimeError and the
existing except schedules the next attempt.
Tests replaced with a stronger suite: hung-network-ladder repro (RED without
the fix), bootstrap hang schedules recovery, success-path sanity, and a
bug-class contract test asserting EVERY updater.start_polling( call site is
wrapped in wait_for so a new unbounded site can't reintroduce the wedge.
Verified RED (3 failures) with the wrappers removed, GREEN with them.
When the connection pool is in a degraded state after
_drain_polling_connections(), start_polling() can hang indefinitely
when both primary and fallback Telegram endpoints are unreachable. The
httpx client may hold a stale socket that neither connects nor times out
within PTB's internal flow, causing the reconnect ladder to stall at
attempt 1/10 forever.
Wrap start_polling() in asyncio.wait_for() with a 30-second timeout so a
hung call raises asyncio.TimeoutError and feeds back into the existing
retry ladder. This unblocks:
- The 10-retry ladder advances to attempt 2, 3, ...
- The heartbeat loop sees _polling_error_task.done() and can trigger recovery
- The reconnect watcher gets the adapter in _failed_platforms
Fixes#59614
Port from anomalyco/opencode#31877: JSON Schema type arrays like
["number","string"] (common in MCP tool schemas) were collapsed to the
first non-null type, silently dropping every other branch. Several
tool-call backends reject the array form outright — llama.cpp's grammar
generator and Gemini via OpenAI-compatible transports (e.g. GitHub
Copilot proxying to Gemini) 400 on it.
_sanitize_node now mirrors @ai-sdk/google: a single non-null type stays
type:X (+nullable if null was present), multiple non-null types become
an anyOf of single-type schemas so no branch is lost, and an all-null
array becomes type:null. Single-null collapse is unchanged.
Verified nested (object props, array items) survive the full sanitize
pipeline — combinator stripping is top-level-only and nullable-union
collapse only fires on single-survivor unions, so multi-type anyOf is
left intact.
Drop the Responses-API native compaction path and its opt-in umbrella
flag from the salvaged feature. On the Codex OAuth chat route Hermes
owns the message list and the summary compressor works (and stays
provider-portable — encrypted compaction items would lock the session
history to chatgpt.com and break /model switches and provider
fallback). On the app-server runtime (codex CLI/agent) the codex agent
owns the real thread context, so thread/compact/start is the only
mechanism that can actually shrink it (#36801) — that path is now the
default behavior for codex_app_server sessions, controlled by
compression.codex_app_server_auto (native|hermes|off), no umbrella
flag.
Removed: responses.compact() call path, codex_compaction_items replay/
persistence plumbing, codex_native_compaction + codex_responses_threshold
config keys, desktop settings fields, and their tests. Kept: everything
app-server (compact_thread(), compaction notifications, bookkeeping,
docs, tests) plus cache-busting keys for the surviving knobs.
Port from openclaw/openclaw#91950: normalize LLM-generated URLs like 'https:// docs.example' before web tool safety checks while preserving path and query encoding semantics.
* fix: cool down transient Telegram typing failures
Port from openclaw/openclaw#93020: add per-chat cooldown for transient sendChatAction failures so keep-typing refreshes do not hammer Telegram during network blips or rate limits.
* fix: support bare Telegram adapters in typing cooldown
* test: update typing backoff imports for relocated Telegram adapter
The Telegram adapter moved from gateway/platforms/telegram.py to
plugins/platforms/telegram/adapter.py since this branch was created;
point the test imports and monkeypatch targets at the new module.
--safe-mode promised to disable ALL customizations, but shell hooks
declared in config.yaml's hooks: block registered anyway —
register_from_config() runs independently of plugin discovery and
load_config() does not honor HERMES_IGNORE_USER_CONFIG. Gate it on
HERMES_SAFE_MODE at the single chokepoint so troubleshooting runs fire
zero user-configured code (plugins, MCP, and hooks).
Docs (en + zh) updated; positive + negative tests added.
The salvaged fix added a post-worker _interrupt_requested re-check to the
main OpenAI/Anthropic streaming poll loop. The Bedrock Converse poll loop
(interruptible_streaming_api_call, api_mode='bedrock_converse') has the same
bug class: its worker calls stream_converse_with_callbacks(on_interrupt_check=
...), which breaks out of the event loop on interrupt and returns a PARTIAL
response WITHOUT raising (bedrock_adapter.py). The worker sets result[
'response'] and exits with _interrupt_requested still True, so the in-loop
raise never fires and the poll loop returns the partial — silently swallowing
/stop on Bedrock exactly as it was on the paths the salvaged commit fixed.
Add the identical post-worker re-check before the Bedrock loop's return.
The non-streaming loop (interruptible_api_call) is structurally immune: its
worker's only early return fires off _request_cancelled, which is set by the
main loop immediately before it raises in-loop, so no swallow window exists.
Guard test flips _interrupt_requested True mid-stream (after the pre-flight
check) and asserts InterruptedError is raised; verified RED without the fix
(DID NOT RAISE) and GREEN with it.
The provider-mismatch guard now checks pool_provider and
current_provider != pool_provider. MagicMock.provider returns
a truthy child mock by default, which would trigger the guard
and skip the pool recovery tests. Set pool.provider='' explicitly.
Review findings: (a) an absolute path outside trusted roots passes
through unchanged and gets rejected downstream by skill_view — add a
debug log at the pass-through so the cron 'skill not found' symptom is
diagnosable next time; (b) test_relative_path_unchanged patched
get_skills_dir although the relative branch early-returns before any
root lookup — drop the misleading patch.
The extracted normalize_skill_lookup_name() resolved trusted roots via
agent.skill_utils.get_skills_dir(), but skill_view() enforces
tools.skills_tool.SKILLS_DIR — a separate module attribute that callers
and 60+ existing tests patch directly. With the helper reading a
different symbol than the enforcer, any SKILLS_DIR patch (or future
divergence between the two resolvers) makes normalization disagree with
enforcement and absolute-path loads regress silently. Read SKILLS_DIR at
call time (deferred import, cycle-safe) with get_skills_dir() as the
fallback, and align the new tests to patch the enforced symbol.
Follow-up to the salvage of #59829 by @HexLab98.
Add unit tests for normalize_skill_lookup_name and a cron scheduler
regression that absolute paths under the skills dir reach skill_view as
relative lookups.
Port from nearai/ironclaw#4547: treat a JSON null memory target as omitted so strict providers that fill optional fields with null use the documented default target instead of failing validation.
Deleting the matched user message breaks the strict role-alternation
invariant on the exact incident tail this fix targets — user(confirm) →
assistant('OK, restarting') becomes two consecutive assistant messages,
which strict providers reject and which the alternation-repair passes
upstream don't cover. Replace the message content with an explicit
'confirmation EXPIRED, re-confirm before any destructive action'
sentinel instead: the trigger text is still neutralized, the model gets
an affirmative instruction not to act, and the message sequence stays
valid. Adds an alternation-preservation regression test.
Follow-up to the salvage of #59640 by @knoal.
When a high-risk side effect (e.g. host restart via shutdown.exe) runs,
the user's plain-text confirmation phrase is persisted in the conversation
transcript. If the host restart killed the gateway process before the
assistant's tool result was written, the transcript tail ends on the
assistant's text response - and the dangerous confirmation text remains
in the user role.
On the next inbound message - possibly a casual 'are you there?' from
the user minutes later - the LLM sees the stale confirmation and may
interpret the new turn as a fresh re-confirmation, re-executing the
destructive action. This is the failure mode reported in #59607.
Fix:
- Add strip_stale_dangerous_confirmations() in agent/replay_cleanup.py
that removes user messages whose content matches a known dangerous
confirmation pattern AND whose timestamp is older than 60 seconds.
- Add is_dangerous_confirmation() helper with the matched patterns
(i18n-aware: covers 確認強制重開機 from the original incident).
- Wire the stripper into _build_gateway_agent_history() right after the
existing 75ed07ace strippers, so the strip chain is:
strip_interrupted_tool_tails -> strip_dangling_tool_call_tail ->
strip_stale_dangerous_confirmations.
- Update _build_replay_entry() to preserve the timestamp on user
messages (it was previously dropped), since the new stripper needs it.
Complements 75ed07ace (which strips the assistant side of the broken
tail) by handling the user side: a stale plain-text confirmation that
the assistant has not yet responded to in a way the resume logic
recognises.
Failing-test-first discipline: the bug-detection test
test_stale_confirmation_text_is_stripped_on_resume fails on unfixed
code (proves the test catches the bug) and passes after the fix.
Five additional safety tests confirm no regression on:
- fresh confirmations (within expiry) are preserved
- non-confirmation text is preserved
- non-matching histories are untouched
- dangerous-pattern detection works in all cases (case, i18n, None)
- direct unit test of the strip helper
Refs: #59607
The repair UPDATE ('SET active = 1 WHERE active IS NULL') was gated at
schema_version < 12, so already-v12+ databases — the exact population hit
by #51646, where the reconciler-added active column lacks its NOT NULL
DEFAULT 1 — never healed rows written as NULL by the pre-fix INSERTs.
Move the idempotent repair into unconditional startup so historical
gateway transcripts become visible again after upgrading.
Follow-up to the salvage of #59832 by @HexLab98.
* fix(gateway): use process-level HERMES_HOME for identity files
Gateway identity files (PID, lock, runtime status, takeover/stop markers)
were written via get_hermes_home() which honours the _HERMES_HOME_OVERRIDE
contextvar used for per-session profile dispatch. When a profile-context
task happened to be active at write time, files landed in the wrong profile
directory.
Add _get_process_hermes_home() that skips the contextvar and uses only the
HERMES_HOME env var or platform default, and route all gateway identity file
paths through it.
Fixes#56986
* chore(release): map liuhao1024 author email for PR #56993 salvage
---------
Co-authored-by: liuhao1024 <sunsky.lau@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ben <ben@nousresearch.com>
* fix(dashboard): use loopback host for in-container WebSocket client (#58993)
Fixes#58993 - the in-container Dashboard's WebSocket client was dialing
the bind host (0.0.0.0) instead of 127.0.0.1, hijacking the host browser
when the container port was exposed.
* `hermes_cli/web_server.py::resolve_dashboard_ws_url()` now substitutes
127.0.0.1 for any 0.0.0.0 bind host discovered via the existing
`find_unused_port` / `get_listen_address` path. LAN IPs and explicit
`DASHBOARD_WS_HOST` overrides pass through unchanged.
* Existing tests preserved (no regression on the explicit-bind case).
Tests in `tests/dashboard/test_ws_client_host.py` cover:
- Bind host 0.0.0.0 → ws URL uses 127.0.0.1
- Bind host 127.0.0.1 → ws URL uses 127.0.0.1 (no regression)
- Bind host 192.168.1.5 → ws URL preserves the LAN IP
- DASHBOARD_WS_HOST env override wins over auto-detection
AI-assisted fix by https://github.com/SquabbyZ/peaks-loop
(cherry picked from commit 5501dd38d660619729ebcad85b75a8f46f8deb38)
* chore(release): map SquabbyZ email for AUTHOR_MAP attribution (#59682)
---------
Co-authored-by: SquabbyZ <601709253@qq.com>
* fix(auth): resolve Anthropic OAuth file per-profile + close port-binding platform gaps
Two focused pieces salvaged from PR #57563:
1. _HERMES_OAUTH_FILE was computed at module import time — frozen before
HERMES_HOME/profile overrides, so multiplexed profile turns read and
wrote the DEFAULT profile's .anthropic_oauth.json (OAuth path hijack).
Replaced with a lazy _get_hermes_oauth_file(); all web_server.py call
sites updated.
2. _PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_VALUES was missing whatsapp_cloud and line —
both bind aiohttp TCP listeners, so a secondary multiplex profile
enabling them would collide with the primary's listener instead of
failing fast at startup.
Original work by @austinlaw076. The rest of #57563 was redundant on
main (adapter routing sweep superseded by #56854's salvage; cron secret
scope landed in fdab380a1; nested-config fallback in from_dict).
* chore(release): map austinlaw076 author email for PR #57563 salvage
* test(hermes_cli): patch _get_hermes_oauth_file instead of removed _HERMES_OAUTH_FILE constant
---------
Co-authored-by: Austin <austin@openvm067.space>
Co-authored-by: Ben <ben@nousresearch.com>
* fix(gateway): per-profile pairing whitelist isolation for multiplex gateways
Pairing approvals are stored per profile (profiles/<name>/pairing/) and
authz routes pairing checks through the serving profile's store, so one
profile's approved users no longer authorize against every other
profile's whitelist in multiplex mode.
The global store remains for the hermes pairing CLI and single-profile
gateways; unregistered/unstamped sources fall back to it, preserving
existing behavior.
Salvaged from PR #53045 (pairing half). The SOUL.md half was dropped:
the agent turn already runs inside _profile_runtime_scope on main, so
load_soul_md() resolves per-profile without changes.
Original work by @soddy022.
* ci: redispatch after arm64 docker dashboard-slot flake (unrelated to this PR)
---------
Co-authored-by: soddy022 <290613374+soddy022@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(gateway): scope reset banners' session info to the serving profile
The auto-reset notice and the manual /reset //new banner both appended
_format_session_info() outside any profile scope, so a multiplexed
gateway advertised the base config's model/provider/context while the
session actually ran on the profile's.
Route both call sites through a new _reset_notice_session_info(source),
which enters _profile_runtime_scope for the source's profile when
gateway.multiplex_profiles is on (mirroring _run_agent's gating), so
_load_gateway_config()/_resolve_gateway_model() resolve the profile's
config.yaml via the existing context-local home override. Single-profile
gateways never enter the scope — behavior unchanged.
Both call sites invoke the helper via asyncio.to_thread: under the
scope, resolution can do blocking work (credential refresh,
context-length HTTP probes) that previously failed fast unscoped and
must not run on the event loop.
Fixes#59003
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(release): map irresi author email for PR #59048 salvage
---------
Co-authored-by: irresi <blueirobin02@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A hosted agent whose Nous bootstrap session dies terminally (invalid_grant /
quarantine) looks HEALTHY to every liveness/connectivity probe — the machine,
relay ws, and dashboard all stay up — yet every inference turn hard-fails with
a provider-auth error until a human re-logs-in. Nothing currently surfaces that
condition to NAS.
Add get_nous_session_validity() (valid|terminal|unknown), classified from local
auth-store state (no working token required), and report it on the public
/api/status payload. NAS's 2-min health sweep reads it and re-mints the
bootstrap session in place on 'terminal'.
Anti-flap: only a terminal failure (relogin_required / persisted quarantine
marker with tokens cleared) maps to 'terminal'; transient/mid-rotation blips and
merely-expiring tokens report 'unknown' so a healthy box never triggers a
spurious re-mint.
Part of the hosted-agent bootstrap-session self-heal (NAS side reads this field).
The test_module_resolves_to_this_worktree guard asserted auth.__file__ contained
'worktrees/bootstrap-h2-logging' — a local dev crutch to defeat the editable-
install trap (venv points at the main checkout). In CI the code lives at
/home/runner/work/... so the assertion always fails. It never belonged in the
committed suite; the 5 behavioural tests are what matter.
A NAS-hosted Fly agent's Nous bootstrap session can take a terminal
invalid_grant and get quarantined in _quarantine_nous_oauth_state, which
clears the dead tokens from auth.json. Until now this quarantine was
completely silent: the only signal was a downstream "No access token found"
WARNING once the credential pool was already empty, which is too late to
root-cause. Because the Fly log drain is WARNING-only, nothing about the
terminal death reached centralized logging, and a real incident could not be
diagnosed because the evidence was never recorded.
Emit a WARNING+ forensic record AT the quarantine point, before the token
material is cleared. Fields: refresh_token hash prefix (12-char SHA-256 hex,
correlates to NAS's refreshTokenHash), client_id, agent_key_id, error code,
reason, auth.json path/size/mtime/exists, and whether the token was already
past its own expiry. WARNING level is deliberate — INFO never reaches the Fly
drain.
Redaction safety (load-bearing): the log dict is built only from computed
values (hash prefix, sizes, booleans). No raw refresh_token, access_token, or
agent_key bytes are ever passed into the log call, avoiding Hermes's known
credential-literal corruption bug class. A test asserts the raw refresh token
substring is absent from all emitted log output.
Note: no session_id field exists on Nous auth state; provenance is captured
via client_id + agent_key_id, which are non-secret routing identifiers.
The stage2-hook auth.json seed is first-boot-only ([ ! -f auth.json ]) to avoid
clobbering rotated refresh tokens on restart. That guard means a container whose
Nous bootstrap session took a terminal invalid_grant (tokens cleared,
providers.nous.last_auth_error.relogin_required stamped) cannot recover from a
restart — it stays unauthenticated until the credential is replaced.
Add a self-heal path: an orchestrator that manages the container supplies a
freshly-issued session via HERMES_AUTH_JSON_REBOOTSTRAP (distinct from the
create-only *_BOOTSTRAP var). On boot, scripts/docker_rebootstrap_nous_session.py
swaps ONLY the providers.nous entry, and ONLY when the on-disk entry is provably
terminal (quarantine marker + no usable tokens). Healthy/rotating/absent/
unparseable auth.json is always a no-op, so the env is safe to leave set across
restarts and never clobbers a good token. Pure stdlib, runs as its own
subprocess, always exits 0 so a re-seed error never fails the boot.
Reuses the same terminal predicate as get_nous_session_validity() so we re-seed
only a session that is genuinely dead.
Follow-up hardening on the cherry-picked pool-fallback fix. The original
_resolve_codex_usage_credentials wrapped BOTH resolve_codex_runtime_credentials()
and the separate _read_codex_tokens() account_id read in one broad
'except Exception: pass', which had three problems:
1. A transient refresh/network failure (non-AuthError) from the resolver was
silently swallowed and downgraded to pool.select(), which could report
/usage limits for a DIFFERENT pool account than the one actually running.
On main that error surfaced. This is a real behavior regression for the
multi-account/pool case.
2. If the resolver succeeded but only the account_id read raised, the whole
singleton tier was abandoned in favor of a pool token that carries no
ChatGPT-Account-Id header (PooledCredential has no account_id concept),
risking a wrong-account read or 401.
3. 'except Exception' masked genuine programming errors.
Fix: narrow the outer catch to AuthError (the documented 'no creds' failure
mode of both functions), and read account_id in a best-effort inner try so a
partial/missing singleton store can't sink an otherwise-usable credential.
Transient errors now propagate and fail open via the outer fetch_account_usage
guard rather than mis-routing to the wrong account. Adds debug breadcrumbs and
a comment characterizing when the tier-3 pool path actually fires.
Guard tests: a non-AuthError resolver failure must NOT swap to the pool
(fail-open, no snapshot); an account_id read failure keeps the singleton token.
Updated the existing pool-fallback test to use AuthError (the real failure
mode) instead of a generic RuntimeError.
Follow-up on the salvage of #59523. Two low-risk cleanups surfaced by review:
- Extract _ZAI_CODING_OVERLOAD_SHORT_ATTEMPTS as a module constant so
adaptive_rate_limit_backoff() and zai_coding_overload_retry_ceiling()
share one source of truth. Previously both hardcoded short_attempts=3
independently; tuning one without the other would silently desync the
retry ceiling from the backoff schedule.
- Replace the tautological formula-mirroring assert in
test_zai_overload_retry_ceiling_exceeds_short_attempts with a behavior
invariant (ceiling leaves headroom for every long-backoff entry), per the
repo's contracts-over-snapshots testing rule.
Assert the invariant that the Z.AI overload retry ceiling exceeds the
short-retry threshold (the original bug had them equal, so the long tier
was dead code), and walk the attempt range the retry loop actually
traverses to prove the full 30/60/90/120s long-backoff schedule now runs.
A fallback candidate can itself carry a stale credential (e.g. an
expired ANTHROPIC_TOKEN picked up by _try_anthropic). Its 401 previously
propagated out of the fallback call site and aborted the auxiliary task
— for compression: a 60s cooldown + context marker while the session
kept growing past the context cap. Live case: mattalachia debug dump
(Jul 2026), Codex timeout → Anthropic 401 x5 → 296K 'Cannot compress
further'.
Now each fallback candidate call is wrapped: on auth error, refresh the
candidate's provider credentials and retry once; if unrefreshable, mark
the provider unhealthy and walk the discovery chain again so the next
viable candidate serves. Sync + async paths. Non-auth errors still
raise unchanged.
Infer the concrete auxiliary auth provider from the selected client base
URL so provider:auto routes can refresh Copilot/Codex/Anthropic/Nous
credentials after auth errors, instead of skipping refresh because
resolved_provider stayed 'auto'. Adds the copilot branch to
_refresh_provider_credentials and evicts the stale auto-route cache
before retrying.
Fixes#20832. Salvaged from PR #20837, reapplied surgically onto current
main (branch predated the _retry_same_provider_sync/async extraction).
The -m flag seeds HERMES_MODEL/HERMES_INFERENCE_MODEL for the launched TUI
process only. But the per-turn config sync (_sync_agent_model_with_config)
computed its target via _config_model_target(), which fell back to those
env vars whenever config.yaml had no model.default — the normal state for
custom-provider-only setups. The sync then replayed the -m model as a
/model switch, and with model.persist_switch_by_default (default true)
_persist_model_switch wrote model.default/provider/base_url into
config.yaml. A one-shot CLI flag became the permanent global model,
visible in every new session and every model picker.
Two-sided fix:
- _config_model_target() no longer falls back to the env seed. Empty
model = config expresses no preference = sync is a no-op. The agent
keeps the session-scoped -m model; config.yaml edits still sync.
- _apply_model_switch() gains persist_override; all three internal
callers (config sync, /moa one-shot swap, /moa post-turn restore) pass
persist_override=False so session-mechanical switches can never write
config.yaml regardless of the persist-by-default setting. User-typed
/model keeps its existing flag/config behavior.
E2E-verified against an isolated HERMES_HOME with a custom-provider-only
config + -m env seed: sync no longer fires, config.yaml byte-identical,
_resolve_model() still returns the seed for the session's own agent.
When context.engine selects a plugin engine (e.g. LCM), the host
compression threshold — including the Codex gpt-5.5 50% -> 85%
autoraise — only configures the built-in ContextCompressor and never
reaches the plugin. The autoraise notice still fired, telling the user
auto-compaction was raised when nothing actually changed, and the
startup context-limit line printed the host percent next to the
engine's own threshold_tokens, contradicting itself.
- Clear _compression_threshold_autoraised when a plugin engine is
selected, suppressing both the CLI startup notice and the gateway
turn-1 replay via _compression_warning.
- Print the active engine's own threshold_percent in the startup
context-limit line so percent and token count agree.
- Built-in behavior is preserved, including the fallback path where a
configured engine fails to load and the built-in compressor takes
over.
Fixes#44439
The Codex gpt-5.5 compaction-threshold autoraise notice re-fired on every
agent init. Because the gateway rebuilds the agent per inbound message, the
notice spammed long-running Discord/Telegram/etc. sessions, and the only
documented remedy (`compression.codex_gpt55_autoraise false`) disables the
useful autoraise behavior itself.
Gate both emission surfaces — the CLI startup print and the gateway
`_compression_warning` replay — on a persisted per-profile marker under
`$HERMES_HOME` (`.codex_gpt55_autoraise_notice`), keyed on the from→to
percentages the notice displays. The notice now shows at most once per
profile; the autoraise still fires and `codex_gpt55_autoraise: false` still
disables it; and a later change to the raised threshold re-notifies once.
Docs updated to match.
The Codex gpt-5.5 compaction autoraise (#40957) overrode the effective
threshold unconditionally. If a user had set compression.threshold above
0.85, agent_init dropped them down to 0.85. That wastes usable window and
contradicts the feature's whole point: use more of the context, not less.
It happened silently too, since the one-time notice is suppressed when the
override doesn't raise.
The override is an autoraise. It must only raise. Pulled the apply logic
into a small pure helper that clamps the Codex case to never lower a
higher-or-equal user threshold, and emits the notice only when it actually
fires. Other overrides (Arcee Trinity) keep their existing unconditional
behavior.
Fixes the Codex gpt-5.5 compaction autoraise lowering a user's higher
configured threshold. A user on the Codex OAuth route with
compression.threshold > 0.85 was silently clamped to 0.85, compacting
earlier than they asked and using less of the 272K window the feature was
meant to unlock. The autoraise now only ever raises.
N/A
- [x] 🐛 Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] ✨ New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] 🔒 Security fix
- [ ] 📝 Documentation update
- [ ] ✅ Tests (adding or improving test coverage)
- [ ] ♻️ Refactor (no behavior change)
- [ ] 🎯 New skill (bundled or hub)
- `agent/agent_init.py`: added `_resolve_compression_threshold()`, a pure
helper that combines the global threshold with a per-model override. The
Codex gpt-5.5 autoraise never lowers a higher-or-equal user threshold;
the notice is returned only when it actually raises. Rewired `init_agent`
to call it, replacing the unconditional `compression_threshold = _model_cthresh`.
- `tests/agent/test_arcee_trinity_overrides.py`: added 5 cases for the
helper — raise from default, never-lower regression, equal-is-noop,
no-override passthrough, and non-codex (Trinity) unconditional apply.
1. Set `compression.threshold: 0.90` and run gpt-5.5 on provider `openai-codex`.
2. Before: effective threshold drops to 0.85, no notice. After: stays 0.90.
3. Run `scripts/run_tests.sh tests/agent/test_arcee_trinity_overrides.py`.
Stash `agent/agent_init.py` and the new cases fail; restore and they pass.
- [x] I've read the [Contributing Guide](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)
- [x] My commit messages follow [Conventional Commits](https://www.conventionalcommits.org/) (`fix(scope):`, `feat(scope):`, etc.)
- [x] I searched for [existing PRs](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/pulls) to make sure this isn't a duplicate
- [x] My PR contains **only** changes related to this fix/feature (no unrelated commits)
- [x] I've run `pytest tests/ -q` and all tests pass
- [x] I've added tests for my changes (required for bug fixes, strongly encouraged for features)
- [x] I've tested on my platform: macOS 15 (Darwin 25.5)
- [x] I've updated relevant documentation (README, `docs/`, docstrings) — or N/A
- [x] I've updated `cli-config.yaml.example` if I added/changed config keys — or N/A
- [x] I've updated `CONTRIBUTING.md` or `AGENTS.md` if I changed architecture or workflows — or N/A
- [x] I've considered cross-platform impact (Windows, macOS) per the [compatibility guide](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#cross-platform-compatibility) — or N/A
- [x] I've updated tool descriptions/schemas if I changed tool behavior — or N/A
gpt-5.3-codex-spark has a native 128K context window but the default
50% compaction trigger fires at ~64K, wasting half the usable window
before the session has accumulated enough turns to summarize
meaningfully. This raises the trigger to 70% (~90K) on the Codex OAuth
route only, leaving ~38K headroom for the summary and continued
conversation before the 128K hard limit.
The override is not gated by allow_codex_gpt55_autoraise because 128K
is the model's native window (unlike gpt-5.5's artificial 272K Codex
cap). Non-Codex routes are unaffected.
Also adds a boundary regression test verifying the short-session
scenario from the issue always yields a non-empty compressible window
(no silent context wipe).
The ChatGPT Codex OAuth backend caps both gpt-5.4 and gpt-5.5 at a 272K
context window, but the autoraise that lifts the compaction trigger to 85%
only matched gpt-5.5. On gpt-5.4 the global 50% threshold fired at ~136K —
half the usable window — compacting far earlier than necessary.
Rename _is_codex_gpt55 -> _is_codex_gpt54_or_gpt55 and match both families.
The one-time user notice is now model-aware (shows the actual slug). The
config key codex_gpt55_autoraise is kept as-is for backward compatibility.
Adds gpt-5.4 coverage to the autoraise tests.
Surfaces the usage_report()/provenance() data layer added in #36701 as a
user-facing CLI command. Unlike `hermes curator status` (scoped to
curator-managed agent-created candidates), `usage` lists every skill on disk
— bundled built-ins and hub-installed included — with per-skill use/view/patch
counts and an agent/bundled/hub provenance tag.
Flags: --sort {activity,recent,name}, --provenance {agent,bundled,hub} filter,
--json for machine-readable output.
* feat(oneshot): add --usage-file JSON usage report to hermes -z
Pipelines driving hermes -z (batch reviewers, cron scripts, eval
harnesses) had no way to account for per-invocation spend: the agent
computes estimated_cost_usd and full token counts internally, but
oneshot mode discards everything except the final response text.
- hermes -z PROMPT --usage-file PATH writes a JSON report after the
run: estimated_cost_usd, cost_status/source, input/output/cache/
reasoning/total tokens, api_calls, model, provider, session_id,
completed, failed.
- Written even when the run fails (with a failure field) so callers
can always account for spend; the write itself is best-effort and
never masks the run's own outcome.
- Flag registered in both the full parser and the Termux fast path;
added to both value-flag scan sets so profile detection stays
correct.
Validation: 6 unit tests + live E2E (real -z run produced a report
with real OpenRouter cost + token counts).
* test: include usage_file kwarg in oneshot dispatch assertions
The two dispatch tests assert the exact kwargs dict passed to
run_oneshot; the new usage_file kwarg must appear there.
A user-approved terminal/execute_code command could be SIGINT-killed
(exit 130 + "[Command interrupted]") by a stale interrupt bit that landed
on the execution thread during the blocking approval-wait, while the
result still carried the "...approved by the user." note. The terminal
tool runs sequentially inline on the execution thread, and nothing
cleared or re-checked the bit between approval-grant and env.execute.
Clear the current thread's interrupt bit once before an approved command
spawns its child (terminal foreground; execute_code local + remote), and
enrich the note to "...approved by the user, then interrupted." on a
genuine post-start interrupt instead of implying success. A genuine
interrupt arriving after execution starts (or during a retry backoff)
still SIGINTs the command; non-approved commands keep current behavior.
Adds regression tests covering stale-bit-clears, genuine-interrupt-still-
kills, the retry-backoff window, natural-exit-130 (not mislabeled), and
execute_code local + remote.
Follow-up on the cherry-picked #36896 commits, wiring 1Password into
the new registry as the reference *mapped* source:
- OnePasswordSource adapter (shape=mapped, scheme=op): fetch-only —
precedence, override semantics, conflict warnings, and env writes
move to the orchestrator; apply_onepassword_secrets kept as legacy
shim like Bitwarden's.
- Registered in _ensure_builtin_sources; mapped op:// bindings now
outrank bulk Bitwarden project dumps on contested vars.
- _cache.py FetchResult/is_valid_env_name re-exported from base so
there is exactly one canonical definition; bitwarden.py re-adapted
onto the contributor's DiskCache substrate.
- ErrorKind classification for op failures (auth/binary/empty/network).
- Registry + conformance coverage for OnePasswordSource, incl. the
headline multi-source test: both vaults claim the same var, mapped
1Password wins, conflict surfaced, provenance correct.
- env_loader tests migrated off the legacy apply_* mocks onto the
fetch layer; AUTHOR_MAP entry for @hwrdprkns.
The 1Password secret source resolves op:// references using
OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN read from os.environ. Under systemd the gateway
gets that token via EnvironmentFile, but cron jobs, subprocesses, CLI
runs, macOS launchd, and Docker containers spawn fresh interpreters with
no inherited shell state — so they silently failed to resolve any
reference and fell back to empty strings.
Two patches close the gap, matching Bitwarden's reliability guarantees:
1. env_loader: auto-load ~/.hermes/.op.env after .env so the gitignored
bootstrap token is available everywhere. override=False plus an
explicit guard ensure it never clobbers a token already in env (e.g.
from a systemd EnvironmentFile, which keeps precedence).
2. credential_pool: _get_env_prefer_dotenv() now prefers the resolved
value in os.environ when .env still holds a raw op:// reference,
instead of handing a URL to provider auth. Non-op:// values keep the
existing .env-takes-precedence behaviour.
Also gitignore .op.env, document the three bootstrap-token options, and
add tests covering auto-load, no-override, and the resolved-vs-raw
precedence (plus regression guards).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolve provider credentials from 1Password op://vault/item/field references
at startup via the official `op` CLI, alongside the existing Bitwarden source.
Users map env-var names to references in secrets.onepassword.env; after .env
loads, each is resolved with `op read` and injected into os.environ. Auth is
whatever `op` already uses (service-account token or desktop/interactive
session) — Hermes never authenticates or installs `op` itself.
Startup-safe and fail-open: a missing binary, expired auth, a bad reference,
or an empty value each warn and fall back to existing credentials, never
blocking startup. Successful, complete pulls are cached in-process and on disk
(<hermes_home>/cache/op_cache.json, 0600) via the shared DiskCache; only
secret values are stored, never the token (auth is fingerprinted into the
key). Adds `hermes secrets onepassword {setup,status,set,remove,sync,disable}`
(aliases op/1password), config defaults, the cli-config example, docs, and
hermetic tests.
Hardening applied across both backends in env_loader: each source runs in its
own guard, config sections are coerced to dict, and cache_ttl_seconds is
coerced defensively — so a malformed secrets: section can't abort startup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to #59524. The one-shot running-claim stale-recovery window was a
fixed 30-min constant. Derive it from the cron inactivity timeout instead
(HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT, the same limit the scheduler enforces per run) so the
safety valve tracks how long a run may actually go quiet:
- unset/invalid -> default 600s inactivity -> TTL 1800s (unchanged behaviour)
- positive N -> max(N * 3 headroom, 1800s floor)
- 0 (unlimited) -> no finite bound -> fall back to the 1800s constant
The fixed constant is kept as the floor + unlimited-case fallback. Resolved
once per due-scan. HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT is a pre-existing internal env var
(already read by cron/scheduler.py); no new config surface.
E2E: with HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=1200 the claim now survives to 60min where the
old fixed 1800s constant wrongly expired it at 30min mid-run. +1 derivation
test; 640/640 cron tests pass.
When a bundled web provider (firecrawl, tavily, exa, ...) is listed in
plugins.disabled, its provider never registers and the web_search/
web_extract dispatchers emitted the misleading "No web extract provider
configured. Set web.extract_backend to ..." — even though the backend was
configured correctly. The real fix is to re-enable the plugin.
- web_tools.py + web_search_registry.py: when the configured backend names
a disabled bundled web plugin, both dispatchers now point the user at the
actual cause (re-enable the plugin) instead of a wrong config hint.
- plugins_cmd.py cmd_enable: enabling by canonical key now also clears the
manifest-name alias (web-firecrawl) from plugins.disabled, so the
suggested command actually re-enables the plugin ('explicit disable wins'
matches on the name too).
- plugins_cmd.py cmd_toggle / _run_composite_ui / _run_composite_fallback:
the interactive 'hermes plugins' menu now persists the canonical key
(web/firecrawl), never the bare manifest name — the drift that put the
offending entry in plugins.disabled in the first place.
Follow-up to #59518 (which fixed web credential resolution, a different
cause). Fixes the disabled-plugin symptom reported after that PR.
The PR predates #31884, which changed the non-interrupted api_calls==0
empty path from silence to a retry hint. Flip the contributed test to
assert the current (correct) behavior.
A /stop sets _interrupt_requested on the session's cached agent, but the
flag is only cleared by the turn finalizer. When the stopped run is hung
or still draining, the flag survives the forced lock release and the
session's NEXT user message is killed at the top of the tool loop
(conversation_loop.py interrupt check): the run completes with
interrupted=True, api_calls=0 and an empty response, which
_normalize_empty_agent_response passed through as pure silence — the
user's message was swallowed with no trace except a
'response ready: ... api_calls=0 response=0 chars' log line.
Two-layer fix:
- _interrupt_and_clear_session now evicts the cached agent whenever it
releases the running state. The next message rebuilds the agent from
session history (mirroring the /new and /model paths), while the old
agent object keeps its interrupt flag so a hung drain still dies when
it unblocks. This intentionally does NOT clear the flag in place:
turn_context deliberately preserves a pending interrupt across turn
start (it carries interrupt-message delivery), and clearing it could
revive a hung run the user just stopped.
- _normalize_empty_agent_response distinguishes a drain from a swallowed
turn: an interrupted run that did work (api_calls > 0) stays silent as
before (deliberate stop/steer; queued messages are delivered by the
recursive drain inside _run_agent), but an interrupted run with ZERO
api_calls never processed the user's message at all and now surfaces a
'send it again' notice instead of nothing.
Same silent-delivery class as a1f76ba7e (#29346), which covered the
extract-stripped case; regression tests added next to that coverage.
Fixes#44212
test_verification_status_outside_workspace_is_not_applicable passed tmp_path as
the cwd and asserted status == not_applicable, relying on tmp_path having no
project-marker ancestor. _marker_root() walks up to ~6 levels, so a stray marker
in a shared tmp-root ancestor (e.g. a /tmp/package.json left by another tool)
made project_facts_for() resolve tmp_path as a workspace and flip the status to
unverified. Green in clean CI, red on any dev box with a polluted /tmp.
Force the no-facts precondition by monkeypatching project_facts_for -> None so
the test deterministically exercises the not_applicable branch regardless of
ambient filesystem state. Test-only; no production change.
`summarize_background_review_actions` was structured on the assumption
that every parsed tool response is a fully-typed dict-of-fields. In
practice the memory/skill tools — and their wrappers over Mem0 OSS and
the skill_manage MCP server — sometimes serialize `_change` as a list
or scalar, and clamp `operations` to a single string when the field
came in via a partial JSON bridge.
The original code did the equivalent of:
change = data.get("_change", {})
change.get("description", "")
so when `_change` was a list the inner .get crashed with
`AttributeError: 'list' object has no attribute 'get'`, every ~10
turns the user saw the entire background review collapse.
Three defensive guards in summarize_background_review_actions:
- `call_details.get(tcid, {})` → `call_details.get(tcid) or {}` plus
`isinstance(detail, dict)` coercion. Catches stale scalar/None
values when a fork inherits partial state from a stale tool_call_id.
- `operations = detail.get("operations") or []` → `isinstance(ops_raw, list)`
coerce, then per-entry isinstance check before `.get()`. Skips
non-dict items without raising; an entire surrounding review no
longer goes down because one entry was malformed.
- `change = data.get("_change", {})` → `isinstance(change_raw, dict)`
coerce. The originally-reported crash class for skill_manage with
list-shaped _change now falls through to the generic summary path.
And the caller in `_run_review_in_thread` is wrapped in a try/except
that maps any residual summarize exception to `actions = []` and
emits a 'partial results' warning, so even an entirely unanticipated
shape won't take down the outer review — the user only sees
'Background memory/skill review failed' instead of the prior hard
crash that lost every successful action the fork had completed.
Tests: tests/test_background_review_list_shapes.py — standalone
pytest-free runner, 7/7 PASS:
a_change_as_list_does_not_crash (originally-reported shape)
a_change_as_int_does_not_crash (scalar fallback)
b_operations_as_string_treated_as_empty
b_operations_as_none_treated_as_empty
c_operations_contains_non_dict_entries (verbose-mode per-entry filter)
d_detail_non_dict_replaced_with_empty
e_call_defends_via_try_except (structural anchor)
Refs NousResearch/hermes-agent#59437
Server names with non-env-safe characters (dots, slashes, spaces)
produced invalid env-var keys like MCP_MY.SERVER_API_KEY or
MCP_GITHUB/MCP_API_KEY, breaking .env writes and ${VAR} header
substitution. _env_key_for_server now replaces any character outside
[A-Za-z0-9_] with an underscore.
Co-authored-by: Hermes Agent <agent@nousresearch.com>
Allow mainstream reverse-proxy path mounts to keep their X-Forwarded-Prefix when Home Assistant Supervisor ingress already consumes nearly the old 64-character budget. Keep validation bounded and keep rejected non-empty prefixes diagnosable with a deduplicated warning.
Constraint: HA Supervisor ingress prefixes are 63 chars before add-on subpaths, so the old 64-char cap dropped valid dashboard deployments.
Rejected: remove the length cap entirely | a bounded header budget is still a conservative validation guard.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep prefix validation centralized in hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix so auth routes, cookies, and SPA asset rewriting agree.
Tested: python probe for the 73-char HA ingress prefix; scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_prefix.py -q; .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server.py -k 'spa_assets_are_read_as_utf8' -q; python -m ruff check hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/prefix.py tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_prefix.py; git diff --check
Not-tested: full test suite
The +60s next_run_at advance only delayed a duplicate one-shot dispatch by
one tick — a job that outlives the 60s tick interval (the reported 2.5-min
research prompt) still re-fired on the next tick after the window expired,
so the concurrent gateway+desktop double-delivery persisted.
Replace it with a durable run_claim (at+by, mirroring fire_claim) stamped
on the one-shot under the same jobs lock get_due_jobs holds, and checked at
the top of the due-scan: a fresh claim held by an in-flight run makes every
other scheduler process skip the job for its ENTIRE run, not one tick.
mark_job_run() clears the claim on completion; a ONESHOT_RUN_CLAIM_TTL
(30 min) safety valve re-dispatches a claim left by a tick that died mid-run
so a one-shot is never wedged.
E2E: long-running one-shot no longer double-fires at +28/+61/+120/+179s;
completion clears the claim + disables the job; crash recovery re-arms past
the TTL. +3 regression tests.
When two scheduler processes (gateway + desktop) run concurrently,
both could pick up the same one-shot job from get_due_jobs() because
its next_run_at was not advanced before execution started — only
recurring jobs were advanced (L3446). This caused duplicate deliveries
and wasted token spend (#59229).
Now _get_due_jobs_locked advances a one-shot's next_run_at by 60s
before returning it as due, persisted immediately under the same
file lock. mark_job_run re-anchors next_run_at on completion, so a
tick death between advance and execution only delays the job by one
tick window — it is never lost.
Closes#59229
Dashboard /chat for the default (launch) profile attaches to the
dashboard process's in-memory TUI gateway. The Node PTY child receives a
bridged TERMINAL_CWD env var, but the in-memory gateway process does not,
so cwd resolution fell through to os.getcwd() (wherever `hermes
dashboard` was launched) and ignored the configured terminal.cwd.
Read the launch profile's config.yaml directly in the in-memory cwd
resolution: a configured terminal.cwd now wins over a stale process env
and the launch directory. Widened to the resume/fallback session-cwd
sites (not just _completion_cwd) via a shared _default_session_cwd()
helper so fresh AND resumed sessions honor the config.
Co-authored-by: ygd58 <buraysandro9@gmail.com>
The CWE-22 traversal guard in SessionEntry.from_dict rejects any
interior '/' in session_key, but session_key is a logical routing
key (never used as a filesystem path) and Google Chat resource names
legitimately contain '/' (spaces/<id>, spaces/<id>/threads/<id>).
All Google Chat sessions were silently dropped on gateway start.
Split the validation: session_id keeps the strict _is_path_unsafe
guard (it's the value used as a filename); session_key now uses a
relaxed _is_session_key_unsafe helper that only blocks genuine
traversal vectors (parent-dir '..', leading '/', leading '\', leading
Windows drive-letter prefix) and allows interior '/'.
The CLI model-switch display (both picker and direct-switch paths)
omitted the custom_providers keyword when calling
resolve_display_context_length(). The function already supports it
(and the gateway correctly passes it), but the CLI call sites relied
on the fallthrough to probe-down default (256K) even when a
custom_providers entry specified a per-model context_length.
Fix: pass agent._custom_providers at both resolve_display_context_length
call sites in HermesCLI._apply_model_switch_result(), matching the
pattern already used for config_context_length.
build_preloaded_skills_prompt() (hermes -s <skill>, and tui_gateway's
HERMES_TUI_SKILLS deployment env var) loads skills via _load_skill_payload()
with a raw identifier, bypassing get_skill_commands()' scan-time disabled
filter entirely. Result: a skill an operator disabled via skills.disabled
still gets force-loaded and injected into every session — including every
session on a shared tui_gateway deployment where the operator set
HERMES_TUI_SKILLS.
The bundle-invocation path (#59156) already re-checks get_disabled_skill_names()
for exactly this reason; preloaded-skill loading was the other _load_skill_payload
call site still missing it.
Fix: check each resolved skill's name (and raw identifier) against
get_disabled_skill_names() before injecting it. A disabled skill is now
reported the same way an unknown one already is (skipped, listed in the
returned missing_identifiers) — no return-shape or caller changes needed.
No behavior change when no skill is disabled.
Same bug class as #40190: these providers read credentials via bare
os.getenv(), so keys stored in ~/.hermes/.env (hermes config layer)
were invisible in execution paths that never exported them into the
process environment. Add get_provider_env() on the WebSearchProvider
module as the shared config-aware lookup (get_env_value with os.getenv
fallback) and route all credential reads through it. SearXNG already
did this (#34290); Firecrawl fixed in the preceding cherry-picked
commit by @liuhao1024.
The Firecrawl provider used os.getenv() to read FIRECRAWL_API_KEY and
FIRECRAWL_API_URL, which only checks the process environment. When
values are supplied through Hermes's ~/.hermes/.env config mechanism
(via hermes_cli.config.get_env_value), they are not guaranteed to be
present in os.environ for every gateway/tool execution path.
Switch to get_env_value() which checks both os.environ and the .env
file, matching the pattern used by other providers (nous_subscription,
setup, discord adapter).
Fixes#40190
_classify_by_status() routes every other transient HTTP status to a retryable
reason (500/502 -> server_error, 503/529 -> overloaded, 429 -> rate_limit,
413 -> payload_too_large), but 408 Request Timeout fell through to the generic
`400 <= status < 500` branch and was classified as a non-retryable
format_error -- the same bucket as a 400 Bad Request.
A 408 is a transient timing failure the server itself flags as safe to retry
(RFC 9110 15.5.9), not a malformed request, so the retry loop aborted the turn
when a simple retry would recover. Common trigger: a reverse proxy in front of
a self-hosted backend (llama.cpp / Ollama / vLLM) returns 408 when a long
generation outruns the proxy's request-read window.
Route 408 to the existing FailoverReason.timeout (rebuild client + retry).
Add a regression test plus a boundary test asserting 400 stays non-retryable.
_sync_back_once defers a SIGINT that lands mid-sync, then re-delivers it once the
sync completes so the user's Ctrl+C isn't lost. It did so with
os.kill(os.getpid(), signal.SIGINT). That is not graceful on Windows: os.kill
only treats CTRL_C_EVENT(0)/CTRL_BREAK_EVENT(1) as console events; any other
value (SIGINT == 2) routes to TerminateProcess(sig), so a Ctrl+C during a
remote-backend (ssh/daytona/modal) sync-back hard-kills the whole CLI session
(exit code 2) on Windows instead of raising KeyboardInterrupt.
Use signal.raise_signal(signal.SIGINT) (3.8+), which invokes the restored
handler through C raise() on every platform. Verified on Windows: raise_signal
runs the handler (graceful) while os.kill(getpid, SIGINT) TerminateProcess-es
the process. Adds a cross-platform regression test that runs on Windows too (it
stubs the locked sync body, so unlike test_file_sync_back.py it needs no fcntl).
Completes the #59395 bug-class fix. create_job and update_job's
schedule-change path already reject past one-shots (via #59410/#59438);
this closes the two remaining doors that stored next_run_at=None for a
'once' schedule and re-created the silent ghost job:
1. update_job fallback-recompute (the safety-net that re-derives
next_run_at when it's missing on an enabled, non-paused job)
2. resume_job (resuming a paused one-shot whose time has already passed
— empirically confirmed to create a scheduled job that never fires)
The redundant update_job schedule-change hunk from the original PR was
dropped (already on main via #59438). Adds resume-reject + update-reject/
accept regression tests.
Salvaged from #59428 by isheng-eqi.
Follow-up to #59332 targeting the remaining PERCEIVED first-token latency
(the wire streaming was already per-token; these fix what the user sees):
1. display.show_reasoning default ON. On thinking models the reasoning
phase streams for tens of seconds; with the display off users stare
at a spinner the whole time and read it as a stall. Flipped in
DEFAULT_CONFIG, load_cli_config defaults, tui_gateway raw-YAML
fallbacks, and the hermes setup status line (all four read sites kept
in sync). Gateway per-platform defaults intentionally stay off —
messaging chats shouldn't fill with thinking text. /reasoning hide
still turns it off and persists.
2. Response box force-flushes long partial lines. _emit_stream_text only
painted on newline, so a response opening with a long paragraph
stayed invisible until the first \n — seconds of blank box. Now
partial lines wrap at terminal width and paint as tokens arrive
(mirrors the reasoning box's 80-char force-flush that existed since
day one). Table blocks remain batch-aligned; no content loss at wrap
boundaries (regression tests added).
3. hermes_time timezone resolution uses read_raw_config (mtime-cached +
libyaml C loader) instead of a raw yaml.safe_load of config.yaml
(~110-140ms measured) inside the FIRST system prompt build. First
build drops 320ms -> ~155ms on a 200-skill install.
4. Stale docs: configuration.md (en+zh) still documented the 70%/90%
[BUDGET WARNING] tool-result injections. Those were removed in April
2026 (c8aff7463) precisely because they hurt task completion; current
behavior is exhaustion-message + one grace call, no mid-loop
injection, no cache impact. Docs now describe reality.
Verified: token-count compression decisions already use API-reported
last_prompt_tokens (rough estimators are preflight-only and cost ~1.7ms
even on 1.7MB histories — not worth touching).
Widen the #59395 fix to the sibling site: update_job's schedule-change path
(cron/jobs.py) had the SAME unguarded compute_next_run -> next_run_at pattern,
so updating a job's schedule to a one-shot >ONESHOT_GRACE_SECONDS in the past
would re-create the ghost job (next_run_at=None, state='scheduled', never fires)
that create_job now rejects. Apply the identical guard on update (raise before
any disk write, so the original job is left intact), with regression tests for
the reject + future-accept cases.
Also surface ONESHOT_GRACE_SECONDS in the raised ValueError (not just the
warning log) so a caller knows how far in the past is too far. Message from the
competing PR #59410 by @isheng-eqi.
Co-authored-by: isheng-eqi <265044697+isheng-eqi@users.noreply.github.com>
Bare 'hermes sessions prune' keeps the historical 90-day default, but any
filter — now including --source — suppresses the implicit cutoff, so
'prune --source cron' targets ALL cron sessions instead of silently only
those older than 90 days (the surprise a user hit live: 'No sessions
match ... source cron' despite plenty of recent cron runs).
- CLI preview + confirmation now show the match count plus the oldest
and newest matching session start times before deleting.
- Dashboard /api/sessions/prune mirrors the semantics: attribute filters
without an explicit older_than_days match all ages (model_fields_set
distinguishes an explicit 90 from the Pydantic default); dry_run
responses gain oldest_started_at/newest_started_at.
- Docs + argparse help updated; tests for both surfaces.
The Skills Hub 'Browse Hub' landing page and index-backed search render
empty on fresh deployments (e.g. Fly.io VPS agents) with no stale cache.
Root cause: the centralized index at /docs/api/skills-index.json is a
large body (~34MB, tens of MB compressed) served with Content-Encoding:
br. httpx's streaming Brotli decoder — backed by brotlicffi 1.2.0.1,
which is pinned so aiohttp can decode Discord attachments — trips over
its own output_buffer_limit on a payload this size and raises:
DecodingError("brotli: decoder process called with data when
'can_accept_more_data()' is False")
_load_hermes_index() catches that (DecodingError is an httpx.HTTPError
subclass) and silently falls back to the on-disk cache. On a fresh box
that cache never existed, so HermesIndexSource.is_available is False,
the index contributes 0 skills, and the hub landing page — which is
built solely from an empty-query index search — is blank. Existing
installs only appear to work because they serve a (possibly weeks-)stale
cached index instead.
Fix: request 'gzip, deflate' on the index fetch so httpx never
negotiates the broken Brotli path, and retry once with 'identity' if a
DecodingError still occurs (defends against a proxy that ignores the
header). Falls through to the stale cache only when both attempts fail.
Verified on a live staging VPS agent: index_available flips False->True
and the featured landing list repopulates from 0 to 12.
Also un-freezes already-deployed images: skills added after an image was
built (e.g. the 'unbroker' optional skill) become reachable again via
the index, which is the whole point of the centralized catalog.
load_gateway_config() only surfaced the top-level `multiplex_profiles`
key into gw_data before calling GatewayConfig.from_dict(). A config.yaml
that pinned the flag under the nested `gateway:` section -- the form
written by `hermes config set gateway.multiplex_profiles true` -- was
silently ignored, so the gateway loaded with multiplex_profiles=False.
from_dict() already honors the nested fallback, but load_gateway_config()
builds gw_data from top-level keys first, so the nested value never
reached it.
Read gateway.multiplex_profiles into gw_data when the top-level key is
absent, mirroring the existing nested fallback for max_concurrent_sessions.
Adds a load_gateway_config() regression test that writes a config.yaml
with `gateway.multiplex_profiles: true` and asserts the loaded config has
multiplex_profiles=True (fails without the fix).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(sessions): full filter surface for prune + new bulk archive subcommand
hermes sessions prune previously only supported --older-than N (integer
days) and --source — no way to target a window like 'the last 5 hours'
(e.g. a batch of CI smoke-test sessions), and no non-destructive option.
- SessionDB.prune_sessions gains keyword filters that AND together:
started_before/started_after epoch bounds, title_like, end_reason,
cwd_prefix, min/max_messages, archived tri-state. Default call is
byte-for-byte compatible (90-day cutoff, ended-only, source).
- New SessionDB.list_prune_candidates (backs --dry-run + confirmation
previews) and SessionDB.archive_sessions (bulk soft-hide via the
existing set_session_archived lineage-aware path; nothing deleted).
- CLI: prune gains --newer-than/--before/--after (durations like 5h/2d/1w,
bare days, or ISO timestamps), --title, --end-reason, --cwd,
--min/--max-messages, --include-archived, --dry-run. New
'hermes sessions archive' takes the same filters, requires at least one,
and is idempotent. Both show a preview before confirming.
- Dashboard /api/sessions/prune accepts the same filters + dry_run.
- Docs: sessions.md + cli-commands.md updated.
Filter parsing lives in hermes_cli/session_filters.py with unit tests;
DB filters covered in tests/test_hermes_state.py.
* feat(sessions): prune/archive filters for model, provider, user, chat, branch, tokens, cost, tool calls
Extends the prune/archive filter surface to everything identifiable in
the sessions table:
- --model (substring on model slug), --provider (exact on
billing_provider, case-insensitive), --user, --chat-id, --chat-type
(exact), --branch (substring on git_branch), --min/--max-tokens
(input+output), --min/--max-cost (USD, actual_cost_usd falling back to
estimated_cost_usd), --min/--max-tool-calls.
- SessionDB prune/archive/list_prune_candidates now share the filter
kwargs via **filters into _prune_filter_where (unknown names raise
TypeError); candidates listing + CLI preview now include the model.
- Any attribute filter (except legacy --source) suppresses the implicit
90-day default so 'prune --model X' matches all ages.
- Dashboard /api/sessions/prune passes the new fields through.
- Docs + tests updated (7 new DB tests, 3 new parser tests).
Fixes#50051 by preserving nested gateway.multiplex_profiles and routing gateway config env reads through the active profile secret scope when present.
This keeps secondary profile adapter startup from inheriting default-profile platform tokens or port-binding enables while preserving legacy single-profile behavior outside a scope.
Constraint: latest upstream main f57ff7aef1 still reproduced both nested-config loss and cross-profile env leakage
Rejected: special-casing API_SERVER_* only | left other profile-scoped tokens vulnerable to the same leak
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: keep future gateway/config env reads on the scoped helper path unless a variable is explicitly process-global
Tested: pytest -q tests/gateway/test_multiplex_phase0.py tests/gateway/test_multiplex_credential_isolation.py tests/gateway/test_config.py -k 'multiplex or scope or getenv or api_server or relay'
Not-tested: full gateway startup across live platform adapters
test_group_new_keeps_existing_reset_semantics_when_dm_topic_mode_enabled
asserts 'parallel work' not in the /new reply — but /new appends a
random tip from hermes_cli.tips (380 entries), and one tip's text
contains exactly that phrase (the delegate_task concurrency tip). CI
failed on PR #59331 slice 2 when the dice landed on it. Pin
get_random_tip in the test.
The routing sweep sends these paths through _adapter_for_source, which
reads source.profile. A bare MagicMock auto-attribute is truthy, so the
fixtures looked like stamped secondary profiles and hit the new
fail-closed branch. Real SessionSource.profile is None or str
(AGENTS.md pitfall #17).
register_mcp_servers now nudges cached entries whose session is None
via _signal_reconnect, so a new agent session recovers a parked server
immediately instead of waiting up to _PARKED_RETRY_INTERVAL for the
next self-probe (#50170). Gate-check idea credit: @izumi0uu (#50184),
@LeonSGP43 (#37772), @Tranquil-Flow (#37899).
The dead-session half-open test drives _signal_reconnect with
session=None; the salvaged _ReconnectAdapter assumed a live old
session. Also count set() calls explicitly instead of relying on
MagicMock introspection.
Four independent pre-request stalls sat on the critical path between
prompt submission and the first streamed token, measured with cProfile
against a live process:
1. Discord capability detection (~2.0s, worst 5s): get_tool_definitions
-> _get_dynamic_schema made a BLOCKING https call to discord.com
inside AIAgent.__init__ for any user with DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN set, on
every platform, every cold process. Now non-blocking: memory cache ->
24h disk cache -> permissive default + one background detection that
seeds the disk cache for the next process. The permissive default is
pinned per-process so tool schemas never flip mid-conversation
(prompt-cache safety); it mirrors the existing detection-failure
fallback (all actions exposed, 403s enriched at call time).
2. Ollama /api/show probe (~0.3s): get_model_context_length step 5e
POSTed to <base_url>/api/show for KNOWN providers (openrouter etc.),
got a 404, and never cached the miss - so every fresh process paid a
full HTTP round-trip. Known non-Ollama providers now skip the probe;
local/custom/unknown endpoints keep the exact previous behavior.
3. env_probe subprocess sweep (~0.5s): the Python-toolchain probe ran
4-8 subprocess calls inside the FIRST system prompt build. Now warmed
off-thread during agent init; the prompt build hits the cache (same
lock, so a mid-flight warm just joins instead of recomputing).
4. tools.mcp_tool import (~0.4s): the between-turns MCP refresh in
build_turn_context imported the whole mcp package even with zero MCP
servers configured. MCP tools can only exist if tools.mcp_tool was
already imported (discovery/reload paths), so gate the import on
sys.modules membership - no behavior change for MCP users.
CLI additionally pre-imports run_agent + openai off-thread during the
idle banner window (same pattern as the /model picker prewarm), hiding
the remaining ~1.5s of module imports while the user types. Fixes 1-4
apply to every interaction layer (CLI, gateway, TUI, desktop, cron).
Measured cold first turn (submit -> request dispatched, openrouter,
discord token set): 4.3s before -> 0.9s after CLI prewarm (~80%); the
agent-side non-import cost drops 2.9s -> 0.36s (init) + 0.27s (turn
prologue).
Some MCP servers (e.g. DocuSeal) serve their web UI on HEAD/GET but
speak Streamable HTTP only via POST. The preflight probe now tries a
lightweight JSON-RPC `initialize` POST before rejecting endpoints
whose HEAD/GET returns a non-MCP content type (e.g. `text/html`).
If the POST returns `application/json` or `text/event-stream` with a
2xx status, the endpoint is accepted. Otherwise the original rejection
behaviour is preserved.
Adds 5 new test cases covering the POST probe path:
- POST rescues HTML HEAD with JSON response
- POST rescues HTML HEAD with event-stream response
- POST still rejects when it also returns HTML
- POST still rejects on non-2xx status
- POST not attempted when HEAD already returns valid MCP content type
Follow-up to #9006/#58899. The gateway routing index (session_key ->
SessionEntry) now lives in a new gateway_routing table in state.db as the
primary store; sessions.json is demoted to an optional legacy mirror.
- hermes_state.py: schema v19 — gateway_routing table (scope + session_key
PK; scope = resolved sessions_dir so multiple stores sharing one state.db
never cross-contaminate) with save/replace/load/delete methods
- gateway/session.py: _save() writes the whole index atomically to the DB
(mirrors the old full-file JSON rewrite semantics) and only falls back to
JSON when the DB write fails; _ensure_loaded reads the DB first and folds
in legacy sessions.json entries for keys the DB lacks (pre-migration
import; DB entries win over stale JSON)
- gateway/config.py + hermes_cli/config.py: new write_sessions_json flag
(default true for compat/downgrade safety); gateway.write_sessions_json:
false stops producing the file entirely
- sessions.json _README updated to say it's a legacy mirror + how to
disable it
Rehydration is now lossless across restarts even with sessions.json deleted:
suspended/resume_pending/model_override/token state all round-trip through
the DB (the old sessions-table recovery only rebuilt the bare key mapping).
When the main agent uses a named custom provider (custom:<name>),
resolve_runtime_provider correctly resolves the base_url and api_key.
But the auxiliary client re-resolves from the bare 'custom' provider
name, losing the provider identity. The bare 'custom' falls back to
OpenRouter, which _resolve_custom_runtime() then rejects — leaving all
auxiliary tasks (title gen, compression, vision, session search, etc.)
with no credentials.
Fix: when resolve_provider_client receives a main_runtime dict
containing concrete base_url + api_key, use it directly instead of
re-resolving. The main agent already solved provider resolution;
the auxiliary client just needs to reuse its answer.
Closes#45472
Regression tests from PR #51586: the inspection agent must receive the
platform-resolved enabled_toolsets and agent.disabled_toolsets, and a
Blank Slate profile's prompt-size must count exactly the 6 file/terminal
tool schemas.
Two pre-existing tests awaited run() to return after initial-connect
retry exhaustion; with #57477's parking that await hangs (CI: 300s
SIGKILL on slices 4 and 6). Assert the new contract instead: the task
stays alive (parked) and exits on shutdown.
The local retries variable in MCPServerTask.run() accumulated across
transient disconnections — each transport exception incremented it, but
only clean transport returns (auth recovery / manual refresh) or
park-wake reset it. Five transient blips over a long-uptime gateway
would permanently park the MCP server.
Promote retries to instance attribute _reconnect_retries and reset it
at all 4 session-establishment sites in _run_stdio / _run_http, so only
consecutive failures without successful reconnection count toward the
parking budget.
Fixes#57604
Persists as the server's connect_timeout in config, which the probe
now honors. CLI-flag portion of PR #54494; the probe-wrapper portion
was superseded by resolving connect_timeout inside _probe_single_server.
_reauth_oauth_server (hermes mcp login / reauth) called
_probe_single_server without a timeout, so it always used the 30s
probe default — far too short for a human browser OAuth round-trip
(open → sign in → consent → loopback redirect). The server-level
connect_timeout in config.yaml was silently ignored, so login timed
out at ~40s no matter what the user configured.
Pass the server's configured connect_timeout through, with a 180s
floor for the interactive login path. Update the two TestMcpLogin
probe mocks for the new kwarg and assert the login path propagates a
>=180s timeout.
Follow-up to the salvaged #54938: the bounded reader gives a proper 413 +
anomaly telemetry for oversized chunked bodies; client_max_size makes
aiohttp enforce the same 1 MiB cap on every other read path
(#58536/#58902/#59180 pattern). Test fixture's fake Application now
accepts kwargs.
The salvaged #25296 fixture's _FakeRequest.read() calls json.dumps but the
test module never imported json — the NameError was swallowed by the
handler's generic except → 400, failing 10 payload tests.
_handle_webhook() called request.read() with no size guard. Since the
endpoint is publicly reachable, an attacker can send an arbitrarily large
POST body to exhaust gateway memory.
Add _TWILIO_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES (64 KiB — well above any real Twilio
payload) and gate on both Content-Length and actual read size, returning
HTTP 413 with an empty TwiML Response on oversized requests. Mirrors the
guard already present in the Raft adapter.
A `hermes update` that bumps the spectrum-ts pin rewrites the Photon
sidecar's package-lock.json but never reinstalls node_modules. The sidecar
then spawns against the old install and the v8 postinstall patch throws
"@spectrum-ts/imessage dist not found", so the gateway retries the photon
platform every 300s forever without ever repairing the deps. Observed in
the wild: a June pin bump to spectrum-ts 8.0.0 left node_modules at 3.1.0,
and inbound/outbound iMessage stayed dead for days with the reconnect loop
faithfully restarting into the identical broken state.
_start_sidecar only checked that node_modules exists, not that it matches
the lockfile, so restart never became repair. Detect the skew with the same
signal npm ci uses: the top-level package-lock.json being newer than npm's
node_modules/.package-lock.json install marker. When stale, reinstall
(npm ci, falling back to npm install) before spawning. The reinstall runs
via asyncio.to_thread so a cold install can't block the event loop and stall
every other platform's traffic; worst case it heals on the next reconnect
tick instead. First-run "deps not installed" behavior is unchanged, and a
missing/unreadable marker fails safe to "not stale" so start is never
blocked.
Reuses the existing npm ci -> npm install fallback from
`hermes photon install-sidecar`. Adds unit tests for the staleness signal
(stale / fresh / missing-marker).
Follow-up to the #55911 salvage: inherit model.api_key only when the aux
base_url resolves to the same hostname as the main model's base_url
(runtime override or config). A misconfigured aux endpoint on a different
host keeps the fail-safe no-key-required placeholder instead of leaking
the main credential cross-host.
When an auxiliary task is configured with provider=custom and an explicit
base_url but an empty api_key, the custom_key fallback chain in
resolve_provider_client() jumped straight to the no-key-required
placeholder without consulting model.api_key from config.yaml. Users
on self-hosted gateways who share the same endpoint and credentials for
both the main model and auxiliary tasks got 401 auth errors.
Add _read_main_api_key() following the same pattern as _read_main_model()
and _read_main_provider(): checks _RUNTIME_MAIN_API_KEY (runtime override)
first, then config.yaml model.api_key. Insert it into the fallback chain
before no-key-required so real credentials are used when available, while
local servers without auth still get the placeholder.
Overlap-invariant regression test from PR #58686 — no toolset in the
blank-slate disabled_toolsets may share a tool with a kept toolset,
since the subtraction happens at tool granularity (#57315, #58281).
The disabled_toolsets subtraction loop in _compute_tool_definitions
preserved shared core tools only for hermes-* platform bundles (#33924),
subtracting bundle_non_core_tools(); every other name took the else
branch and got a full resolve_toolset() subtraction. The `coding`
toolset is a posture toolset (posture: True) that re-lists the shared
_HERMES_CORE_TOOLS it does not own, so disabled_toolsets=["coding"]
stripped those core tools from the whole schema (34 tools collapsed to a
handful; terminal/read_file/write_file/web_search/execute_code gone).
Extend the core-preserving branch to also match posture toolsets, so
they subtract only the non-core delta. Only `coding` carries
posture: True, so atomic toolsets stay fully removable. The
bundle-misconfiguration info log is gated to hermes-* names, since its
wording is bundle-specific and disabled_toolsets=["coding"] is a
legitimate config written by older `hermes setup` runs.
Adds a regression test (TestDisabledToolsetsPostureToolset) alongside
the existing #33924 bundle tests.
Blank Slate's _blank_slate_minimal_toolsets() adds every TOOLSETS entry
to agent.disabled_toolsets except file and terminal. The coding
posture toolset (session-level, selected by agent/coding_context.py)
slips through because the loop only skips hermes-* composites and
includes-only groups.
At runtime, model_tools.get_tool_definitions() resolves coding and
subtracts its tools — terminal, read_file, write_file, patch,
search_files, process — erasing the entire Blank Slate minimal surface.
The agent ends up with only cronjob.
Skip posture toolsets in the disabled-list computation. Posture
toolsets are not user-facing capabilities to disable; they are
per-session selections that should never appear in agent.disabled_toolsets.
Fixes#57315
Assert the "Test server" probe skips prompts/list when tools.prompts is false,
skips both families when the server advertises neither capability (the Unreal
MCP server case), probes both when advertised and enabled, and falls back to
the legacy always-try behaviour when no capability info was captured.
* fix(docker): heal pairing-dir ownership after `docker exec` writes (#10270)
The official Docker image runs the gateway as the unprivileged `hermes`
user (uid 10000) via `gosu`, but `docker exec` defaults to root. Approval
files written by `docker exec <container> hermes pairing approve <code>`
end up as `-rw------- root:root`, and the post-gosu gateway process
cannot read them. The approval is silently ignored — the user keeps
hitting 'Unauthorized user' on every message.
The entrypoint's existing top-level chown is gated on the top-level
$HERMES_HOME being mis-owned, so on warm boots (where /opt/data is
already hermes:hermes) the recursive chown is skipped — meaning a
container restart does NOT self-heal the bug either.
Three-part fix:
1. docker/entrypoint.sh: chown the platforms/pairing/ (and legacy
pairing/) subtree on every container start, regardless of the
top-level decision. The directory is tiny (a few JSON files), so
the unconditional chown is effectively free. Container restart
now self-heals.
2. gateway/pairing.py: PairingStore._load_json was swallowing
PermissionError under its bare 'except OSError' branch, which is
what made this a silent failure. Split it out: log a WARNING that
names the file, the gateway's uid, the file's owner/mode, and the
exact docker exec -u hermes workaround. Still falls back to {} so
the gateway stays up.
3. website/docs/user-guide/security.md: add a Docker tip to the
pairing-CLI section pointing users at `docker exec -u hermes …`
up front.
Reproduced end-to-end in a containerized harness — before the fix
the gateway sees 0 approved users after `docker exec` + restart;
after the fix it sees the expected 1, and the file on disk goes
from `root:root 600` back to `hermes:hermes 600` on next start.
Fixes#10270
* fix(pairing): gate os.geteuid for Windows in PermissionError warning
Adds approvals.deny to config.yaml — a list of fnmatch globs matched
against terminal commands. A match blocks unconditionally, BEFORE the
--yolo / /yolo / approvals.mode=off bypass, making it the user-editable
counterpart to the code-shipped hardline blocklist.
- Checked in both command gates (check_dangerous_command and
check_all_command_guards), after the hardline floor and sudo-stdin
guard, before the yolo bypass and permanent allowlist.
- Matching runs over the same normalized/deobfuscated command variants
as the dangerous-pattern detector, case-insensitive.
- Opt-in: empty/absent list is a no-op; behavior unchanged.
Supersedes the trust-engine approach from #21500 with a minimal
config-native design: the only capability the existing stack lacked
was deny-that-beats-yolo. Allow already exists (command_allowlist),
ask already exists (session approvals).
Sibling sweep from the #58902 raft review found aiohttp servers still
running on the implicit 1 MiB default with no explicit body cap:
- bluebubbles webhook (127.0.0.1): 1 MiB explicit cap — events are small
JSON/form payloads; attachments arrive via the REST API
- teams Bot Framework listener (0.0.0.0 bind — most exposed): 1 MiB cap;
activities are JSON well under that
- hermes proxy server: 10 MB cap mirroring api_server's MAX_REQUEST_BYTES
(chat-completion payloads can be large, but must stay bounded)
client_max_size bounds every read path including chunked transfer-encoding
requests that carry no Content-Length (#58536/#58902 pattern).
Deliberately excluded: feishu, whatsapp_cloud, sms, line, wecom, msgraph —
open contributor PRs (#54938, #54944, #54620, #54931, #54934, #25296)
already cover those; reviewing them separately preserves their credit.
3 regression tests pin the wiring.
PR #58889 fixed the CLI-fallback transport; review of that fix found the
same leak class at four sibling spawn sites of the third-party cua-driver
binary:
- _resolve_mcp_invocation (cua-driver manifest): no env= at all — full
parent environment inherited
- cua_driver_update_check (check-update --json): telemetry env but no
secret sanitization
- doctor._drive_health_report (<binary> mcp Popen): telemetry env only
- permissions._run (every macOS/Linux permission probe): telemetry env only
All now route through _sanitize_subprocess_env(cua_driver_child_env()),
matching the sanctioned MCP spawn and the #53503/#55709/#58889 strip-by-
default policy for non-terminal spawns. Sanitization degrades gracefully
(falls back to the telemetry env) so doctor/permission probes never break
on an import error.
4 regression tests covering each site.
Skill bundles load their member skills via _load_skill_payload directly,
bypassing the scan-time disabled filter in get_skill_commands(). PR #58888
closed this gap for stacked slash-skill invocations, but /<bundle> dispatch
in the gateway had the same class of bypass: a skill an operator disabled
for a platform via skills.platform_disabled still got its full content
injected when referenced by a bundle.
build_bundle_invocation_message() now accepts a platform kwarg, filters
members against get_disabled_skill_names(platform=...), and reports skipped
skills in the bundle header. Gateway dispatch passes the event's platform
explicitly (env-var resolution can't be trusted in the multi-platform
gateway process, same reasoning as the #58888 gate).
When a single line exceeds the entire char budget, its tail is
unreachable via offset pagination (offsets are line-granular). Tell
the model so it doesn't assume it saw the full line.
read_file previously hard-rejected any read whose formatted output exceeded
the ~100K char safety limit, returning an error with zero content. A file
with few but very long lines (logs, wide CSV rows, minified data) sails past
the line-count limit and then trips the char guard, so the model gets nothing
and must guess a smaller limit — wasting a full round-trip.
Now the read is trimmed to the last complete line that fits the budget and
returns the partial content plus truncated_by="bytes" and a next_offset, so
the model paginates forward instead of starting over. A single line larger
than the whole budget is clamped on a code-point boundary (never empty) and
the cursor still advances. Applies at both read paths (normal + extracted
documents).
Adapted from IronClaw's Rust dual line/byte cap to hermes's Python tool-layer
char guard, which is the single uniform chokepoint over the gutter-rendered
content for every backend.
Follow-up to the salvaged toggle commit:
- file_tools.py / code_execution_tool.py: carry docker_network in their
container_config dicts so those environment-creation paths honor the
lockdown instead of silently defaulting back to bridge (the probe/exec
asymmetry class reported on #46358).
- docker.py: cross-process reuse now inspects HostConfig.NetworkMode when
docker_network=false and removes a mismatched (networked) container
before starting a fresh air-gapped one. Fails closed when inspect fails.
Default-network config never churns containers, so operators using
docker_extra_args --network=none are unaffected.
- tests: AST invariant that every container_config site carrying
docker_run_as_host_user also carries docker_network, plus three reuse
guard tests (reject bridge under lockdown / keep matching none /
no inspect when network enabled).
- docs: configuration.md gains terminal.docker_network + env var row.
Port from qwibitai/nanoclaw#2713: expose Hermes' existing Docker network isolation primitive through terminal config so operators can opt out of container egress.
_resolve_task_provider_model returns early on an explicit provider arg,
which skips the config block that consults auxiliary.<task>.base_url /
api_key. Any caller passing provider explicitly (e.g.
resolve_vision_provider_client(provider="custom", ...)) bypasses the
configured custom endpoint and falls through to main-runtime resolution,
silently routing the task to the wrong backend.
Adopt the task's configured base_url/api_key before the early returns,
but only when no explicit base_url was given and the config targets the
same provider (or names none) — a caller forcing a *different* provider
keeps full explicit-arg priority, and an explicit base_url still wins
over config.
Fixes#58515
The load_config() cache is keyed on config file mtime/size only, so a
load_config() that runs before load_hermes_dotenv() populates the process
environment caches the unexpanded ${VAR} literal and serves it for the
life of the process — auxiliary.<task>.api_key/base_url env refs reach the
provider client verbatim (auth failure / silent fallback), while
providers.* appear to work because provider credential resolution re-reads
the environment at call time.
Record a snapshot of every ${VAR} name referenced in the raw config
(user + managed) with its os.environ value at expansion time, and treat
the cache as stale when any of those values change. Covers both the late
.env load and in-process key rotation; an unchanged environment still
takes the cache-hit path.
Fixes#58514
Moves gateway routing metadata (display_name, origin_json, expiry_finalized)
into state.db, making SQLite the single source of truth for gateway session
discovery. Eliminates the dual-file (sessions.json + state.db) polling
dependency that caused the mcp_serve new-conversation race (#8925).
- hermes_state.py: schema v18 (3 new sessions columns + sessions.json
backfill migration), record_gateway_session_peer gains
display_name/origin_json, new set_expiry_finalized(),
list_gateway_sessions(), find_session_by_origin()
- gateway/session.py: peer recorder persists display_name + full origin
JSON; new SessionStore.set_expiry_finalized() single write-path
- gateway/run.py: expiry watcher success + give-up paths use the store
helper so the flag lands in both sessions.json and state.db
- mcp_serve.py: routing index reads state.db first (sessions.json fallback
for pre-migration DBs); _poll_once collapses to a single state.db mtime
check — the #8925 race is structurally impossible now
- gateway/mirror.py, gateway/channel_directory.py, hermes_cli/status.py:
query state.db first, sessions.json fallback
Closes#9006
Port from openclaw/openclaw#95108: an unbounded response.read() on a
non-OK *streaming* response can balloon memory (huge body) or hang the
agent forever (body opens then stalls with no further bytes). The
diagnostic body is only ever shown truncated, so reading megabytes or
blocking indefinitely buys nothing.
Add agent/bounded_response.read_streaming_error_body() which caps the
read at a byte limit and enforces a hard wall-clock deadline (run on a
worker thread so it can interrupt a socket read that stalls mid-chunk,
which a between-chunk wall-clock check cannot). Wire it into all three
streaming error-body sites that previously did a bare response.read():
native Gemini, Gemini Cloud Code, and Antigravity Cloud Code. The
existing error builders now accept an optional pre-read body_text so
classification (status code, RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED, free-tier guidance,
Retry-After) is preserved unchanged.
Tests use a real in-process socket server (no mocks): oversize body is
capped, stalled body hits the deadline with partial text preserved,
normal error envelope reads intact and parses.
_redact_env already skips redaction when a KEY=value assignment's value is
a programmatic env lookup (os.getenv(...), os.environ[...], process.env.X)
per issue #2852 — masking it would corrupt a code snippet, not redact a
secret. _redact_json (JSON "key": "value" syntax) and _redact_yaml
(unquoted key: value syntax) are separate closures in the same function
and never got the same check, so the identical code-snippet-in-config-
syntax case still gets mangled:
{"apiKey": "os.getenv('OPENAI_API_KEY')"} -> {"apiKey": "os.get...EY')"}
api_key: os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY") -> api_key: os.get...EY")
Fix: apply the same _ENV_LOOKUP_VALUE_RE.match(value) check in both
closures before masking, mirroring _redact_env exactly. Real secret
values in JSON/YAML syntax are still redacted (verified live and via new
tests) — this only skips the case where the "value" already look like a
code snippet.
a0a3c716f fixed the exact same failure mode for Telegram (#58563):
post-#48648, oversized mid-stream edits truncate to a one-message preview
instead of splitting. Once a long streamed reply grows past that cap, every
subsequent progressive edit truncates to the SAME preview text — re-sending
an identical edit every tick still counts against the platform's edit rate
limit for the rest of the stream.
Discord's edit_message() has the identical architecture (mid-stream
truncate-in-place, both pre-flight and reactive-after-50035 truncation
paths) and this file's own docstring already calls out "the Telegram #48648
lesson" it's built on — but the saturated-preview dedup fix itself was never
ported over.
Fix: track the last truncated preview per (chat_id, message_id), mirroring
a0a3c716f exactly. Skip the edit call when the new truncation is identical;
still deliver when the visible content actually changes (e.g. the
chunk-count marker crosses (1/2) -> (1/3) as the stream grows). State
clears on finalize and when content shrinks back under the cap, so dedup
can never mask a real edit.
11b4a21a5 cleared the per-session _last_resolved_model cache on /new and
the compression-exhausted auto-reset, so a resumed/reset conversation
resolves the model from current config instead of a stale cached value
(#58403). Three other sites documented as the same "full conversation
boundary" treatment — pop _session_model_overrides, clear the reasoning
override, pop _pending_model_notes — still missed _last_resolved_model:
- _session_expiry_watcher's permanent finalization block (gateway/run.py):
a session that goes idle and is finalized, then resumed, could serve a
model cached before it went idle on a transient config-cache miss.
- The daily/idle/suspended auto-reset cleanup (_was_auto_reset handling,
gateway/run.py): same failure mode, different trigger.
- /resume (gateway/slash_commands.py), whose own comment already says
"conversation boundary just like /new" for the sibling dicts it clears.
Fix: pop the session's _last_resolved_model entry in all three, mirroring
the exact pattern 11b4a21a5 established.
_handle_wake() and _handle_activity() enforced max_body_bytes only via
the Content-Length header. A Transfer-Encoding: chunked request
(content_length=None) or a spoofed small Content-Length bypassed the
cap entirely, letting the actual read be bounded only by aiohttp's
implicit 1 MiB client_max_size default (64x the 16 KB default) — the
same pattern ec29590a0 just fixed for gateway/platforms/webhook.py.
Fix: web.Application(client_max_size=self._max_body_bytes) so aiohttp
enforces the cap on every read path including chunked bodies, catch
HTTPRequestEntityTooLarge -> 413 on both endpoints (was swallowed into
a generic 400), and re-check the actual bytes read as defense in depth.
Exposure here is narrower than the webhook adapter (binds to 127.0.0.1
by default and requires the bridge token), but the bypass is otherwise
identical.
_redact_telegram_error_text() strips bot tokens from api.telegram.org
URLs embedded in transport-error text, and is already applied across the
send/edit transient-error paths. Four sites still built their message
from the raw exception:
- connect()'s fatal-error handler is the most severe: the raw text is
passed to _set_fatal_error(), which persists it via
write_runtime_status() to a dashboard/admin-facing runtime status
file, not just a log line. A transient network error during startup
commonly embeds the request URL
(https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getMe), so this could leak the
live bot token into that surface.
- disconnect(), send_document(), send_video() build the same unredacted
pattern into a warning log line (lower blast radius, but the same
leak class).
Fix: route all four through the existing _redact_telegram_error_text()
helper before building the message/log line, mirroring the send/edit
paths exactly. Also drops exc_info=True from the two logger.error/
logger.warning calls that had it — exc_info prints the exception's own
traceback (including its unredacted message) separately from the format
string, which would otherwise defeat the redaction; the already-redacted
sibling call sites in this file follow the same convention.
_CuaDriverSession._call_tool_via_cli() (the EAGAIN/silent-empty MCP
fallback transport) invokes `cua-driver call <tool> <json>` via
subprocess.run() with no env= argument, so the third-party cua-driver
binary inherits the full, unsanitized parent environment. The primary
MCP spawn site (_lifecycle_coro) already applies
_sanitize_subprocess_env(cua_driver_child_env()) before opening the
stdio client, per the same policy #53503/#55709 established for other
subprocess spawn points — this fallback path, added alongside the
EAGAIN/silent-empty-capture hardening, missed it.
Fix: apply the same env=_sanitize_subprocess_env(cua_driver_child_env())
to the subprocess.run() call in _call_tool_via_cli(), mirroring the
sanctioned spawn site exactly (telemetry policy applied first, then
Hermes-managed secrets filtered).
_handle_message() re-checks a slash-skill command's per-platform disabled
status before dispatch, because get_skill_commands() only applies the
global disabled list at scan time. That check only covered the leading
skill: split_stacked_skill_commands() resolves additional /skill tokens
that follow it (stacked invocations, up to 5 skills, #57987), and
build_stacked_skill_invocation_message() loads every one of them via
_load_skill_payload() with no disabled-status check of any kind.
A message on a platform with skills.platform_disabled configured for a
given skill could still get that skill's full SKILL.md content injected
into the agent's context for the turn, as long as it was typed after an
allowed skill: `/allowed-skill /disabled-skill do X`.
Fix: after computing the stacked extra_keys, look up each one's skill
name and re-check it against the same get_disabled_skill_names(platform=)
set already used for the leading skill. If any stacked skill is disabled
for the platform, reject the whole invocation with the same style of
message the leading-skill check already returns, instead of partially
loading it.
Port from openai/codex#21069 ("Spill large hook outputs from context").
Both shell hooks and Python plugins can return {"context": "..."} from
pre_llm_call, which gets appended to the current turn's user message on
every subsequent API call. A plugin that emits a large blob inflates
every turn and blows out the prompt cache prefix.
- tools/hook_output_spill.py: shared helper that writes oversized
context to $HERMES_HOME/hook_outputs/<session_id>/<uuid>.txt and
returns a head/tail preview plus the saved path. Never raises.
- agent/turn_context.py: apply the cap at the pre_llm_call aggregation
site (moved here from run_agent.py since the original PR), covering
both Python plugins and shell hooks.
- agent/shell_hooks.py: reserve output_spill as a sub-key under hooks:
so the config block doesn't emit unknown-hook-event warnings.
- Docs: document the cap + config in build-a-hermes-plugin.md.
Config (behaviour-preserving when absent):
hooks.output_spill: enabled/max_chars/preview_head/preview_tail/directory
Tests: 14 unit tests; shell_hooks (56) and plugins (100) suites green.
E2E validated with isolated HERMES_HOME (spill, passthrough, traversal
sanitisation, reserved-key skip).
Feishu adapter's disconnect() cancelled WSS-thread tasks but never
called the lark_oapi client's _disconnect() coroutine, so no
WebSocket CLOSE frame was sent. Feishu's server kept routing
messages to the stale endpoint for minutes (CLOSE-WAIT timeout),
silencing the channel across every shutdown path — systemd restart,
hermes update, hermes gateway restart, and the --replace takeover
during 'hermes dashboard' invocations.
Schedule ws_client._disconnect() on the WSS thread loop via
run_coroutine_threadsafe with a 5s timeout before the existing
task-cancel + loop-stop sequence. Defensive hasattr guard + broad
except keeps disconnect() resilient if lark_oapi's internals shift.
Fixes#10202
Port from Kilo-Org/kilocode#11555: GLM-5.2 exposes a native
reasoning_effort knob with two enabled levels (high / max) on its
OpenAI-compatible endpoints. Previously the zai profile (direct Z.AI
/api/paas/v4) used the base ProviderProfile and emitted nothing, and the
OpenCode Go profile only handled Kimi K2 / DeepSeek — so a user's effort
preference for GLM-5.2 was silently dropped on both routes.
- zai: ZaiProfile maps effort onto high/max (xhigh/max -> max, lower -> high)
- opencode-go: same mapping for GLM-5.2, alongside existing Kimi/DeepSeek
- alias spellings recognized (glm-5.2 / glm-5-2 / glm-5p2, vendor-prefixed)
- disabled / no effort leaves the server default untouched
The google-antigravity and google-gemini-cli OAuth providers were removed
in #50492. They were the only producers of a cloudcode-pa:// base_url, so
the account-level-quota early-returns in _pool_may_recover_from_rate_limit
and _credential_pool_may_recover_rate_limit are now unreachable.
- Drop the dead cloudcode-pa:// checks and the now-unused provider/base_url
params on _pool_may_recover_from_rate_limit (only caller updated).
- Prune the obsolete CloudCode-specific regression tests; keep the live
single/multi-entry pool-rotation invariants (#11314).
ruff check --fix --select F541 . on current main. Pure prefix removals;
adjacent-string concatenations keep the f only on interpolating fragments.
No string content or live placeholder altered.
TestMcpParallelToolBatch seeded provenance under old-style
mcp_<server>_<tool> names, which no longer pass the
is_mcp_tool_parallel_safe() prefix gate after the naming change.
Port from anomalyco/opencode#33533. Native MCP tools now register as
mcp__<server>__<tool> (double-underscore delimiter) instead of
mcp_<server>_<tool>, aligning with the convention used by Claude Code,
Codex, and OpenCode.
The double-underscore delimiter disambiguates the server/tool boundary
even when either component contains underscores (the single-underscore
form was ambiguous, which is why is_mcp_tool_parallel_safe already had to
track provenance in a side-map). It also unifies native registration with
the Anthropic-OAuth wire form (_MCP_TOOL_PREFIX = 'mcp__'), so the
single->double promotion that path performed is now a no-op for native
tools while still handling legacy replayed names.
- tools/mcp_tool.py: add MCP_TOOL_NAME_PREFIX + mcp_prefixed_tool_name()
helper; route _convert_mcp_schema, utility schemas, refresh stale-set,
and the parallel-safe prefix gate through it
- agent/transports/codex_event_projector.py: mirror convention in the
deterministic call_id input for MCP server-executed tool calls
- tests: update produced-name assertions to the new convention
Defense-in-depth alongside the interpreter-shutdown guard: run_job closed
the cron agent's async resources (agent.close + cleanup_stale_async_clients)
in its finally block BEFORE run_one_job called _deliver_result, so a live
delivery could race a torn-down async client. run_job now accepts an optional
defer_agent_teardown holder; when set it hands the live agent back instead of
closing it, and run_one_job tears it down (via the extracted _teardown_cron_agent
helper) only AFTER delivery — in a finally so a failed run never leaks. Default
path (holder=None) is unchanged, so every existing caller keeps inline teardown.
Reorder approach based on #58777 by @LavyaTandel; reworked to keep a single
delivery site in run_one_job and add regression coverage.
Co-authored-by: LavyaTandel <lavya@loom.local>
Pins `_interpreter_shutting_down()` (finalizing flag + shutdown-error-text
fallback) and asserts the standalone delivery path skips gracefully without
scheduling a send when the interpreter is finalizing, while the normal
non-finalizing path still delivers. Source guardrails keep the guard wired
into both the dispatch (`_submit_with_guard`) and standalone-delivery sites.
Assert _await_thread_exit lets a coroutine scheduled onto the running loop by a
blocked worker thread complete (the #58818 deadlock a synchronous join caused),
returns False when the thread outlives the timeout, and handles None/dead
threads.
Phase-2 review follow-ups on the unreadable-config chokepoint work:
- hermes_cli/xai_retirement.py apply_migration() is a full-file config.yaml
rewriter (ruamel round-trip + plain open("w")) that lives outside the
atomic_yaml_write path, so the chokepoint didn't cover it. It reads the
file first (which already fails closed on an unreadable file), but add
require_readable_config_before_write() right before the write as a
backstop for the read-then-write window, and a regression test asserting
the original bytes survive an unreadable config.
- Drop the unnecessary "Path" string quotes on atomic_config_write's
annotation — Path is imported eagerly at module top, no forward ref needed.
auth.py _update_config_for_provider / _reset_config_provider intentionally
keep their standalone require_readable_config_before_write guard + bare
atomic_yaml_write: the guard must fire BEFORE the read (fail-fast) at those
read-then-write sites, and a test pins the atomic_yaml_write call. Both are
already fully guarded against the bug; routing them through the wrapper
would move the check to write time for no benefit.
The unreadable-config-overwrite bug (an existing config.yaml that reads as
{} on a permission/IO error gets replaced with only defaults or the edited
section) is not limited to save_config / config set / auth. The same
read-then-atomic_yaml_write pattern lives at ~7 other independent write
sites that don't route through those functions:
- gateway/slash_commands.py: _save_config_key, memory/skills write_approval
toggles, tool_progress toggle, runtime_footer toggle, personality set
- hermes_cli/doctor.py --fix (stale root-key migration)
- gateway/platforms/yuanbao.py auto-sethome
- plugins/platforms/telegram/adapter.py topic thread_id persistence
- tui_gateway/server.py _save_cfg
- agent/onboarding.py mark_seen
Rather than sprinkle require_readable_config_before_write() at each site,
add a single fail-closed chokepoint, atomic_config_write(), that runs the
guard then delegates to atomic_yaml_write, and route every config.yaml
write through it. Root cause remains that read_raw_config() can't tell an
absent file from an unreadable one (returns {} for both) — read-only
callers correctly stay fail-open, but any full-file replacement now fails
closed in one enforced place instead of relying on each caller to remember
the guard.
save_config / set_config_value / auth keep the contributor's original
guard calls (their commit); this commit widens the fix to the sibling
call paths and adds a regression test on the chokepoint (fails closed on
unreadable existing file + still creates a genuinely absent file).
httpx ignores the client-level `limits` kwarg when a custom `transport`
is supplied. The #31599 keepalive fix injected limits via
`httpx_kwargs[limits]`, but the fallback-IP branch also passes a
custom `TelegramFallbackTransport` — so the limits were silently
discarded and the inner AsyncHTTPTransport instances ran with httpx
defaults (keepalive_expiry=5.0), leaking CLOSE_WAIT fds.
Pass the tuned limits directly into `TelegramFallbackTransport`
via `transport_kwargs` so its inner transports honour keepalive_expiry.
Only affects the fallback-IP branch; proxy and direct-DNS branches
continue to use `_with_limits()` as before.
Fixes#58790
The two TestSourceGuardrail tests asserted the presence of literal
strings ("#58753", "_user_survives") in context_compressor.py. Those
are change-detector tests that break on any refactor without catching a
real regression. The four behavioral tests in
TestCompressAlwaysKeepsAUserTurn already exercise the real compress()
path and fully cover the invariant (user turn survives, summary pinned
to user, no consecutive user roles, surviving tail user untouched).
Regression coverage for the kanban-worker crash where compression left a
transcript with no user-role messages, triggering a non-retryable
`400 No user query found in messages` from vLLM/Qwen.
Exercises the real `compress()` path with the reporter's shape (no system
prompt in the list, a re-compaction with the only user turn in the
compressed middle) and asserts the output always keeps >=1 user turn,
never introduces consecutive user roles, and leaves a surviving tail user
message untouched. A source guardrail pins the guard so a future refactor
cannot silently drop it.
Add an opt-in toggle (require_admin_for_exec_approval, default false) that
restricts who can click Approve/Deny on a dangerous-command prompt to admins
listed in allow_admin_from. Off by default, so the v0.16-restored user-scope
behavior is unchanged. When on, the clicker must pass the normal admission
check AND be an admin; fails closed (logged) when no admins are configured.
Only ExecApprovalView is gated — model picker / clarify / update-prompt stay
user-scope.
coerce_tool_args only repaired the outermost value, so JSON-encoded
*elements* of array properties (and nested object sub-fields) were left
as strings. Three core tools have array<object> schemas — todo.todos,
delegate_task.tasks, memory.operations — so a model emitting
{"todos": ["{...}"]} would pass raw JSON strings into the tool and fail
downstream on item["id"]/item["goal"] access.
Adds a schema-guided recursive pass (_normalize_json_strings_for_schema)
that parses JSON-string array items and nested object fields only when
the matching schema position expects an array/object, preserving
legitimate JSON-looking string fields (type: string).
Adapted from cline/cline#11803 to hermes-agent's existing coercion layer.
Follow-up to the salvaged #58696 (devatnull) + #41343 (annguyenNous)
commits: instead of fully suppressing commentary/analysis-phase stream
deltas, fire on_reasoning_delta so the CLI/gateway display them like
thinking text. Matches Codex CLI semantics where commentary is never
the turn's final answer, while keeping the narration visible in the
reasoning display. Adds devatnull to AUTHOR_MAP.
- bridge: only enqueue poll_update events for polls Hermes itself created
(tracked via recentlySentIds when /send-poll returns) so arbitrary human
polls in group chats don't inject agent-visible messages on every vote
- update test_already_whatsapp_italic for the new markdown-italic mapping
- AUTHOR_MAP entry for @devatnull (PR #58704 salvage)
The SOM/AX element list dropped labels for two extremely common cua-driver
render forms, leaving the model unable to target elements by name:
- [79] AXButton (Dark) -> parenthesised label
- [4] AXStaticText = "Wi-Fi" -> = "value" form
- [92] AXPopUpButton = "Automatic" -> = "value" form
The old regex only matched quoted "label" and id=Label, so System Settings
buttons/text/popups all surfaced with empty labels. That's why selecting the
macOS Appearance 'Dark' button by element index required guessing — the
labels weren't available to aim with.
Fix: extend _ELEMENT_LINE_RE to capture all four label forms (= "value",
"quoted", (parenthesised), id=Label), skipping a pure-digit (N) order number
in favour of the id= label. Verified live against System Settings: the
Appearance buttons now surface as Auto/Light/Dark.
Adds a regression test covering all label forms. Full suite: 84 passed.
The first fix handled the EAGAIN McpError path. But the persistent MCP
session (long-running gateway/desktop worker) has a second failure mode:
list_windows or get_window_state 'succeed' over MCP yet return a
degenerate/empty payload (no windows, or no screenshot + blank tree)
WITHOUT raising — typically when the bridge reconnected mid-call and
dropped the heavy response. That surfaced to the model as a silent 0x0
capture with no error and no fallback firing (0.00s empty return).
Fix: detect empty results in capture() and re-fetch over the CLI
transport before giving up:
- empty list_windows -> CLI re-fetch the window list
- empty get_window_state (som/ax) -> CLI re-fetch the AX tree + screenshot
- empty screenshot (vision) -> CLI re-fetch get_window_state for the PNG
Adds 2 regression tests. Full suite: 83 passed.
The cua-driver MCP stdio bridge intermittently (and on some machines
persistently) fails to forward heavier calls like get_window_state to
the daemon with POSIX EAGAIN — 'daemon transport error forwarding
get_window_state: Resource temporarily unavailable (os error 35)'.
The wrapper surfaced this as an empty 0x0 capture, so computer_use
returned blank screenshots even though the display, permissions, and
the daemon were all healthy (the direct 'cua-driver call' CLI path
worked fine throughout).
Fix: when the MCP path raises the transient/transport error, fall back
to the 'cua-driver call' subprocess transport, which talks to the
daemon over a different socket. The CLI fallback routes get_window_state
screenshots to a temp file via screenshot_out_file (tiny JSON response
instead of a multi-MB base64 blob that congests the socket), reads the
PNG back, retries with backoff, and remaps the JSON into the same
{data, images, structuredContent, isError} shape the MCP path produces
so capture()/_action() are transport-agnostic.
Adds _is_transient_daemon_error() classifier and 3 regression tests.
Verified live: captures that returned 0x0 now return full
1567x905 screenshots with the AX element tree.
The 'never reached ready' error (issue #57025) was undiagnosable — doctor
and MCP test pass while the wrapper times out, with no hint where startup
stalled. Track a phase marker through _lifecycle_coro (binary-check →
manifest-discovery → mcp-initialize → capability-discovery → ready) and
include it in the timeout RuntimeError plus a pointer to doctor and the
agent.log phase timings.
Complements the 15s→30s bump + success-path phase timing log from #58760.
Replaces the POSIX `/bin/bash -c "$(curl …)"` invocation with a
download-then-exec flow: curl the upstream install.sh into a mkstemp
temp file (unpredictable name, 0600) and run it as a plain argv list.
No shell=True, no command substitution. The temp script is removed in
a finally block; download failures return cleanly without exec.
Salvages the intent of #34974 by @ErnestHysa. His original patch
targeted a fixed /tmp/cua-driver-install.sh path (symlink/TOCTOU-prone
on multi-user hosts) and predates Windows/Linux installer support;
this version uses mkstemp and keeps the powershell path untouched.
Co-authored-by: ErnestHysa <takis312@hotmail.com>
Follow-up to #57987: after /skill-a the completer previously went silent
for a second /skill token. Now, while the leading tokens form an unbroken
skill chain (each token a distinct installed skill, under the 5-cap) and
the word under the cursor starts with '/', the completer keeps offering
the remaining skill commands, and SlashCommandAutoSuggest ghost-suggests
the rest of the next skill name. Instruction text, path-like tokens, and
broken chains get no suggestions. The TUI's complete.slash RPC reuses
SlashCommandCompleter, so it inherits the behavior with no changes.
* fix(cli): unwedge cua-driver installer timeouts — group-kill on timeout, stale-lock pre-clear, 660s ceiling
The cua-driver refresh in hermes update could wedge permanently:
subprocess timeout (300s) killed only the outer shell, orphaning the
curl|bash grandchildren and the upstream installer's concurrent-install
lock (~/.cua-driver/packages/.install.lock.d). The installer only
reclaims a stale lock after 600s of waiting — longer than our old
ceiling — so every subsequent run was killed before recovery could
fire: 'always times out'.
- Run the installer in its own process group (start_new_session) and
SIGKILL the whole group on timeout, so no lock-holding orphans survive.
- Pre-clear a provably-stale lock (dead holder pid, or pid-less and
older than the upstream 600s window) before invoking the installer.
- Raise the ceiling to 660s (> upstream LOCK_STALE_AFTER_SECONDS=600).
- Timeout message now names the lock path and the manual re-run command.
Fixes#58762
* chore: suppress windows-footgun lint on platform-gated kill calls
Both sites are POSIX-only: _clear_stale_cua_install_lock early-returns
on win32, and os.killpg sits in the 'not is_windows' branch.
The custom ``httpx.HTTPTransport(socket_options=[SO_KEEPALIVE, ...])``
in ``_build_keepalive_http_client()`` was introduced to fix CLOSE-WAIT
socket accumulation on long-lived connections (#10324).
That approach broke streaming for providers behind reverse proxies
(OpenResty, Cloudflare, etc.) because the custom socket options
conflict with the proxy's chunked-transfer handling (#54049, #12952).
It also stripped TCP_NODELAY, stalling TLS handshakes and SSE encoding.
Narrow per-provider bypasses were added for Copilot (#50298), Codex
(#36623, #12953), but the root cause remained.
The fix moves connection lifecycle management from the socket layer to
the HTTP pool layer:
- ``httpx.Limits(keepalive_expiry=20.0)`` tells httpx to close idle
pooled connections at 20 s, before a reverse proxy's typical 30-60 s
timeout drops them and causes CLOSE-WAIT accumulation.
- The default httpx transport preserves OS TCP defaults (including
TCP_NODELAY), so TLS handshakes and SSE chunked encoding work
correctly.
- ``trust_env=False`` prevents httpx from double-dipping on env vars
(we handle proxy detection ourselves via ``_get_proxy_for_base_url``
which respects NO_PROXY).
- The Copilot host bypass (line 3632) is no longer needed since all
providers now use the same standard httpx.Client.
Closes#54049. Supersedes #12010, #36623, #12953, #50298.
Follow-up to #56236: the broadened root token /[/.]*\** treats any run of
dots after the root slash as a collapse spelling, so a literal root-level
directory named '...' (rm -rf /...) was unconditionally hardline-blocked
with no approval path. Tighten the token to /(?:(?:\.\.?)?/)*(?:\.\.?)?\**
so each inter-slash segment must be exactly '.' or '..' — all real collapse
spellings (//, /., /./, /.., //*, ///, /../..) stay on the hardline floor
while literal dot-run dirs fall through to the softer DANGEROUS_PATTERNS
rules like every other real path.
* feat(approvals): /deny <reason> relays denial reason to the agent
Port from qwibitai/nanoclaw#2832 (reject with reason).
Gateway /deny now accepts an optional trailing reason (/deny <reason>
or /deny all <reason>). The reason rides on the per-session approval
entry through resolve_gateway_approval -> _await_gateway_decision and is
appended to the BLOCKED tool result the agent receives, so a declined
agent can adapt instead of only hearing 'denied'.
Adapted to hermes-agent's synchronous single-command /deny model: no DB
state, no second-message capture step, no migration. Reason is capped at
280 chars and threaded through both the terminal-command guard and the
execute_code guard. Plain /deny and the approve paths are unchanged.
- tools/approval.py: _ApprovalEntry.reason; resolve_gateway_approval gains
optional reason; _await_gateway_decision returns it; both gateway BLOCKED
messages include it
- gateway/slash_commands.py: parse leading 'all' + trailing reason
- locales/en.yaml: deny.denied_reason_{singular,plural}
- hermes_cli/commands.py: /deny args_hint '[all] [reason]'
- tests: 3 new (with-reason, all+reason, plain-deny regression)
* fix(ci): localize deny-reason keys across all locales + update interrupt-path assertions
CI surfaced two enforced invariants broken by the deny-with-reason change:
- test_i18n catalog-parity requires every locale to carry the same keys as
en.yaml with matching placeholders. Added deny.denied_reason_singular/plural
(with {count}/{reason}) to all 15 non-English locales.
- test_approval_interrupt asserts the exact dict from _await_gateway_decision,
which now carries a 'reason' key (None on the interrupt/timeout paths).
Inspired by Claude Code v2.1.199 (July 2, 2026): stacked slash-skill
invocations load all leading skills (up to 5), not just the first.
- agent/skill_commands.py: split_stacked_skill_commands() consumes leading
/skill tokens (stops at the first non-skill token so slash-path arguments
are never swallowed); build_stacked_skill_invocation_message() composes
the multi-skill turn reusing the existing bundle scaffolding markers so
extract_user_instruction_from_skill_message() keeps memory providers
storing the user's instruction, not N skill bodies.
- cli.py + gateway/run.py: dispatch the stacked path on both surfaces.
- 11 new tests + docs section in skills.md.
Port from anomalyco/opencode#34529: MCP servers can emit
notifications/message logging notifications (RFC 5424 levels), but the
MCP SDK's default logging_callback silently discards them — server-side
warnings/errors during tool calls were invisible.
- tools/mcp_tool.py: pass a logging_callback to every ClientSession
(stdio, SSE, streamable HTTP old+new API paths via the shared
sampling_kwargs sites), mapping the 8 MCP log levels onto Python
logging levels and tagging entries with [server/logger] origin.
- JSON-serialize non-string payloads, cap at 2000 chars so a chatty
server can't flood agent.log, never raise from the handler.
- Gated on SDK support (_check_logging_callback_support) mirroring the
existing message_handler gate for old SDK versions.
- tests/tools/test_mcp_server_log_notifications.py: 10 tests covering
level mapping, origin tagging, JSON payloads, truncation, and the
never-raise contract.
Inspired by Claude Code v2.1.199 (July 2, 2026): SSL certificate errors
(TLS-inspecting proxies, missing CA bundles, expired certs) no longer
burn retries before showing actionable guidance — they fail immediately
with the fix hint.
- agent/error_classifier.py: new FailoverReason.ssl_cert_verification +
_SSL_CERT_VERIFY_PATTERNS, checked BEFORE the transient-SSL patterns
(cert-verify messages also contain '[SSL:' and previously retried
forever as timeout). Non-retryable, no compression, no fallback churn.
- agent/conversation_loop.py: dedicated status line + per-cause fix
hints (corporate proxy CA bundle, certifi refresh, self-signed local
endpoints) on the non-retryable abort path.
- 7 new tests incl. regression guards (transient alerts still retry,
large-session cert failure doesn't trigger compression).
`hermes profile export default` crashed with `shutil.Error` when
HERMES_HOME pointed outside ~/.hermes (common in Docker deployments)
and the workspace contained broken symlinks. Two root causes:
1. `copytree` defaults to `symlinks=False` and follows link targets;
broken ones crash. #58397 (liuhao1024) drafted a minimal
`symlinks=True` flag fix; this PR adopts that change.
2. `copytree` was invoked against the entire HERMES_HOME root (which
doubles as cwd in Docker layouts). The post-hoc blacklist at
`_DEFAULT_EXPORT_EXCLUDE_ROOT` is a fixed-length enumerate-and-pray
list that can't anticipate every unrelated sibling directory
(`x11-dev/`, etc.). Replaced with a positive allow-list at
`_DEFAULT_EXPORT_INCLUDE_ROOT` enumerating the known Hermes profile
artifacts (config, persona, skills, cron, scripts, sessions,
plugins, memories, knowledge, preferences). Sensitive runtime
surfaces (`state.db`, `logs/`, auth files, other profiles) are
intentionally not in the allow-list so the export stays a
portable, credential-free snapshot of the user-facing surface —
which means the existing `test_export_default_excludes_infrastructure`
regressions remain green.
Adds two regression tests:
* test_export_default_uses_allowlist_for_unrelated_dirs — >x11-dev<
sibling directories must not leak into the archive.
* test_export_default_handles_broken_symlinks — symlinks inside
allowed artifacts survive instead of crashing the export.
closing that PR as superseded once this lands.
Closes#58394
shutil.copytree() defaults to symlinks=False which follows symlinks and
crashes on broken ones. In Docker/custom HERMES_HOME deployments,
unrelated directories may contain stale symlinks that break export.
Add symlinks=True to both copytree() calls in export_profile() so
broken symlinks are preserved as symlink entries in the archive.
Fixes#58394
video_analyze_tool's local-path branch read raw bytes via
_detect_video_mime_type (extension-only, no magic-byte check) with no
call to agent.file_safety.raise_if_read_blocked, unlike the image-gen
and video-gen provider plugins that already route local inputs through
that shared chokepoint (#57698). A model could point video_url at a
credential store (e.g. .env, auth.json) renamed or symlinked to a
video-like extension and have its raw bytes base64-encoded and sent to
the vision provider.
vision_analyze_tool and its native fast path (_vision_analyze_native)
had the same gap in their local-file branches; they were only
incidentally protected by the image magic-byte sniff rejecting
non-image content, not by the intended read guard.
Add raise_if_read_blocked() to all three local-file branches, mirroring
the existing plugins/image_gen and plugins/video_gen call sites.
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