`_resolve_chat_guid` no longer consults the participants list — it
matches strictly on `chatIdentifier`/`identifier`. The
`with: ["participants"]` request parameter is now wasted bandwidth on
every chat list query and serves no purpose. Drop it so the BlueBubbles
server can skip the participant join on each call.
No behavioral change; pure payload trim.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The outbound chat resolver in BlueBubblesAdapter._resolve_chat_guid()
matched on participant addresses after the exact chatIdentifier check,
which let an outbound DM reply leak into a group thread when the same
contact existed in both a 1:1 DM and a group chat: if the group chat
was returned earlier by /api/v1/chat/query and the DM's
chatIdentifier differed from the bare address, the participant match
on the group fired first and returned the group GUID. That GUID was
then cached under the bare address, so every subsequent reply went to
the wrong chat.
Restrict resolution to:
1. raw GUID passthrough
2. exact chatIdentifier / identifier match
When no exact match exists the resolver now returns None and the
caller already handles that path safely: send() creates a fresh DM via
_create_chat_for_handle for address-shaped targets, and
_send_attachment fails with a clear "chat not found" error rather than
guessing into a group.
Adds regression tests under TestBlueBubblesGuidResolution covering:
- exact chatIdentifier match still resolves to the DM
- participant-only presence does not resolve to the group
- the DM is chosen even when the group is returned first
- unresolved targets are not cached (no stale-None and no stale-group)
Fixes#24157.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mitigates indirect prompt injection (CWE-863) in Slack thread context.
When the bot is mentioned mid-thread for the first time, _fetch_thread_context
pulls the full thread via conversations.replies and prepends every reply to
the LLM prompt. Replies from senders not on the allowlist were rendered
identically to authorised senders, letting a third party in a shared channel
inject instructions the model might act on when answering the next authorised
message.
- BasePlatformAdapter.set_authorization_check / _is_sender_authorized, registered
by GatewayRunner._make_adapter_auth_check() with a closure over the existing
_is_user_authorized chain (platform/global/group allowlists, allow-all flags,
pairing store all stay the single source of truth — no env-var re-parsing).
- Tags non-bot thread messages whose sender fails the auth check with an
[unverified] prefix; strengthens the header with soft guidance only when at
least one unverified message is present, so setups without an allowlist see
no behaviour change.
- Wired into all three adapter-init sites in run.py (start, reconnect watcher,
restart) so the reconnect path is covered too.
Softened wording: adapted from the original [untrusted] tag to [unverified]
and non-accusatory header framing — the label reflects allowlist status, not
a judgment about the person. Adapter relocated to plugins/platforms/slack/
since the PR was authored.
Salvaged from #17059.
In single-process multi-profile runtimes (desktop tui_gateway), profile
scoping is a context-local ContextVar override, not a process env var. Three
subsystems froze their HERMES_HOME-derived paths at import time (or read
os.environ directly), pinning every later profile to whichever profile first
imported the module — a cross-profile data leak.
- tools/skills_hub.py: SKILLS_DIR/HUB_DIR/LOCK_FILE/etc. were module constants
frozen at import. Replace with per-call resolver functions; add a PEP 562
module __getattr__ so external 'from tools.skills_hub import SKILLS_DIR'
callers (all function-local) resolve dynamically with no call-site changes.
Convert default-arg bindings (HubLockFile/TapsManager) and the derived
HERMES_INDEX_CACHE_FILE constant too.
- gateway/platforms/base.py: image/audio/video/document cache-dir getters now
re-resolve via get_hermes_dir() per call, falling back to the module
constant when a test has monkeypatched it (preserves the existing test seam).
Media-delivery safe-roots already enumerate all profiles' cache dirs
(#31733), so per-profile resolution does not break delivery.
- gateway/rich_sent_store.py: _store_path() read os.environ['HERMES_HOME']
directly, bypassing the override entirely; route through get_hermes_home().
The extension-less MEDIA delivery guards short-circuited on
"MEDIA: not in text and [[audio_as_voice]] not in text", so a
response carrying only [[as_document]] (an image-only reply requesting
unmodified document delivery) leaked the directive as visible text.
Add [[as_document]] to both guard conditions (_strip_media_tag_directives
and strip_media_directives_for_display) and cover it with a regression
test.
Files like Caddyfile or Makefile have no extension, so MEDIA_TAG_CLEANUP_RE
never matched them and Telegram showed the raw MEDIA: line as text. Extract
and strip validated extension-less tags via a second pass.
In `WHATSAPP_MODE=bot` the bridge currently drops every fromMe inbound
message — they are all assumed to be echoes of our own /send calls.
That makes it impossible for plugins / agents to detect when a human
owner has typed directly into a customer chat from the same WhatsApp
Business account (e.g. via a linked phone or WhatsApp Web).
This adds an opt-in `WHATSAPP_FORWARD_OWNER_MESSAGES` env var. When
true, the bridge classifies fromMe inbound by looking up `key.id` in a
bounded LRU of recently-sent message IDs (the existing 50-entry echo
suppressor, bumped to 512 and extracted to a testable
`outbound_ids.js` helper). Hits in the LRU are still dropped (echoes);
misses are forwarded to the Python adapter with `fromOwner: true`.
The Python adapter lifts that flag onto
`MessageEvent.metadata["whatsapp_from_owner"]`. `metadata` is a new
free-form dict on the event so future per-platform signals don't each
need their own field. Default behaviour is unchanged: with the env
flag unset, bot mode still drops every fromMe message exactly as
before.
Use cases for downstream consumers:
- Implicit handover activation when the owner replies manually
- Sliding TTL on owner activity (keep an active session alive while
the owner is engaged)
- Audit trails of owner interventions
- Analytics on human-vs-bot reply ratios
Heuristic limitation (documented in code): the LRU is in-memory. After
a bridge restart, in-flight delivery receipts of pre-restart sends will
briefly look like owner-typed for a few seconds until the set is
repopulated. Persisting isn't worth the disk churn — downstream
consumers should treat the flag as best-effort.
Tests:
- tests/gateway/test_whatsapp_from_owner.py (new): adapter sets the
metadata flag iff the bridge payload has `fromOwner: true`; absent
otherwise.
- scripts/whatsapp-bridge/outbound_ids.test.mjs (new): LRU bounds,
eviction order, falsy-id handling.
Backwards compatibility: with the env flag unset, every code path is
identical to before. No existing deployment is affected.
The base BasePlatformAdapter implementations of send_voice, send_video,
send_document, and send_image_file forwarded their *_path argument
verbatim into the chat text (e.g. "🎬 Video: /home/.../hermes/cache/...").
Telegram, Discord, and Slack adapters all fall back to those base methods
when their native send raises — so a rejected video on Telegram surfaced
the host filesystem layout to the user instead of a useful message.
Replace the path-echo with a friendly notice, log the path for operator
diagnostics, and keep the user-supplied caption intact. The Slack adapter
had three identical sites that fell through to the same path-echo on its
own native upload failures; fix those too. send_document still surfaces
the caller-provided file_name (or the basename derived from it) since
that is the user-facing filename, not a host path.
Add regression tests asserting the *_path argument never appears in the
fallback content while caption text and explicit file_name still do.
Add a generic per-platform PlatformConfig.typing_indicator flag (default
True) that gates the _keep_typing refresh loop in
_process_message_background. When false, the loop is never spawned, so no
typing/"is thinking…" status is shown on that platform — message delivery
is otherwise unchanged.
Mirrors the gateway_restart_notification contract exactly: dataclass field
+ to_dict/from_dict (with extra-fallback resolution) + shared-key bridge in
load_gateway_config, so 'slack: typing_indicator: false' under platforms
works without a separate block. Generic by design — the same key works for
every platform (Slack 'is thinking…', Telegram/Discord/Signal typing).
Motivated by users who find Slack's assistant 'is thinking…' status noisy
(it also briefly disables the compose box, via the Assistant API).
The topic-mode helpers (_telegram_topic_mode_enabled,
_recover_telegram_topic_thread_id, _record/_sync_telegram_topic_binding,
_is_telegram_topic_lane/_root_lobby, _normalize_source_for_session_key,
_telegram_topic_new_header, _schedule_telegram_topic_title_rename, and the
base.py _apply_topic_recovery hook) each run a synchronous SessionDB read or
write. They reach the event loop through async handlers, so a contended
state.db froze the loop the same way the handoff watcher did.
These helpers already run off-loop in the run_sync thread-pool closure, so
they are proven thread-safe there. Rather than colour them async, loop-side
callers now invoke them via asyncio.to_thread(...); the executor callers are
unchanged. Inside the helpers the SessionDB handle is unwrapped to the sync
door (getattr(db, '_db', db)) since they always run on a worker thread, and
AIAgent construction + query_session_listing are handed the sync SessionDB
directly. base.py wraps its single _apply_topic_recovery call in to_thread.
The guard is now alias-aware (catches db = getattr(self, '_session_db', None);
db.method(...)) and enforces the offload contract: the offloaded sync helpers
may never be called bare on the loop. Sibling test fixtures wrap their injected
SessionDB in AsyncSessionDB to match how the gateway holds it.
Defense-in-depth on top of _safe_session_filename_component (#5958):
Sink (makes the bad write impossible regardless of entry point):
- run_agent._save_session_log: sanitize session_id before building the
session_{sid}.json snapshot path.
- agent_runtime_helpers.dump_api_request_debug: sanitize before building
the request_dump_{sid}_{ts}.json path.
Boundary (clean 400 instead of a silently-hashed filename):
- api_server rejects path-traversal-shaped X-Hermes-Session-Id on the
session-continuation path and the explicit /api/sessions create path,
reusing gateway.session._is_path_unsafe (mirrors the native gateway's
entry-boundary guard). Also enforces the session-header length cap on
the continuation path.
Tests: traversal session_id stays contained at the write site; sanitizer
always yields a traversal-free segment; the API header rejects
../, absolute, and Windows-traversal IDs with 400.
Two of the three fixes from PR #6660 (the cli.py reopen_session change is
moot — that raw _conn.execute reopen block no longer exists on main).
- gateway/run.py: stop sending raw type(e).__name__ and str(e)[:300] to
end users on chat platforms. Exception text from LLM providers can leak
API URLs, file paths, and partial credentials. Return a generic message;
keep curated status hints for known HTTP codes; full detail stays in logs.
- gateway/platforms/webhook.py: validate pr_number (positive int) and repo
(owner/name regex) before passing to the 'gh pr comment' subprocess.
Payload-controlled values could otherwise inject gh flags (--help, a
different --repo). List-form subprocess means this is arg injection, not
shell injection, but validation is still correct.
Co-authored-by: aaronagent <1115117931@qq.com>
* fix(gateway): log error-notification failures instead of silently swallowing
The last-resort exception handler in _process_message_background() that
sends an error notice to the user caught all exceptions with a bare pass,
leaving zero trace when the notification itself failed. Upgrade to
logger.error(..., exc_info=True) so a failed error-notification send is
debuggable post-mortem.
Salvaged from #6499 by @BongSuCHOI (the logging-upgrade portion only).
* docs: add PR infographic for gateway error-notify logging
yuanbao_media.download_url() fetched model-supplied (outbound) and inbound
image/file URLs server-side via httpx with follow_redirects=True and no
SSRF check. A model response containing <img src="http://169.254.169.254/...">
routed through ImageUrlHandler -> download_url and would fetch cloud-metadata
endpoints; same for inbound media.
Add an is_safe_url() pre-flight plus an async redirect event-hook that
re-validates every 30x target, matching the cache_image_from_url() guard in
gateway/platforms/base.py. The other gateway adapters already guard their
URL-fetch paths; this was the remaining unguarded one.
When a stale lock file survives a gateway crash, `acquire_scoped_lock()`
may return `(False, existing_dict)` even after detecting and deleting
the stale lock (e.g. if unlink fails or a race condition occurs).
Previously, `_acquire_platform_lock()` called
`_set_fatal_error(..., retryable=False)`, which permanently killed the
platform — the reconnect watcher never retries a non-retryable fatal
error.
Change to `retryable=True` so the platform enters the "retrying"
state and the reconnect watcher can attempt acquisition again after the
standard backoff delay.
Fixes#54167
Follow-up to the salvaged #37733 fix. The contributor centralized
redaction at _openai_error and the chat/responses failure paths, which
covers the OpenAI-compatible envelopes transitively. Two sibling classes
crossed the same authenticated HTTP boundary unredacted:
- 8x cron-management endpoints returning {"error": str(e)} on 500
- the session-chat SSE error event ({"message": str(exc)})
Route both through the same _redact_api_error_text(force=True) helper.
Add AUTHOR_MAP entry for coygeek and a TestRedactApiErrorText guard
covering mask/force/limit/passthrough behavior.
Force API-server error text through the existing secret redactor before returning OpenAI-compatible errors, response fallback text, response snapshots, and run failure events. This prevents credential-shaped provider failure text from crossing the API-server boundary while preserving debuggable sanitized messages.
Generated images under a profile gateway's cache (profiles/<name>/cache/
images/...) were silently dropped from Telegram/Discord delivery when
HERMES_HOME is symlinked under a denied prefix (e.g. /opt/data ->
/root/.hermes) and $HOME is not that prefix. The resolved path lands
under /root (a system denylist prefix), the root-home exception only
fires when the denied prefix IS $HOME, and the static safe-roots list
only covers the active HERMES_HOME's top-level cache — not per-profile
cache dirs. Both gates fail, so validate_media_delivery_path returns
None and the gateway logs 'Skipping unsafe MEDIA directive path'.
_media_delivery_allowed_roots() now also enumerates per-profile cache
roots (<root>/profiles/*/cache/{images,audio,videos,documents,
screenshots}) at check time. Allowlist match runs before the denylist,
so the profile artifact delivers regardless of the /root interaction;
profile-dir credentials (auth.json) stay blocked since they aren't
under a cache subdir.
Reopened regression of #34485/#38108, neither of which covered the
profile-scoped symlink case. Fixes#31733.
Follow-up to #53791 addressing review feedback: the footgun checker treated
capture_output=/stdout=/stderr=/check_output as proof a subprocess can't pop a
Windows console. That invariant is false — stream redirection controls where a
child's output goes, not whether a console is allocated. From a console-less
parent (Desktop/Electron, pythonw.exe, detached gateway/cron) a console-subsystem
child still flashes a window even when fully captured.
- check-windows-footguns.py: capture/redirect/check_output is no longer a blanket
safe-pass. Added _WINDOWS_FLASHING_PROGRAMS (git/gh/npm/node/python/uv/ffmpeg/
docker/powershell/…); calls to those are flagged even when captured. Non-flashing
programs keep the capture exemption (no 271-site noise). _subprocess_compat.run/
popen calls are inherently safe (wrapper injects CREATE_NO_WINDOW).
- Routed the 35 genuine flashing git/gh/npm/uv/ffmpeg/docker spawns through the
_subprocess_compat.run/popen chokepoint (Brooklyn's wrapper from #53810) — the
durable fix, not per-site annotations. cmd.exe /c start stays # ok (intentional).
- Updated tests + CONTRIBUTING.md rule #17 to the corrected invariant.
The adapter-level intake gate (_is_dm_allowed / _is_group_allowed, reached
via _should_process_message) did a raw set-membership check against the
configured allowlist. WhatsApp now delivers inbound DM senders in LID form
(<id>@lid) while operators configure allowlists with phone numbers, so the
check never matched and every DM from an allowed contact was silently
dropped before the gateway authz layer ran.
Route both gates through the existing gateway.whatsapp_identity.
expand_whatsapp_aliases helper (already used by gateway authz and session
keys), which walks the bridge's lid-mapping-*.json session files. Phone and
LID forms now resolve to each other in both directions; exact JID matches,
wildcard, disabled/open policies, and empty-allowlist fail-closed behavior
are all preserved.
Fixes#14486
Move table-detection regex, row-splitting, and table-to-bullet
conversion into gateway/platforms/helpers.py so both Discord and
Telegram adapters can share them.
Co-authored-by: Yashiel Sookdeo <yashiel@skyner.co.za>
Replies on WhatsApp Cloud arrived at the agent with reply_to_id set but
reply_to_text=None, so run.py never injected the "[Replying to: ...]"
disambiguation prefix (it gates on reply_to_text). Meta's webhook context
object carries only the quoted message's id, never its text.
Index (chat_id, wamid) -> text in rich_sent_store on every inbound message
and every outbound text send -- the same store that solved the identical
Telegram rich-send problem -- then look up the quoted text in
_build_message_event_from_cloud and populate reply_to_text plus
reply_to_is_own_message, derived from context.from versus the business
number.
After a prolonged outage the in-process network-error ladder escalates to
fatal and GatewayRunner._platform_reconnect_watcher rebuilds a fresh adapter
that reconnects through the bootstrap path. That path called
start_polling(drop_pending_updates=True), discarding every update Telegram
queued during the outage — all messages sent while the bot was down were
silently lost. The in-process ladder and 409-conflict handler already passed
drop_pending_updates=False; only bootstrap did not distinguish a cold first
boot from a reconnect.
Thread an is_reconnect signal from the watcher through
_connect_adapter_with_timeout into adapter.connect(). The base
BasePlatformAdapter.connect() gains a keyword-only is_reconnect=False so every
adapter inherits a tolerant signature (no per-platform breakage when the
runner forwards the kwarg). Telegram translates is_reconnect into
drop_pending_updates=not is_reconnect on both the polling and webhook bootstrap
calls. Cold boot still drops the stale queue; a watcher reconnect preserves it.
Fixes#46621.
Co-authored-by: annguyenNous <annguyen@nousresearch.com>
Co-authored-by: kyssta-exe <kyssta-exe@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kewe63 <Kewe63@users.noreply.github.com>
A hosted instance fronted by the Team Gateway connector dropped EVERY relay
message as "Unauthorized user" and the agent never replied — despite the
message routing correctly through the connector to the instance.
Root cause: gateway authorization (_is_user_authorized) had no notion of
upstream-enforced authz. Platform.RELAY matches no {PLATFORM}_ALLOWED_USERS
allowlist and isn't in the HA/WEBHOOK always-authorized set, so a relay user
with no env allowlist configured hit the default-deny ("No user allowlists
configured. All unauthorized users will be denied."). The message was received,
then silently denied before reaching the agent.
This is incorrect for relay: the connector authenticates the gateway's WS with
a per-instance secret and performs owner-only author-binding resolution BEFORE
delivering. A message only reaches this gateway because the connector resolved
it to THIS instance's bound user (user_instance_binding), keyed on the author id
the connector OBSERVED off the event — never a gateway claim. The authorization
decision is already made by a trusted, authenticated upstream; there is no local
RELAY_ALLOWED_USERS allowlist to consult, and default-denying for its absence is
the bug.
Fix: add a generic BasePlatformAdapter.authorization_is_upstream capability
(default False) that the relay adapter overrides to True, plus a dedicated
trusted branch in _is_user_authorized that honors it. This is delegation to a
trusted upstream, NOT a fail-open: it fires only for an adapter that explicitly
declares the flag; every direct network-exposed adapter leaves it False and the
env-allowlist default-deny (SECURITY.md §2.6) is unchanged. Distinct from
enforces_own_access_policy, which mirrors a LOCAL config-driven allowlist —
this delegates to an authenticated upstream's decision.
Tests: behavior contract that the base defaults False, the relay adapter
declares True, a relay user (group + DM) is authorized with no env allowlist,
and crucially a non-upstream adapter with no allowlist still default-denies
(guards against the fix becoming a blanket fail-open). 6 new tests; relay +
authz + config-policy suites green (134 + 90).
Found via live staging debug of the Discord self-serve onboarding flow.
When Telegram's sendRichMessage returns a FloodWait/RetryAfter error,
_try_send_rich() now extracts the server-provided retry_after value and
propagates it through SendResult.retry_after. The base _send_with_retry()
layer honors this value instead of using its default short exponential
backoff (~2s, ~4s), preventing the retry budget from being exhausted
against a server that demands a 25-37s wait.
Salvaged from #46774 by @liuhao1024. Telegram adapter path moved from
gateway/platforms/telegram.py to plugins/platforms/telegram/adapter.py
since the original PR.
Closes#46762
_session_task_is_stale() failed to detect a stale session lock when the owner
task completed and cleaned _session_tasks (del in _process_message_background's
finally) but _active_sessions was NOT released because _release_session_guard
skipped on a guard mismatch (a concurrent reset/new command or drain handoff
swapped _active_sessions[key] to a different guard). With no owner task left to
inspect, _session_task_is_stale reported 'not stale', the orphaned guard was
never healed, and the session deadlocked permanently — later messages received
but never dispatched.
Reorder the finally cleanup to release-then-conditional-delete: release the
guard first, then drop the _session_tasks entry ONLY if the guard was actually
released (session_key no longer in _active_sessions). On a guard mismatch the
done-task entry survives, so the on-entry self-heal (_session_task_is_stale ->
_heal_stale_session_lock) detects the stale lock and clears it on the next
inbound message.
Extracted the cleanup into a callable _cleanup_finished_session_task() helper so
the regression test drives the REAL production code path rather than a copy of
its logic (the original test inlined the fixed logic and passed regardless of
the production order — mutation-verified the rewritten tests now fail on the
buggy del-first order). Added a positive-path test (guard matches -> release +
delete) so both branches are pinned.
Co-authored-by: kshitijk4poor <82637225+kshitijk4poor@users.noreply.github.com>
The media-delivery denylist in gateway/platforms/base.py enumerated only
.env/auth.json/credentials/config.yaml under HERMES_HOME, so other
credential stores that live at the root fell through and could be
auto-attached to chat replies. The reported case: the Google Workspace
skill's google_token.json refreshes every turn, bumping its mtime to
'now', which kept passing the strict-mode recency window and re-sent the
OAuth token on every reply.
Extend the explicit per-file denylist to mirror the canonical credential
set already enforced by the read/write guards in agent/file_safety.py:
google_token.json, google_oauth_pending.json, auth/google_oauth.json,
.anthropic_oauth.json, webhook_subscriptions.json, cache/bws_cache.json,
auth.lock, and the pairing/ token directory.
Targeted per-file additions (not a blanket ~/.hermes deny, which was
declined in #32090/#34425 because it would block skills/, logs/, and
ad-hoc agent-written deliverables). mcp-tokens/ (#37222) and
state.db/kanban.db (#41071) are left to their sibling targeted PRs.
Reported-by: xxxigm (#50912)
Follow-up to ScotterMonk's cron-truncation fix:
- Remove HERMES_DELIVERY_MAX_PLATFORM_OUTPUT env var. Behavioral config
belongs in config.yaml, not a new HERMES_* env var (.env is secrets
only). The actual bug is fixed entirely by the adapter-aware skip; the
configurable cap was unneeded scope. MAX_PLATFORM_OUTPUT is a constant
again, collapsing the max_output=0 disable branch and the
audit-vs-truncation threshold divergence.
- Flag the remaining verified-chunking adapters (slack, matrix, feishu,
mattermost, teams, whatsapp, whatsapp_cloud, weixin, bluebubbles,
yuanbao) with splits_long_messages=True so the fix covers the whole
bug class, not just Discord/Telegram. Each verified to chunk in its
own send() via truncate_message().
- SMS deliberately left False: it chunks for normal replies but a
multi-segment cron blast is cost-bearing; the 4000-cap + file save is
the safer default there.
- Update tests: drop the two env-override tests, add a test asserting a
save failure during truncation (non-chunking) propagates.
Gateway-level truncation (MAX_PLATFORM_OUTPUT=4000) was pre-empting
adapter-side message splitting. Discord and Telegram both chunk long
content natively in their send() via truncate_message(), but the
delivery router truncated to 3800 chars + footer before the adapter
ever saw the full payload — so long cron output was cut short instead
of being delivered as multiple messages (issue #50126).
Changes:
- HERMES_DELIVERY_MAX_PLATFORM_OUTPUT env var makes the cap configurable
(default 4000, backward compatible). Set to 0 to disable truncation.
- TRUNCATED_VISIBLE (3800) removed — visible portion now derived
dynamically from max_output minus the actual footer length.
- New BasePlatformAdapter.splits_long_messages capability flag (default
False). Adapters that chunk in send() set True; delivery skips
truncation for them but still saves full output to disk as audit.
- Flagged Discord and Telegram (both verified to chunk in send()).
Fixes#50126
Tirith redacts its own findings, but the approval-request callbacks built the
operator prompt from the RAW command string, so a credential-shaped value
Tirith flagged was sent verbatim to clients, undoing the redaction one layer up.
Two egress transports carried the leak; both are fixed via a shared
module-level seam _redact_approval_command() (redact_sensitive_text force=True):
1. chat platforms — _approval_notify_sync (gateway/run.py): redact before
both the button path (send_exec_approval) and the plain-text /approve
fallback.
2. SSE/API stream — _approval_notify (gateway/platforms/api_server.py):
redact event['command'] before it is enqueued to API/desktop clients.
(whole-bug-class: sibling call path on a separate transport.)
force=True so the prompt — a hard secret-egress boundary — honors redaction
even when security.redact_secrets is off. Clean commands pass through unchanged.
Tests bind the seam (synthetic credential-format fixtures, force-when-disabled) AND assert
BOTH callbacks ASSIGN the redacted result before the send/enqueue sink, via an
AST contract that rejects a discarded-result call. All mutation-checked.
Authorization to message the agent is the gate, not the file extension.
Previously the inbound-attachment allowlist (SUPPORTED_DOCUMENT_TYPES) was
opt-OUT on Discord (allow_any_attachment defaulted false) and had no bypass
at all on Telegram/Slack — so an .html (or any non-allowlisted type) was
dropped or hard-rejected before the agent saw it.
Now every authorized upload is cached and surfaced to the agent regardless
of type:
- base.cache_media_bytes(): unknown types cache as octet-stream (or the
caller-supplied MIME) instead of returning None — fixes the chokepoint
that Teams/Telegram-media route through.
- discord/telegram/slack adapters: removed the allowlist reject/skip; any
non-media attachment is typed DOCUMENT and cached. Known types keep their
precise MIME.
- Text inlining now gates on a shared _TEXT_INJECT_EXTENSIONS set (text +
code + config + markup) instead of a blind UTF-8 decode, so binary formats
(PDF/zip/docx) with ASCII headers are never inlined.
- gateway/run.py emits the path-pointing context note for every DOCUMENT,
including non text/application MIME types.
- discord.allow_any_attachment is now a documented no-op kept for config
back-compat.
Validation: 357 gateway tests pass; E2E confirms .html/.bin/custom types
cache, known types stay precise, PDFs are not inlined.
Remove the dashboard --insecure auth-bypass, add an MCP persistence guard +
IOC blocklist, and raise the API-server key entropy floor.
Driven by the June 2026 hermes-0day campaign (r/hermesagent, live 854.media
instance): scanners find exposed Hermes dashboards/API servers, drive the
root agent to plant a 'command: bash' MCP entry that appends an attacker SSH
key to authorized_keys, which cron + startup then re-execute every tick.
- dashboard: --insecure no longer disables the auth gate. should_require_auth
returns True for every non-loopback bind; a public bind ALWAYS requires an
auth provider (bundled password provider or OAuth). --insecure kept as a
warned no-op for backward compat. Fail-closed error now points at the
password provider, not at --insecure.
- mcp_security: validate_mcp_server_entry now also rejects shell payloads that
write to OS persistence surfaces (authorized_keys/.ssh/pam.d/sudoers/cron/
rc files) and hard-rejects a hermes-0day IOC blocklist (attacker SSH key +
source IPs) anywhere in command/args/env. Runs at save AND spawn time.
- api_server: raise network-bind API_SERVER_KEY entropy floor 8->16 chars;
warn when a network-accessible API server runs an unsandboxed local backend.
Add a platform-neutral send-failure vocabulary so consumers can branch on a
typed category instead of substring-matching the raw provider message.
- base.py: SEND_ERROR_KINDS + classify_send_error() (too_long / bad_format /
forbidden / not_found / rate_limited / transient / unknown), and an optional
SendResult.error_kind field (defaults None — fully backward compatible).
- telegram.py: populate error_kind on send() failures; message_too_long keeps
its existing error token plus error_kind='too_long'.
Purely additive: no behavioral change to the existing degrade-and-deliver
paths (MarkdownV2->plain-text fallback, overflow split, retry classification
all untouched). 22 new tests + 210 adapter regression tests green.
* fix(api-server): stop silently promising async delivery on stateless HTTP path
terminal(notify_on_complete=True / watch_patterns) and delegate_task(background=True)
silently no-op'd on the API server / WebUI path (#10760): the watcher / detached
child registered, but every API-server route (OpenAI-spec /v1/chat/completions
and /v1/responses, plus the proprietary /v1/runs SSE stream) tears down its
channel when the turn ends, and APIServerAdapter.send() is a no-op stub. A
completion that fires after the response closed had nowhere to go — from the
agent side, indistinguishable from a hang.
There is no spec-compliant surface to wake the agent later on a stateless HTTP
client, so make the no-op honest instead of silent:
- Add a per-adapter capability flag supports_async_delivery (default True;
APIServerAdapter = False), propagated into a HERMES_SESSION_ASYNC_DELIVERY
contextvar via async_delivery_supported(). Toggle on the adapter, not a
hardcoded platform string — a future stateless adapter is correct-by-default.
- terminal: when delivery is unsupported, skip watcher registration, force
notify_on_complete off, and return a notify_unsupported note telling the
agent to process(action='poll').
- delegate_task: when delivery is unsupported, fall back to SYNCHRONOUS
execution (work runs and returns in the same response) with a note, instead
of handing out a handle that never resolves.
CLI (in-process completion_queue) and the real gateway platforms are unchanged.
Fixes#10760
* refactor(api-server): route session binding through a single no-delivery chokepoint
Add APIServerAdapter._bind_api_server_session() and route both agent-entry
paths (_run_agent for /v1/chat/completions + /v1/responses, and the /v1/runs
_run_sync path) through it. The helper hardwires platform="api_server" and
async_delivery=False with no async_delivery parameter to pass, so a future
route added to the API server physically cannot reintroduce the silent
no-op (#10760) by forgetting to mark the channel as non-delivering.
The binding stays request-scoped (cleared per turn), so a session resumed
later on a delivering interface (CLI / gateway platform) re-binds fresh and
is NOT blocked — the no-delivery decision tracks the interface handling the
current turn, never the session.
Inbound image/audio/video payloads were buffered fully into process memory
before being written to the cache, with no size limit. A large upload
(Discord Nitro allows 500 MB) or a remote media URL in an inbound message
pointing at a huge file could spike RAM and OOM-kill the gateway.
Enforce a configurable cap in the shared cache helpers (gateway/platforms/
base.py) so the protection holds across every platform adapter, not one:
- cache_image/audio/video_from_bytes reject oversized payloads before writing
(video was the gap in the original report — now covered).
- cache_image/audio_from_url stream the body, rejecting on an oversized
Content-Length header and re-checking the running total per chunk so an
absent/lying header can't smuggle an unbounded body past the cap.
- Discord's _read_attachment_bytes checks att.size up front, so an oversized
attachment is rejected before any bytes are pulled into memory.
Configurable via gateway.max_inbound_media_bytes in config.yaml (default
128 MiB; 0 disables). No new env var — non-secret config lives in config.yaml.
Salvaged and extended from @sgaofen's PR #13341 (the original report and the
shared-helper approach). Reapplied onto current main (Discord adapter has
since moved to plugins/platforms/discord/), the configurable knob moved from
an env var to config.yaml, and the video cache helper added.
Co-authored-by: Hermes Agent <noreply@nousresearch.com>
The OpenAI-compatible API server only enforced a hardcoded cap of 10
concurrent runs on /v1/runs, leaving /v1/chat/completions and
/v1/responses unbounded — a request flood could exhaust CPU, memory,
and upstream LLM quota (#7483).
- Add gateway.api_server.max_concurrent_runs (config.yaml, default 10,
0 disables). No env var.
- Shared concurrency gate across all three agent-serving endpoints,
counting both the chat/responses in-flight counter and the /v1/runs
stream set. Returns OpenAI-style 429 + Retry-After when at the cap.
- Remove the dead hardcoded _MAX_CONCURRENT_RUNS class attribute.
Closes#7483.
Follow-up cleanups on top of the busy/idle readout (PR #50103):
- web_server.py /api/status reused the single drain-timeout resolver
hermes_cli.gateway._get_restart_drain_timeout() (HERMES_RESTART_DRAIN_TIMEOUT
env -> agent.restart_drain_timeout config -> default) instead of inlining a
third hand-rolled copy of that precedence chain. Also fixes a subtle
divergence: the inline copy used os.environ.get() so a set-but-empty env var
was treated as a value rather than falling through to config; the shared
resolver .strip()s and falls through correctly.
- Added gateway.status.parse_active_agents() and routed BOTH HTTP surfaces
(/api/status and /health/detailed) through it, so the exposed active_agents
field is consistently clamped non-negative. Previously /api/status clamped
while /health/detailed exposed the raw file value, diverging on a corrupt
count.
- Added TestParseActiveAgents covering the shared coercion contract.
Give an external consumer (NAS) a trustworthy, always-reachable busy/idle
readout it can poll before a disruptive lifecycle action (restart,
migrate, stop, auto-update). The dashboard /api/status is the only HTTP
surface guaranteed up on a hosted agent regardless of which gateway
platforms are enabled, and it already reads gateway_state.json.
Add to /api/status (additive, non-breaking):
- active_agents — in-flight gateway-turn count (now refreshed
per-turn by the companion gateway-side commit)
- gateway_busy — running AND active_agents > 0
- gateway_drainable — running and live (a valid begin-drain target)
- restart_drain_timeout — resolved seconds, so the consumer can size its
poll deadline without out-of-band knowledge
(env HERMES_RESTART_DRAIN_TIMEOUT → config
agent.restart_drain_timeout → default)
The busy/drainable contract is defined once in gateway.status
(derive_gateway_busy / derive_gateway_drainable) and consumed by both
/api/status and /health/detailed so the two surfaces can never disagree.
Liveness keys off gateway_running (a live PID/health probe), NEVER
gateway_updated_at — a healthy idle gateway never advances that timestamp.
All derived fields degrade to safe falsy values when the gateway is down
or the status file is absent/corrupt (never a spurious "busy" that would
wedge the consumer). active_sessions (the 5-min DB recency heuristic the
SPA reads) is left exactly as-is — new signal, new fields.
Tests (behaviour contracts, not snapshots): the pure derivation contract
across every running/state/count/liveness combination; /api/status
integration for busy, idle-drainable, draining, down, stale-busy-file,
corrupt-count, and timeout surfacing; and /health/detailed parity.
In Docker the install tree (/opt/hermes) is read-only, so npm install for
the WhatsApp bridge fails with EACCES. Add resolve_whatsapp_bridge_dir() in
whatsapp_common.py: when the install dir is read-only, mirror the bridge
source into a writable HERMES_HOME location and use that. Both the
adapter and the 'hermes whatsapp' CLI resolve through the shared helper so
the install and runtime paths agree.
Fixes#49561
Salvage of PR #41284 onto current main. Relocates the last 9 inline messaging
adapters (+ satellites: telegram_network, feishu_comment/_rules/meeting_invite,
wecom_crypto, wecom_callback) from gateway/platforms/ into self-contained
bundled plugins under plugins/platforms/<x>/, discovered via the platform
registry. Strips the per-platform core touchpoints from gateway/run.py,
gateway/config.py, hermes_cli/gateway.py, hermes_cli/setup.py, and
tools/send_message_tool.py.
Carries forward the migration fixes (explicit enabled:false honored,
get_connected_platforms forces discovery, plugin is_connected via
gateway.get_env_value, logs --component gateway matches plugins.platforms.*,
matrix hidden on Windows).
Additionally ports config keys main added since the PR base: the matrix
plugin's _apply_yaml_config now also covers allowed_users,
ignore_user_patterns, process_notices, and session_scope (the inline
gateway/config.py matrix block gained these in the 1340 commits the PR sat
open; they would otherwise have been silently dropped on deletion).
`_sent_message_timestamps` (the reply-to-own-message quote cache) used a
`set` evicted with `set.pop()`, which removes an ARBITRARY element — so once
more than the cap (500) outbound timestamps are tracked, a still-recent
timestamp could be dropped while older ones survive, missing a genuine
reply-to-own-message. Convert it to an OrderedDict with FIFO (oldest-first)
eviction, mirroring the recently-hardened echo ring (#31250). This closes the
same bug class on the sibling cache.
Adds a regression test asserting oldest-first eviction + MRU promotion.
Review follow-up on the salvaged self-mention strip (#31217): the original
only stripped the bot's rendered @<number>/@<uuid> self-mention inside the
`require_mention=true` branch, so groups with require_mention=false still
leaked it into the agent text. Hoist the strip to run for every group message
(fixing the whole bug class), and collapse the doubled space a mid-sentence
removal leaves while preserving intentional newlines.
Widen the env_float() guard from #48735 across the whole bug class: a
non-numeric value (e.g. a stale .env "HERMES_API_TIMEOUT=abc" or a typo'd
port) raised an unhandled ValueError and crashed adapter/agent init.
Converts 22 genuinely-unguarded first-party int/float(os.getenv()) sites to
the canonical utils.env_int / utils.env_float helpers (the established house
pattern), instead of duplicating per-module helpers or inline try/except:
- gateway/config.py: WECOM_CALLBACK_PORT, BLUEBUBBLES_WEBHOOK_PORT
- gateway/platforms/email.py: EMAIL_IMAP/SMTP_PORT, EMAIL_POLL_INTERVAL
- gateway/platforms/feishu.py: dedup cache + text/media batch settings
- gateway/platforms/wecom.py, discord/adapter.py: text batch delays
- gateway/platforms/telegram.py: media batch delay, TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_PORT
- gateway/platforms/whatsapp.py: WHATSAPP_NPM_INSTALL_TIMEOUT
- hermes_cli/auth.py: CODEX/XAI refresh timeouts
- agent/chat_completion_helpers.py: API/stream read/stale timeouts
- run_agent.py, agent/auxiliary_client.py: API + nous timeouts
Sites already guarded by try/except or local helpers are left untouched.
The HERMES_MAX_ITERATIONS sites are already guarded on main via
_current_max_iterations(), so they are not included.
Review follow-up on the salvaged AAC + markdown changes:
- Fix an inaccurate comment claiming the STT layer has a sniff-and-remux
fallback (verified: no such fallback exists; the ffmpeg-absent path caches
raw ADTS and STT may reject it).
- Type the _markdown_to_signal wrapper as tuple[str, list[str]] to match the
shared helper instead of a bare tuple.
- Replace the hardcoded /home/pi/... test fixture with a runtime-generated
ADTS AAC sample so the remux round-trip actually runs in CI (skips only
when ffmpeg is absent) instead of always-skipping.
Android Signal delivers voice notes as raw ADTS AAC frames, which
share the `0xFF 0xFx` sync word with MPEG-1/2 Layer 3 (MP3). The
`_guess_extension` byte-signature test in gateway/platforms/signal.py
was matching both, so ADTS AAC was being misclassified as MP3 — saved
to disk with the wrong extension and rejected by every major STT API
(Groq, OpenAI) because their server-side format sniffers inspect the
actual codec, not the file extension.
Two changes:
1. Tighten the MP3 vs ADTS disambiguator. ADTS packs `ID`,
`layer`, and `protection_absent` into bits 3-0 of byte 1, where
`ID=0` and `layer=00` for AAC. Real MP3 has `ID=1` and
`layer` in {01, 10, 11}. The mask `0xF6` against target `0xF0`
cleanly separates them.
2. Remux raw ADTS AAC to MP4 container at the cache step via
`ffmpeg -c:a copy`. Single demux/remux, no re-encode, no quality
loss, sub-100ms on a Pi 5. The cached file is a normal `.m4a`
that all major STT providers accept. ffmpeg is a transitive
dependency of many other Hermes features (TTS, video skills) so
this isn't a new install requirement; the remux degrades
gracefully to a no-op if ffmpeg is missing.
The new helper `_remux_aac_to_m4a` is unit-tested with a real
Android voice note from the audio cache that originally triggered
the bug, plus synthetic ADTS frames for the byte-level
disambiguator and garbage-input graceful failure.
Closes the gap that broke transcription for any Android Signal user
sending voice messages to Hermes.
Route Signal send paths through shared markdown formatting helpers and render markdown bullets consistently as Unicode bullets. Add coverage for Signal formatting and send_message integration.
Behavior-preserving cleanups on the managed-node resolver:
- Hoist _candidate_node_command_names() out of the inner dir loop in
find_hermes_node_executable (computed once, not per directory).
- Drop redundant os.environ.copy() at the two with_hermes_node_path(
os.environ.copy()) sites \u2014 the helper already copies os.environ when
called with no argument (verified env-equivalent).
- Add reciprocal keep-in-sync comments between iter_hermes_node_dirs()
(hermes_constants.py) and hermesManagedNodePathEntries() (electron
main.cjs), which mirror the same platform-ordering rule across the
Python/Node boundary.
Sets the Telegram bot's short description (the line under its name) to
"Online" on gateway connect and "Offline" on clean disconnect, gated
behind extra.status_indicator (off by default).
Telegram bots have no presence/online dot — that's a user-account
feature the Bot API doesn't expose for bots. The short description is
the closest available surface, so this gives users a way to tell whether
the gateway is up from the bot's profile.
- New extra.status_indicator flag (+ status_online/status_offline text
overrides), read in __init__ via config.extra — no config-schema change.
- _set_status_indicator() helper: best-effort, swallows API errors so it
never blocks connect/disconnect; truncates to Telegram's 120-char cap.
- Wired Online after _mark_connected(), Offline at top of disconnect()
while the bot HTTP client is still alive.
- 9 unit tests + Telegram docs section.
Requested by @ilTrumpista, cc @Teknium.
Serve webhook inbound for multiple profiles off the one shared listener via a
URL prefix, with no second port bound.
- SessionSource gains a 'profile' field (round-trips through to_dict/from_dict;
omitted when unset so existing serialization is unchanged). It carries which
profile an inbound message was routed to.
- WebhookAdapter registers /p/{profile}/webhooks/{route_name} alongside the
existing /webhooks/{route_name}. _resolve_request_profile validates the
prefix against profiles_to_serve(): None when absent or multiplexing is off
(ignored, handled as default — no spurious 404), the profile name when valid,
_PROFILE_REJECTED (→ 404) when the profile isn't served. The resolved profile
is stamped onto the SessionSource.
- session-key namespacing and the per-turn home/credential scope now prefer
source.profile: SessionStore._resolve_profile_for_key(source),
_session_key_for_source fallback, and _resolve_profile_home_for_source all
honor it (→ the agent turn resolves that profile's config/skills/credentials
via the Phase 2 _profile_runtime_scope).
Constraint: routing inbound needs no per-profile platform credential, but the
agent still needs the routed profile's provider key — delivered by Phase 2's
secret scope. api_server (OpenAI-compatible surface) profile routing is a
focused follow-on; its source-construction path differs from webhook's.
Tests: SessionSource.profile round-trip + namespace drive; _resolve_request_
profile accept/reject/ignore matrix.
Phase 4F (F.1 + F.2 + F.3, agent side). F.4 is the operator-run live smoke
(needs a NAS deployment); recorded in the PR, not code.
F.1 — on_jobs_changed wiring:
- cron/scheduler.py: _notify_provider_jobs_changed() — resolve the active
provider, call on_jobs_changed(), swallow errors. Lives in scheduler.py (not
jobs.py) so the store stays free of provider imports (no import cycle).
- Wired at the consumer surfaces AFTER a successful mutation: the cronjob model
tool (tools/cronjob_tools.py, create/update/remove/pause/resume) — which the
`hermes cron` CLI also routes through — and the REST handlers
(gateway/platforms/api_server.py, same five). Built-in's no-op default = zero
behavior change on the default path. Sleeping-agent direct jobs.json writes
(no tool/CLI/REST) are covered by reconcile-on-wake in start().
F.2 — config: cron.chronos.{portal_url,callback_url,expected_audience,
nas_jwks_url}. All non-secret; the agent holds no scheduler creds and the
outbound provision call reuses the existing Nous token (no token key). Additive
deep-merge key, no version literal.
F.3 — docs:
- docs/chronos-managed-cron-contract.md: authoritative agent↔NAS wire contract
(the three agent-cron endpoints + inbound /api/cron/fire + the 3-hop trust
model + at-most-once/re-arm semantics). This is what the NAS-side agent builds
against.
- cron-internals.md: "Managed cron (Chronos) for scale-to-zero" section.
- cli-commands.md: cron.provider accepts chronos + the cron.chronos.* keys.
- User docs name no scheduler vendor (QStash is a NAS-internal detail).
INVARIANT re-verified: zero qstash/upstash hits across plugins/cron, gateway,
hermes_cli, tools, website/docs (the one remaining repo hit is an unrelated
Context7 MCP comment in tools/mcp_tool.py).
Tests: test_jobs_changed_notify (5) — notify calls provider hook, swallows
errors, built-in harmless, tool create/remove notify. Full cron + chronos +
webhook + config + api_server_jobs suites green (504 in the cron+chronos+webhook
run).
Phase 4E (E.1 + E.2). The inbound side of Chronos: NAS POSTs the agent when a
one-shot fires; the agent verifies a NAS-minted JWT and runs the job.
E.1 — plugins/cron/chronos/verify.py:
- verify_nas_fire_token(token, expected_audience, jwks_or_key, issuer): verifies
signature against the NAS JWKS (RS/ES family; symmetric rejected), aud == this
agent, exp/nbf, iss, and purpose == "cron_fire" (so a general agent JWT can't
be replayed against the fire endpoint). Returns claims or None; never raises.
Crypto delegated to PyJWT[crypto] (already a declared dep) — no hand-rolled
JWT, no new dependency. No key configured → refuse (never unsigned-decode a
security boundary).
- get_fire_verifier(): pluggable indirection so the DQ-4 escape hatch
(direct per-job cron-key) can swap in with no handler change.
E.2 — gateway/platforms/api_server.py:
- POST /api/cron/fire (registered only when _CRON_AVAILABLE). Authenticated by
the NAS-JWT via get_fire_verifier() — NOT API_SERVER_KEY (NAS holds no API
key; this is the only inbound that triggers remote job execution, so it gets
its own purpose-scoped check). Verifier args come from cron.chronos.* config.
401 on bad/missing/forged token. 400 on missing job_id. On success: 202 +
fire_due runs in the background (so a long agent turn never trips NAS's HTTP
timeout); the store CAS claim inside fire_due de-dupes a scheduler retry.
Tests:
- test_chronos_verify (11): REAL RS256 signing — valid→claims, wrong-aud,
missing/wrong purpose, expired, wrong-iss, tampered-signature (attacker key),
no-key-refuse, empty-token, JWKS-URL key resolution, get_fire_verifier.
- test_cron_fire_webhook (5): valid→202+fire, invalid→401+no-fire, missing
token→401, missing job_id→400, and fire path does NOT require API_SERVER_KEY.
api_server regression suites (214) green.
E.3 (NAS endpoints) is a separate cross-repo PR; the wire contract lands next
(docs/chronos-managed-cron-contract.md).
Telegram does not echo a sendRichMessage's content back in
reply_to_message (.text/.caption empty, .api_kwargs None), so replies
to rich sends (briefings, the gateway's own rich finals) arrived with
no quotable text and the [Replying to: ...] injection was skipped.
Remember message_id -> text at send time in a best-effort JSON index
(gateway/rich_sent_store.py), and recover it on inbound when text and
caption are both empty. Best-effort and no-throw throughout: any
failure degrades to prior behavior and never breaks a send or message.
Salvaged from #47375 by @x1erra. Dropped the cross-platform run.py
reply-prefix rewrite (out of scope; bloated every reply on every
platform) and scrubbed a docstring reference to an out-of-repo script.
Kept the inbound reply_to logging enrichment used to verify the fix.
PROBLEM: Mattermost threads can become invalid or enormous, exposing two failure modes: internal scratch/reasoning/commentary displays could leak into persistent Mattermost threads via global display toggles, while rejected threaded user-visible replies could disappear unless every failed send fell back flat. A broad flat fallback would pollute channels with tool/status/progress noise.
SOLUTION: Require explicit Mattermost platform opt-in for scratch displays, keep using the existing notify=True metadata marker for user-visible final text/media/file replies, and allow the Mattermost plugin adapter to flat-fallback only notify-worthy sends whose threaded POST failure looks like a broken root/thread. Keep tool/status/progress and other non-notify sends thread-strict. Add regression tests for display opt-in, notify-only broken-thread fallback, generic API failure suppression, and stream notify metadata.
Verification: tests/gateway/test_mattermost.py tests/gateway/test_stream_consumer.py tests/gateway/test_stream_consumer_thread_routing.py tests/gateway/test_stream_consumer_fresh_final.py tests/gateway/test_stream_consumer_draft.py; tests/gateway/test_session_api.py tests/gateway/test_status_command.py tests/gateway/test_resume_command.py tests/hermes_cli/test_commands.py; py_compile touched gateway files; git diff --check.
Session: Mattermost thread 6qg8e9dd1pd9pkhi74xyaa1mry, 2026-06-01.
`BasePlatformAdapter.send_multiple_images` passes `metadata=metadata` to
`send_image` / `send_image_file` / `send_animation` on every send. The
WhatsApp and email `send_image` overrides stopped their signature at
`reply_to`, so any image delivered as a URL (the common case — image-gen
backends return URLs) raised:
TypeError: send_image() got an unexpected keyword argument "metadata"
and the image silently failed to send. Their sibling overrides
(`send_image_file` / `send_video` / `send_voice` / `send_document`)
already absorb it via **kwargs, which is why only plain image-URL sends
broke.
- whatsapp/email `send_image`: accept `metadata` (matches the base
signature); WhatsApp forwards it to the super() text fallback.
- Add `tests/gateway/test_media_metadata_contract.py`: asserts WhatsApp +
email accept it, plus a best-effort sweep over every adapter so the next
slip fails at test time instead of in production.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Streamed Telegram replies that finalize through editMessageText were
converted to MarkdownV2, which has no table syntax and rewrites pipe
tables into bullet lists — users saw a table while streaming that
collapsed to a list at the last moment.
Finalize now edits the existing preview IN PLACE via Bot API 10.1's
editMessageText rich_message parameter when the content has constructs
the legacy path degrades (tables, task lists, <details>, block math).
No fresh send + delete, so no duplicate-preview flicker — the reason
#46206 reverted the fresh-final re-send path. prefers_fresh_final_streaming
stays False; the in-place edit replaces it.
- _needs_rich_rendering(): rich reserved for table/task-list/details/math
(adapted from #45995, @YonganZhang); plain replies stay on MarkdownV2.
- _try_edit_rich(): editMessageText + rich_message via do_api_request,
mirroring _try_send_rich's fallback/latch/transient contract.
- edit_message finalize tries rich in place before the 4,096 overflow
pre-flight (rich cap is 32,768), falling back to legacy on rejection.
- rich_messages default flipped back to True (DEFAULT_CONFIG + adapter).
- docs (en + zh-Hans) + cli-config example updated to default-on.
Closes the root cause behind #45911 / #46009.
Port 465 expects implicit TLS (SMTP_SSL) from the first byte. The email
adapter always used SMTP() + starttls(), which is correct for port 587
but hangs/fails on port 465 providers (e.g., Swiss ISPs).
Additionally, when the SMTP host has AAAA DNS records but IPv6 is
unreachable, socket.create_connection() tries IPv6 first and hangs
until timeout. Add an IPv4 fallback via AF_INET socket.
Extract _connect_smtp() helper to consolidate the 4 duplicate SMTP
connection sites into a single method with correct protocol selection
and IPv6 fallback logic.
Carry forward focused follow-ups from PR #45741: treat PTB's raw Bot API 10.1 response shapes safely, recognize real missing-endpoint errors, preserve link preview settings on rich sends, and lock the rich limit to Telegram's character-based cap.
Own-policy adapters (WhatsApp, WeCom, Weixin, QQBot, Yuanbao) default dm_policy/group_policy to "open", which forwards every sender. The gateway's adapter-trust shortcut in _is_user_authorized blanket-trusted those platforms when no env allowlist was set, so an operator who enabled one with only credentials authorized the entire external network -- the fail-open SECURITY.md section 2.6 forbids ("an allowlist is required for every enabled network-exposed adapter").
Trust the adapter only when its effective policy for the chat type is an actual "allowlist" restriction (the case #34515 was protecting). "open"/"pairing"/anything else falls through to default-deny, where {PLATFORM}_ALLOW_ALL_USERS / GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS and the pairing flow remain the explicit opt-ins.
Old Office formats (.xls, .doc, .ppt) were missing from the
SUPPORTED_DOCUMENT_TYPES dict in gateway/platforms/base.py while their
newer counterparts (.xlsx, .docx, .pptx) were included.
Sending an .xls file via Telegram triggers 'Unsupported document type'
and the file is silently dropped instead of being cached and forwarded
to the agent.
Add the three legacy MIME types so these files are handled the same way
as their modern equivalents.
Remove the rich_messages config toggle entirely so Telegram replies always try the Bot API 10.1 rich-message path first, with the existing MarkdownV2 fallback/latch behavior for unsupported endpoints and per-message failures.
Restore the Telegram platform hint to encourage rich Markdown tables/task lists/math now that the rich path is the default, and remove the config/docs surface for the old toggle.
- Use reply_parameters per the sendRichMessage spec instead of the
undocumented reply_to_message_id scalar (silently ignored -> reply
anchor quietly dropped).
- Latch rich sends off after an endpoint-capability failure (old PTB /
server without sendRichMessage) so every later reply doesn't pay a
doomed extra roundtrip; per-message BadRequests do NOT latch.
- Default rich_messages to OFF (opt-in) while the day-old Bot API 10.1
endpoint is validated live; revert the prompt-hint table guidance
until the default flips on.
- Tests: reply_parameters shape, send-latch behavior, BadRequest
non-latch; rich tests opt in explicitly via extra.
Introduce opportunistic support for Telegram Bot API 10.1 rich messages by sending raw agent Markdown via sendRichMessage and streaming previews via sendRichMessageDraft. Implements a rich-path fast‑path in gateway/platforms/telegram.py (RICH_MESSAGE_MAX_BYTES=32768, feature gate platforms.telegram.extra.rich_messages, bot capability checks, routing/thread handling, and conservative fallback rules: permanent/capability errors fall back to the legacy MarkdownV2 path, transient/network errors are surfaced without legacy-resend). Also add a latch for draft capability failures (_rich_draft_disabled) and preserve legacy chunking and draft behavior when needed. Update agent prompt hints (telegram encourages rich Markdown/tables), add CLI config example option, update English and Chinese docs to describe rich messages and fallbacks, and add/adjust tests for rich send and draft behavior.
Email cached document attachments and placed them in media_urls, but
msg_type only flipped on image attachments — documents stayed TEXT and
run.py's document-context injection (gated on MessageType.DOCUMENT)
silently dropped them. Same bug class as Signal #12845. DOCUMENT wins
over PHOTO for mixed attachments since image handling keys off per-path
mime types while document injection gates strictly on message_type.
Widen the salvaged #12851 fix to match the established classification
pattern (WhatsApp/Slack/BlueBubbles/Mattermost): video/* -> VIDEO, and
any remaining MIME type falls through to DOCUMENT instead of TEXT, so
exotic types still trigger run.py's document-context injection.
Register no-op Slack event handlers for inbound reaction_added and reaction_removed events so Slack Bolt does not log unhandled-request warnings for events Hermes does not consume.
The previous implementation captured loop vars via default arguments::
async def _wrapped(ack, body, action, _cb=_cb, _plugin_name=_plugin_name):
slack_bolt's ``kwargs_injection`` introspects each listener's signature
via ``inspect.signature`` and passes ``None`` for any parameter name it
doesn't recognise (see ``slack_bolt/kwargs_injection/async_utils.py``
``build_async_required_kwargs``). That clobbered ``_cb`` to ``None`` at
dispatch time, so the wrapped plugin handler became ``NoneType`` —
``await _cb(...)`` then raised ``'NoneType' object is not callable`` and
no plugin action handler ever fired.
Replace the default-arg trick with a small closure factory so the
wrapper's public signature is exactly ``(ack, body, action)``. Add a
regression test that introspects the wrapped function's signature.
Found via real Slack click on a Block Kit button registered through
``ctx.register_slack_action_handler`` — gateway log showed
``[Slack] Plugin 'None' action handler raised: 'NoneType' object is
not callable`` despite the registration log line confirming the
handler was wired.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plugins that post Block Kit messages with interactive elements (buttons,
overflow menus, datepickers, etc.) had no documented way to receive the
resulting click events. The plugin API exposed register_tool, register_hook,
register_command, register_platform, and register_context_engine, but
nothing for slack_bolt action handlers. The only workaround was to
monkey-patch SlackAdapter.connect from inside register(), which is
fragile and breaks on every Hermes update.
This change adds:
* PluginContext.register_slack_action_handler(action_id, callback) —
validates inputs and queues the handler on the PluginManager.
action_id accepts whatever slack_bolt.App.action() accepts (literal
string, compiled re.Pattern, or constraint dict).
* PluginManager.get_slack_action_handlers() — accessor used by the
Slack adapter at connect time.
* SlackAdapter.connect — after wiring its built-in approval and
slash-confirm buttons, iterates the plugin-registered handlers
and registers each via self._app.action(matcher)(callback). Each
callback is wrapped defensively so a misbehaving plugin cannot
crash slack_bolt's dispatch loop, with a best-effort ack on
exception so Slack stops retrying the click.
* Defensive fallback when the plugin layer is unhealthy: a
RuntimeError from get_plugin_manager() is logged and swallowed
rather than blocking the gateway from starting.
* Test coverage in tests/gateway/test_slack_plugin_action_handlers.py
for input validation, multi-plugin registration, the connect-time
wiring, defensive exception handling, and the plugin-loader-
failure fallback path.
* Documentation in website/docs/guides/build-a-hermes-plugin.md
describing the new API alongside the existing register_command /
dispatch_tool documentation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- nous_subscription: gate the STT managed-default flip on openai-audio
entitlement and skip when a local backend (faster-whisper or custom
command) works; new _local_stt_backend_available() helper + tests
- whatsapp_cloud: WHATSAPP_CLOUD_{DM_POLICY,ALLOW_FROM,GROUP_POLICY,
GROUP_ALLOW_FROM} env overrides so both adapters can run in parallel;
normalize allowlist entries (JID/punctuation) to bare wa_id
- whatsapp_cloud: wrap per-message event build in try/except (dedup-marked
wamids would be silently dropped on Meta's batch retry otherwise)
- whatsapp_cloud: validate media_id before URL/filename interpolation,
delete transient .ogg after voice upload, FIFO-cap interactive-button
state dicts and per-chat wamid cache
- whatsapp_common: '# **Title**' headers no longer double-wrap asterisks
- setup wizard: read access token / app secret via getpass on TTYs
- docs: new WHATSAPP_CLOUD_* gating env vars
* fix(gateway): gate oversized Telegram voice/audio before download
Adds a pre-download size check to the Telegram voice and audio inbound
paths. Files that exceed _max_doc_bytes (default 20 MB) are rejected
before get_file() is called, preventing silent OOM-style stalls on large
uploads. A human-readable note is appended to the event text so the
model can explain the limit to the user.
Also extends 403 entitlement detection in recover_with_credential_pool
to cover two additional cases: 'oauth authentication is currently not
allowed for this organization' and Anthropic anthropic_messages-mode 403s,
both of which should be treated as entitlement failures rather than
transient errors.
Tests: 7 new cases in test_telegram_voice_v0_regressions.py covering
the size gate (accept, reject, note text) and the STT-failure notice path.
Salvaged from #40487 (cryptopafi) — cherry-picked the Telegram voice
policy and 403 entitlement fixes; LiveKit/Discord/uv.lock workstreams
left for separate PRs.
* test(gateway): drop orphaned voice tests not backed by this PR
The cherry-picked test file from #40487 included 3 tests for STT-failure
notice and voice-mode (_handle_voice_command 'on' -> voice_only) behavior
that this PR intentionally does NOT salvage (those belong to the LiveKit/
voice-policy workstreams left in #40487). They fail on both this branch
and clean main because the feature code isn't present.
Keep only the 2 tests backed by code actually in this PR:
- test_telegram_audio_size_gate_rejects_oversized_media_before_download
(covers the _telegram_media_size_allowed guard this PR adds)
- test_voice_tts_is_explicit_audio_reply_opt_in (matches current main)
Removed now-unused imports (MessageEvent, MessageType, AsyncMock).
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